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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
TRANSNATIONAL POLICY ARTICULATIONS: INDIA, AGRICULTURE, AND THE WTO 
 
Agriculture remains one of the most contentious issues in the ongoing negotiations of the World 
Trade Organization, with serious implications for food security and the livelihood of farmers in 
the developing world.  This dissertation examines the formation of agricultural trade policy and 
the politics and arguments surrounding it within the context of India’s position in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).  The research has two components.  A set of archival documents 
relating to India’s participation in a WTO institution called the Trade Policy Review (TPR) was 
analyzed.  In addition, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with a number of Indian 
experts and officials involved in agricultural trade policy.  This project suggests a number of 
tentative conclusions with implications for political geography and particularly for the literature 
on policy transfer, neoliberalism, and Neo-Gramscian models of international relations.  First, it 
finds that the WTO Secretariat plays a key role in promoting neoliberal ideas within the TPR 
institution and that the forms of argumentation used here can help to explain the resiliency of 
neoliberalism in the face of policy failure.  Second, it shows that the Indian government has not 
accepted neoliberal policy models wholesale, but has exercised autonomy, selectivity, and 
adaptation in its liberalization programs.  Third, it demonstrates that neoliberal ideas do not 
always favor the positions of developed countries.  Finally, it supports the narrative of increasing 
developing country bargaining in the WTO and shows that the Indian representatives bolster 
their arguments by articulating them as being in the interest of the developing world in general. 
KEY WORDS: WTO, India, policy transfer, neoliberalism, hegemony  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 The subject of agriculture remains perhaps the most contentious issue within ongoing 
negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The outcome of these negotiations has 
tremendous implications for food security and farmer livelihood in the developing world.  It is 
one of a number of issues in the WTO that tends to line up developing countries against 
developed countries (with several exceptions, notably in relation to the Cairns Group, which will 
be explained in chapter 2).  Therefore, the progress of these negotiations can tell us something 
about the relative power of developing countries within the WTO.  India is a key player is WTO 
agricultural trade negotiations and for this reason India was chosen as the case study through 
which these issues will be examined in this dissertation. 
 This project of the present work is to examine agricultural trade policy formation in 
conditions where a country adheres to a set of international laws applicable in multiple 
countries, as is the case with the WTO agreements.  It will examine how WTO law connects or 
articulates with agricultural policy in India.  Although the WTO can be seen as a mechanism to 
standardize economic policies on a global scale among its members, it is flexible enough to allow 
India substantial discretion in designing its own unique trade liberalization program.  
 The objects of analysis in this project include policy outcomes in the WTO and India; the 
strategies that the Indian state deploys in the WTO system; the actors and discourses which 
contribute to these strategies; and the ways in which all these objects connect to one another.  
These connections will be looked at in three overlapping discursive-institutional political arenas: 
the WTO, the Indian state, and the community of policy-expertise in India.  The WTO and 
agricultural trade issues are extensively discussed and debated in the expert community and 
much of the knowledge that informs policy choices is produced here.  Actual policy plans and 
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strategies are further developed within the narrower corridors of state power.  And finally these 
strategies are deployed in WTO forums themselves. 
 This dissertation is based on a research program arranged around five research 
questions related to the case study: 
1) What are the positions and strategies of the Indian government in the WTO system, especially 
with regard to agriculture? 
2) How has the Indian government presented WTO membership and its consequence to the 
public?  
3) How is the WTO and its relation to Indian agriculture understood and represented among the 
policy expert community in India?  
4) What, if any, are understood (by officials and experts) to be the specific effects of the WTO 
agreements on Indian agriculture?  
5) What do the first four questions suggest about the configuration of hegemonic knowledge 
production across transnational, state, and expert spaces? 
 Additionally, the research was guided by three more abstract, theoretical questions.  
These were aimed not at producing cut or dry answers, but rather to contribute ideas to the 
bodies of theory used to frame the project: 
6) How does hegemony work within the WTO? 
7) How can we conceptualize the articulations of sovereignty between an individual sovereign 
state and an institution of transnational governance? 
8) Can questions six and seven tell us why developing countries remain in the WTO? 
 The research undertaken here consists of two components, each with their own 
methodological approaches.  A set of documents was selected from the publicly available WTO 
archive.  This archive is quite extensive and contained many subsets of documents of interest to 
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the questions asked in this project.  The set of documents concerning India’s periodic Trade 
Policy Reviews was in the end chosen, because of their specific focus on India and their inclusion 
of a wide variety of speakers including representatives of India, representatives of other WTO 
members, and members of the WTO Secretariat.  As will be explained in chapter 5, this set of 
documents is particular useful in revealing the normative orientation of the supposedly-neutral 
Secretariat. 
 The second component was a series of semi-structured interviews with officials and 
experts in India whom were concerned with different aspects of agricultural trade policy and 
WTO affairs.  These 26 interviews were conducted over two intervals of fieldwork undertaken in 
New Delhi from 2008 and 2010.  Questions focused on the background and institutional roles of 
the subjects; the flows of ideas, authority, and money through the institutions (including 
government bureaucracies, think tanks, and other bodies); and the ways in which they 
constructed objects, actors, relationships, processes, and events related to the subject matter.  
This component allowed me to map out relevant institutions involved in policy formation and 
the relationships between them.  It also helped me to understand how key gate-keepers in 
policy circuits saw the objects of their professional concern. 
 
The WTO and Agriculture as Objects of Study 
 The World Trade Organization provides an excellent mechanism to study hegemonic 
power relations, state theory, and economic development.  As a decision-making body, the 
outcomes of its negotiations cannot be understood as the results of formal rules alone, but must 
take into account the bargaining powers, negotiating capacity, informal alliances, dominant 
discursive supports, and other informal mechanisms that are at work here.  This makes the WTO 
an ideal arena for the study of hegemonic politics.  It is also quite interesting from the point of 
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view of state theory.  As a governance body, it shares many aspects with the traditional 
territorial state without possessing territory (or a military), which provides an excellent 
opportunity to study government/ sovereignty in a case where some of classic elements are 
present, but not others.  And finally, in regard to economic thought, the WTO is a seat of power 
for promoting and diffusing dominant development models, while also serving a forum to 
contest these. 
 Agriculture is, of course, of fundamental political and economic interest in the first place 
simply because everybody eats, and the distribution of adequate food is among the most basic 
developmental indicators.  But it is of specific interest to ongoing WTO negotiations for at least 
two major reasons.  One, it is an issue which tends to divide developed and developing countries 
(with many exceptions and qualifications).  Two, it has constituted the main sticking point of 
WTO negotiations for at least the last decade.  Arguably, the controversy over agriculture (and 
especially over agricultural subsidies) is what has prevented the successful conclusion of a 
second round of negotiations. 
 
India as the Case Study 
 India, as a predominantly agrarian country, has major interests in the outcome of WTO 
agriculture negotiations.  On one hand, India has enormous potential as an agricultural exporter 
(much of it so far unrealized, due in part to subsidized competition from developed economies).  
On the other, India relies on its domestic food production to feed its vast population, much of 
which lives uncomfortably close to subsistence level.  Consequently, Indian policy-makers tend 
to be wary of any reforms (such as lowering tariffs or de-controlling grain prices) that could 
destabilize its food system.  There is vigorous debate within India over how trade liberalization is 
affecting rural poverty. 
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In choosing India as my case study, I am making a strategic choice to focus on a ‘powerful’ 
developing country rather than a ‘typical’ one.  India shares many broad characteristics and 
interests with other countries generally classified as developing, including a large population 
living at or near subsistence levels and a large portion of its workforce engaged in agriculture.  
India, however, is in a better bargaining position than most other developing countries in the 
WTO.  Despite its relative poverty, the sheer size of its economy makes it more difficult to 
marginalize, ignore, or buy-off in the negotiating process.  India has also assumed a leadership 
role among developing states in the WTO, especially in its capacity as a leader in the G20 
(‘Group of 20’) faction and its role as one of the three developing countries in the ‘Five 
Interested Parties’ (FIPs) negotiations.   Therefore, its counter-hegemonic struggles within the 
WTO are more likely to bear fruit than those of other developing states.   
The above must be qualified by stating that the advance of India’s interests within the WTO 
does not necessarily translate into the advance of developing states generally (although it 
might).  India is in many respects an atypical developing state, and its strategic interests and 
options do not necessarily correspond with the rest of the developing world.  Further, the 
interests of elites within India with regard to the WTO do not necessarily correspond to those of 
most of India’s population. 
 
Operationalizing the Research 
 The analysis for this project focused on two main sets of statements, one archival and 
one produced dynamically through 26 interviews undertaken during the course of fieldwork in 
Delhi.  The archival component took the form of documents associated with a WTO procedure 
known as a ‘Trade Policy Review.’  India was subject to this review five times: in 1993 (then as 
part of GATT, preceding the formal inauguration of the WTO), 1998, 2002, 2007, and 2011.  The 
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first and last reviews – 1993 and 2011 – were excluded from analysis, as falling outside of the 
historical period of interest.  The interviews were conducted during two visits to India in 2008- 
2010.  They were semi-structured and open-ended and the subjects were drawn from officials 
and experts concerned with India’s agricultural trade policy. 
 The archival material associated with the three Trade Policy Reviews has been most 
been most useful in regard to question one.  The interviews, which provided extensive material 
on agro-trade policy arguments within India, and their institutional context, substantially 
addressed questions three, four, five, and six.  
 As noted, the ‘theoretical’ questions 6 through 9 cannot be answered in a decisive 
fashion, but the research conducted does shed some light on the issues addressed and suggests 
refinements and extensions for existing theory. 
 
Contributions to the Literature 
 This project is meant primarily as an empirical contribution to the field of political 
geography.  Some of it, particularly the observations on neoliberalism, may be of interest to 
economic geographers.  It also touches upon some literatures which are of interest to fields 
outside of geography, particularly political science and social theory.  These include the 
literatures on policy transfer, neoliberalism, Neo-Gramscian international relations theory, 
international institutions, and state theory. 
 The research undertaken here answers Marsh and Sherman’s (2009) call for more 
research focused on policy transfer in the developing world and Stone’s (2004) call for more 
focus international institutions and non-state actors.  It also is attentive, especially in the 
interview component, to role of specific institutional sites and individuals play in policy transfer, 
in accordance with the approach to policy transfer (or policy mobilities) among geographers 
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(Larner and Laurie 2010; Prince 2012a).  This research finds that policy ideas spread into (and 
out of) India not only through formal mechanisms like WTO obligations and negotiations, but 
also via think tanks and research institutions with transnational connections.  It also finds that 
policy transfers in the Indian context often involve selectivity, hybridization, and mutation, as is 
predicted by much of the geography literature on policy mobilities (Peck and Theodore 2001, 
2010; McCann and Ward 2012; Prince 2012b). 
 Neoliberalism is a term used to describe economic policy which seeks to maximize the 
regulatory role of competitive markets and minimize the regulatory role of government in the 
economy.  This entails promoting policies to lower trade barriers, deregulate business and 
finance, privatize government-run enterprises, decontrol prices, and reduces subsidies; that is, 
many of the policies pushed in the WTO and elaborated in the case of this research in the 
Secretariat Reports of the Trade Policy Review processes.  Neoliberalism is, however, a much 
contested term, partly for the reason that its proponents often do not self-identify with it (Peck, 
Brenner, and Theordore 2009).  It is however very useful to describe a general attitude of free-
market zealotry which was particularly prominent and pervasive globally during the period 
examined in this project (about 1995- 2010).  Peck, Brenner, and Theodore 2010a, 2012) note 
that even after taking somewhat of an intellectual beating in with the Great Recession in 2008, 
neoliberalism remains strong and influential. 
 The term neoliberalism is never used in the three Trade Policy Reviews studied in this 
project, but it provides a good description of the policy orthodoxies promoted by the 
Secretariat. It is also rarely mentioned by the subjects of the semi-structured interviews, where 
India’s market-oriented reforms are generally described as merely liberal.  And I agree with this 
characterization; India’s reforms do not approach the extreme laissez faire character called for 
in neoliberal theory.  Still the term neoliberalism can be used in the context to describe a 
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globally pervasive influence which influences Indian policy to go in a ‘neoliberal direction,’ 
including through the mechanisms of the WTO. 
 The original WTO agreement as it emerged from the Uruguay Round of negotiations 
(1986- 1994) is widely characterized as being biased toward developed economies and against 
developing economies (Steinberg 2002; Kwa and Jawara 2004; Lee & Smith 2008; Sharma 2009), 
despite the numerical superiority of developing countries in the WTO.  This can be explained 
partly by the simple material bargaining capacity of wealthier countries compared to poorer 
countries, but it seems likely that other aspects such as the structure of the WTO as an 
institution (Kwa and Jawara 2004; Chimni 2006; Steinberg 2002; Laidi 2008; Narlikar 2006) and 
the dominance of neoliberal ideas at the time (Chang 2003; Wade 2003) also played significant 
roles in disadvantaging developing countries.  This idea of material capabilities, ideas, and 
institutions interacting to create hegemonic power structures is the basis for the school of 
thought in international relations called Neo-Gramscian, developed by Robert Cox (1981, 1983) 
and his followers (Gale 1998; Bieler and Morton 2004) as an alternative to state-centric and 
ahistoric models of international relations. 
 This Neo-Gramscian framework can help explain the disadvantage that developing 
countries face in the WTO, but it can also help to explain the more recent assertiveness of 
developing countries in the Doha Round (1991- present) of WTO negotiations.  Cox’s model also 
allows for institutions created to serve the hegemonic purposes of great powers to take on 
“their own life” (Cox 1981; Gale 1998) and possibly even become an instrument of counter-
hegemony. 
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Outline of the Dissertation 
 The dissertation breaks down into two major parts.  The four chapters introduce the 
project, describe the historical context and body literature in which it is situated, and describes 
the methods used.  The last five chapters then describe the empirical findings and substantive 
contributions which the project makes. 
 This introduction has provided an overview of the project.  The problems that it 
addresses have been described, the research questions have been set up, and a brief overview 
of the theoretical framework and methodology has been provided.  Chapter 2 provides a 
historical overview of the World Trade Organization and summarizes the political-economic 
context for Indian agricultural trade policy.  Chapter 3 explores the some bodies of literature 
relevant to the project and connects them to the subsequent research.  These include the 
literatures on policy transfer, neoliberalism, Neo-Gramscian interpretations of international 
institutions, and state theory.  This portion of the dissertation concludes with chapter 4, 
describing the methods used, including discourse analysis and semi-structured interviews. 
 The empirical portion of the dissertation can be further subdivided into three 
components.  Chapters 5- 7 examine the Trade Policy Review documents.  Chapter 5 begins by 
giving an overview of the TPR mechanism, with attention to the procedures and the roles of the 
various speakers.  The second half of the chapter provides a statistical description of the volume 
of statements contributed by various speakers (using wordcount as a proxy).  Chapter 6 
examines the content of the statements in these documents and thematic patterns that tie 
them together.  This is by the longest chapter and it describes a number of discursive 
regularities and strategies emerging from the documents, including the Secretariat’s promotion 
of neoliberal orthodoxy, the Indian government’s subversion of some these orthodoxies, and 
the latter’s rhetorical strategy to position itself as speaking for the developing world.  Chapter 7 
9 
 
continues along these lines, but focuses specifically on statements concerning agriculture.  In 
this analysis, contending arguments for agricultural exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism 
emerge, as well as a distinction between the types of agro-exceptionalism tending to be 
developing and developed countries respectively. 
 Chapter 8 is an analysis of the semi-structured interviews undertaken with officials and 
experts in India.  These interview subjects were drawn from public and private institutions, as 
well as those in between.  These included officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry; research institutions and agencies dependent on the 
government for funding; private think tanks; and other institutions, affiliated with international 
organizations and business lobbies.  A high degree of interaction was found among these 
institutions, including a high degree of personnel interchange among them (except in the case of 
civil servants) and many had international connections.  The research in this chapter supports 
the view that liberalization in India was propelled more by an indigenous intellectual movement 
than by top-down coercive imposition from international institutions like the WTO (Ahmed 
2009). 
 The conclusion, chapter 9, reiterates the research questions and explains how the 
research has answered them.  It also outlines some of the major contributions this project 
makes to the bodies of literature described in chapter 3.  It ends with a brief discussion of some 
possible outcomes of the current Doha Round of negotiations and what these might mean in the 
context of the hegemonic sketches proposed earlier in the chapter. 
 
 
 
Copyright © Christopher Laurence Blackden 2014 
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Chapter 2: Background 
 
Explaining the WTO 
 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a multi-state body formed to administer a set of 
interlocking international agreements, which are primarily concerned with trade regulation.  It 
also serves as a forum to negotiate interpretations of and alterations to these agreements.  It 
officially came into existence on January 1, 1995, after several years of negotiations.  It is 
explicitly committed to lowering trade barriers and to economic liberalization in general.  It 
currently has 159 members.  WTO agreements cover a vast sweep of economic and political 
policy realms, not merely trade policy, but other aspects of policy (such as environmental 
regulations) that can be argued to impact trade.  Member states are obligated to alter their 
policies and domestic laws to accord with the agreements. 
 The WTO was formed at the height of what is often called the “Washington Consensus” 
– a period when international economic expertise was dominated by the conviction that 
markets functioned better with less government regulation and that sought to reform 
economies in this direction.  The Washington Consensus has not ended, although it has since 
been weakened, primarily by the Southeast Asian Meltdown of the late 1990s and more 
recently by the global financial crisis starting in 2007.  The general reforms pursued by this 
movement included lowering trade barriers, privatizing state-run enterprises and services, and 
deregulating business – a set of policy prescriptions also known as Neoliberalism.  Somewhat 
paradoxically for an anti-state orientation, this policy reform movement was promoted and 
enforced primarily by top-down multilateral bodies like the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund – global institutions which in effect ‘regulated deregulation.’  The World Trade 
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Organization arose out of this orthodoxy and embodied it, especially with regard to the agenda 
of lowering trade barriers. 
 In 1995, the WTO already included most of the world’s recognized sovereign states and 
since then has expanded to encompass most of the rest, notably China in 2001 and Russia in 
2012.  Only about 35 countries are not members of the WTO and most of these have observer 
status.  Most members are sovereign states, but there are exceptions.  Although each of the 28 
members of the European Union is also a member of the WTO, the EU itself is considered a 
distinct member.  For negotiating purposes, all EU countries are represented by a single 
delegation.  Hong Kong and Macao are parts of China and yet both have separate membership 
status in the WTO (both in fact were members of the WTO before China joined and before 
either of them were part of China)1.  Taiwan is also recognized as a member under the name 
“Chinese Taipei,” despite its complicated de jure status as part of China.  That being said, the 
sovereign state is the norm for WTO membership. 
 Most of the constituent agreements of the WTO took their present form during a series 
of multilateral negotiations known as the Uruguay Round, taking place from 1986- 1994.  These 
built upon and incorporated an older set of international agreements known as GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), dating from 1947.  The Uruguay Round agreements regulate a 
vast sweep of international economic policy, including tariff levels, the use of non-tariff trade 
barriers, subsidies, copyright law, trade in services, and foreign investment.  The foundational 
WTO agreements also included provisions for their own alteration and augmentation in 
expected future negotiations.  Thus far, few changes have been made to the original agreement 
other than time-dependent clauses from the Uruguay Round kicking in (such as the expiration of 
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 2005). 
1 Hong Kong reverted to Chinese control in 1997; Macau did so in 1999.   
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 The WTO was more comprehensive than GATT, extending trade rules to new areas like 
services and intellectual property rights.  Agriculture also came under treaty regulation, 
although it was subject to a much less ambitious liberalization than other sectors.  Both 
agriculture and textiles were deemed exceptional enough to each merit a separate agreements, 
a point to which we shall return.  In addition, the WTO included a far more robust system of 
surveillance and enforcement than GATT, including regular trade reviews of its members, an 
institutionalized mechanism to hear complaints and settle disputes, and a system for authorizing 
retaliatory trade sanctions in the event of non-compliance. 
 The structure of the WTO can be thought of as analogous to a ‘three branches of 
government’ model.  The Ministerial Meeting system is the ‘legislature’ where alterations and 
additions to the agreements are negotiated.  The permanent member missions in Geneva 
constitute the WTO General Council, a sort of executive branch which is headed by the Director-
General of the WTO and handles day-to-day administrative matters.  And finally, the WTO 
version of a judiciary is its Dispute Settlement Mechanism, which includes a Dispute Settlement 
Body (really, just the General Council meeting under a different name) and a standing panel of 
seven experts in international trade law called the Appellate Body. 
 The Uruguay Round was not meant to be the end state of the WTO.  Rather it was seen 
as a platform which would be expanded upon in future comprehensive negotiations and 
agreements.  For this reason, the WTO holds what is called a Ministerial Meeting every two 
years or so, always in a different city.  It is attended by member delegations, usually led by a 
member government’s minister of trade or equivalent.  It is here that major decisions towards 
new agreements are taken.  Early optimism that this institution would soon replace the Uruguay 
Round agreements with something even more comprehensive went unfulfilled.  Most 
Ministerials do end up producing token agreements, but so far these have been agreements 
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mainly about the terms of future negotiations – what is on the table, what metrics and formulas 
will be used, etc. – rather than specific binding laws.  A new agreement requires unanimous 
consent of all members and negotiations here are often contentious.  Two of the Ministerials, 
Seattle in 1999 and Cancun in 2003, broke down without even signing a token declaration.  At 
present, the body of law set up during the Uruguay Round remains mostly unaltered. 
 In between Ministerials, the General Council and the Secretariat (the bureaucratic staff 
of the WTO), carry out routine functions of the WTO.  These include undertaking Trade Policy 
Reviews and settling disputes among members.  The Trade Policy Review is an institution which 
will be examined in detail in chapters 5- 7.  Here the General Council meets as the Trade Policy 
Review Body and critiques the economic policies of one member government.  Each member is 
required to submit to such a review periodically, the frequency varying depending on the size of 
its economy and its share of world trade (WTO 2013a). 
 The General Council also meets as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to decide the 
outcome of trade disputes among members.  Under the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, one or 
more members can file suit against one or more other members if the former believe that the 
latter have somehow violated their WTO obligations, for instance if their tariffs on some product 
exceed the limitations agreed to in the Uruguay Round.  Three experts are then chosen from the 
Appellate Body to form a panel to evaluate the case.  The panel issues a recommendation and 
then the DSB meets to accept or reject the recommendations.  If the defending member is 
found to be in violation, they are required to render compensation and alter their practices.  If 
they fail to do so, then the members which brought the suit are authorized to impose limited 
trade sanctions on the offending member.   The Appellate Body consists of professional 
functionaries rather than representatives of members.  Those serving upon it are barred from 
holding any concurrent official positions in their home country.  
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 The WTO’s permanent bureaucracy in Geneva, called the Secretariat occupies a key 
position in the institutional structure of the WTO.  While it has no decision-making power, it is 
responsible for planning meeting logistics, for producing and circulating documents, and 
dispensing technical advice.  At present it includes 629 staff, mostly economists and lawyers and 
mostly from Europe, the United States, and Canada.  It has a longer history than the WTO itself, 
being ‘inherited’ from GATT.  Like the Appellate body, the Secretariat is in theory absolutely 
neutral, serving only to facilitate the conditions for the member representatives to negotiate 
and make decisions.  One of its roles is to undertake and write up a report critiquing the 
economic policy of any country undergoing a Trade Policy Review.  We will examine some of 
these reports in detail in the chapters on Trade Policy Reviews. 
  
Agriculture in the Uruguay Round 
 Agricultural trade occupies a somewhat exceptional position within the sweep of WTO 
agreements.  The fact that agriculture required a separate agreement is testimony to the special 
status with which it is regarded.   
 Within the WTO body of law, the URAA – the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(sometimes also abbreviated as AoA, “Agreement on Agriculture”) – remains the basic 
framework for regulating agricultural trade.  It came into effect at the inception of the WTO in 
1995, and has remained substantially unchanged since then, except for the expiration of the so-
called ‘Peace Clause’ in article 13.  This is not to say that it has not been differentially 
interpreted; the victory of Brazil in 2004 in its suit against the United States over cotton 
subsidies represented a more rigid interpretation of the URAA than had been the case in the 
past.  The URAA was written with the intention that it would be temporary; article 20 dictated 
that it should be renegotiated in the next round of talks.  However, the original schedule for the 
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renegotiations was never met and most of the negotiations in the meantime have merely been 
over the terms of future negotiations.  Although the URAA was the only agreement to concern 
itself exclusively with agriculture, other Uruguay Round agreements – notably the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures – had significant implications for agricultural trade. 
 One of the functions of the URAA was to set up the regulatory framework for 
agricultural subsidies.  This is important, because it was and remains one of the most 
contentious issues in the negotiations.  Subsidies are a less obvious trade barrier than tariffs, the 
policy instrument with which the WTO is most concerned.  Tariffs are taxes on trade, primarily 
on imports, which shield domestic producers from international competition by adding to the 
cost of imported products.  In contrast, subsidies protect domestic producers by paying part of 
the production costs, thus lowering the price of domestically produced goods in relation to the 
price of imports.  Another major difference, from a fiscal perspective, is that tariffs provide 
revenue to the government while subsidies cost the government revenue.  This is an important 
difference especially for developing economies, which are less able to foot the bill for expensive 
subsidies than developed economies, and at the same time are in more need of the revenue 
that tariffs provide. 
 The United States and many European countries went into the Uruguay Round with very 
extensive systems of agricultural subsidies which they were not willing to give up easily.  The 
URAA was a compromise where they got to keep the bulk of their subsidies, but were required 
to reform the allocation mechanism for these to minimize trade distortions.  This led to a 
detailed and confusing classification system which categorizes different types of agricultural 
subsidies based on how much they were thought to distort market prices and trade.  The 
classification system included three ‘boxes’ named for different colors.  The ‘Amber Box’ 
contained subsidies thought to be most trade-distorting, those which directly encouraged 
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overproduction or export-dumping.  The ‘Green Box’ contained subsidies thought to be 
minimally trade-distorting, based on the idea that such subsidies were decoupled from 
production (that is, the amount of the subsidy was not related to amount of commodities 
produced).  Another category, called the ‘Blue Box’ was added at the insistence of the European 
Union during the Uruguay Round (Josling 2000: 107) and it was to contain subsidies which were 
linked to production, but which included mechanisms to limit overproduction (for instance, 
programs that automatically cut off payments once a certain level of production had been 
achieved).  The boxes were controversial and the question of which subsidies should go in which 
box was often open to dispute. 
The Amber Box was particularly important, because these subsidies were subject to 
quantitative restrictions.  They were used to calculate a number called the Aggregate Measure 
of Support or AMS.  The AMS was not to exceed a specified percentage (5% for developed 
countries, 10% for developing countries) of the total value of agricultural production for the 
member economy in a given year.  After joining the WTO, the United States and the EU moved 
to reform their agricultural support programs so as to move as many subsidies as possible from 
the Amber Box to the other boxes and thus escape the limitations of AMS (Josling 2000: 106). 
Outside of the URAA, the agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures also had 
implications for agricultural subsidies.  The SCM, especially articles 5 and 6, outlaws subsidies 
that damage another country’s market for the same good.  The SCM definition of a subsidy, 
outlined in Article I of the document, includes direct payments by the government, tax breaks, 
provision of goods and services other than infrastructure by the government, purchase of goods 
from the party by the government, and the funding or empowerment by the government of a 
private group that in turn provides the type of support noted above.  Article 13 of the URAA – 
the so called ‘Peace Clause’ provided, at least temporarily, a way around this.  It mandated that 
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as long as a country’s combined Amber and Blue Boxes (Green is not counted here) did not 
exceed the level of subsidies it had provided in the base year 1992, its agricultural subsidies 
were exempt from the SMC and other agreements.  This clause was meant to be temporary, 
however, and expired at the end of 2004. 
The text of the URAA is on the WTO website (WTO 2013b); for a summary of the ‘boxes’ 
see WTO 2004d; for a readable general explanation of the URAA and the issues surrounding it, 
see Margaret Rosso Grossman (2003). 
 
Alliances within the WTO 
 Alliances of varying degrees of formality and persistence are often formed among 
members seen as having similar interests on specific issues.  These informal groupings of 
countries often meet among themselves prior to Ministerial Meetings to hammer out a common 
position on specific issues.  Some of the most important of these blocs include the Quad, 
consisting of the The EU, United States, Japan, and Canada; the Cairns Group, consisting of many 
agricultural exporters, developed and developing; the G20, consisting of about 20 (membership 
tends to fluctuate) of the larger developing economies, formed mainly to advocate for stronger 
rules against agricultural subsidies; and the G33, another coalition of developing countries 
formed to advocate for special and differential treatment for developing economies in the 
application of WTO rules. 
 
The Quad 
 As its name implies, the Quad has four members – The EU, USA, Japan, and Canada.  
However, it represents a much larger group of countries, given that the EU itself has 28 
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members.  These four members also represent the most powerful economies in the WTO and 
the most influential governments in international trade negotiations, with experience going 
back to the foundation of GATT in 1947.  Quad countries do not always agree on every issue (not 
even on those relating to agriculture).  For example, the EU and Japan have generally been more 
enthusiastic about the so-called ‘Singapore Issues’ (see below) than the United States.  The key 
to their strength is not only that they are individually big and powerful economies, but that their 
representatives meet informally before official Ministerials in order to work out differences 
among themselves.  In this way, they can put up a united front at the Ministerials, creating a 
force that is difficult (but, as events have shown, not impossible) to resist (Kwa and Jawara 2004: 
22, 56- 59). 
With the notable exception of Canada, the Quad countries are the ones within the WTO 
most committed to defending farm subsidies.  However, even along the US-EU axis there are 
substantial disagreements.  The United States’ subsidies are high and it seeks to keep them that 
way, but not as high as the EU’s.  Thus, the US will sometimes join the attack on the EU’s farm 
policies, claiming that the latter’s subsidies are excessive, while its own are reasonable. 
 
Cairns Group 
 Prior to the formation of the G20, the Cairns Group was the major faction pushing for 
agricultural liberalization within the WTO.  It is older than the WTO itself, being formed in 1986 
while the Uruguay Round was still in its early stages.  The members of the Cairns Group tend to 
be countries with strong agricultural exports.  Currently there are 19 members; there were 17 at 
the time of Cancun.  Three are developed countries (Australia, New Zealand, and Canada) and 
the rest are developing, mostly from Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru) and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
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Philippines, and Thailand), with two more from other regions (Pakistan and South Africa).  Cairns 
membership overlaps with both the Quad (Canada belongs to both) and with the G20 (over half 
of the Cairns Group are also members of the G20, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Guatemala, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, and Thailand;  Colombia and 
Costa Rica are former members of the G20). 
Unlike the G20, it advocates across-the-board agricultural liberalization, not just a 
reduction in farm subsidies.  The position of the Cairns group is that agricultural trade should be 
treated like any other sector, and subject to similar rules and disciplines as other goods and 
services, basically that its special status governed by a separate agreement should be ended.  
Their rhetoric is aimed mainly at the EU, to a lesser extent against the US (the US sometimes 
aligns itself with the Cairns Group in pressing the EU for subsidy reduction).  They present 
themselves as champions of the poor farmers in developing countries that would benefit from 
higher agricultural prices and also claim to support the special and differential principle, which 
they interpret as giving developing countries more time and flexibility to implement reforms 
(NFU 2001).  In arguing for indiscriminate liberalization, however, the Cairns Group limited its 
appeal among developing countries, like India, which seek to protect their domestic markets 
from dumping and/ or have concerns about food security. 
According to Kwa and Jawara (2004: xxvi) some countries within the Cairns Group were 
less committed to liberalization than others.  They credit some members - notably Indonesia and 
Philippines - with splitting the group over concern for their own modest protection policies in 
the run-up to the 2003 Cancun ministerial summit.   
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G20 
In August 2003, a month before the Cancun Ministerial, the EU and US concluded their 
personal pre-meeting negotiations and jointly presented a framework for Cancun that would 
sidestep the agricultural subsidy issue.  When the Cairns Group failed to put up any significant 
resistance, Brazil and several of its other developing country members helped form the G20.  
The G20 distinguished itself from Cairns by narrowing its focus from agricultural liberalization 
per se to just the issue of subsidies in developed countries.  Thus it had an issue that almost all 
developing countries, even those with high agricultural tariffs, could rally around.  Thus, several 
non-Cairns developing countries, including the mammoths India and China, also joined the G20 
(Kwa and Jawara 2004: xxvi; Govt. of India 2005: 7- 8).  By delinking subsidies and tariffs, the 
G20 effected a revolution in WTO alignments.  It now had an issue that almost all developing 
countries, even those with high agricultural tariffs, could rally around.  Thus, several non-Cairns 
developing countries, including the major negotiating powers India and China, also joined the 
G20 (Kwa and Jawara 2004: xxvi; Govt. of India 2005: 7- 8; Ranjan 2005).  Malaysia and Uruguay 
were the only developing Cairns members not to join the G20.  In September in Cancun, the 
G20, supported by most developing countries, managed to resist the implementation of the EU-
US framework and the summit ended without a new agreement.   
All members of the G20, current and former, are developing countries.  The original 
membership of the G20 in 2003 included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela.  El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Colombia later 
left, while several other countries joined.  The number of members has fluctuated and has 
almost never been exactly 20, although the name has stuck.  The G20 is frequently seen as a 
vanguard broadly representing the developing world.  Its own rhetoric supports this claim as is 
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evident in the following excerpt from a G20 press release following a meeting in New Delhi in 
early 2005: 
 
The G20 Ministers have firmly believed that developing countries must garner collective 
strength if they are to succeed in eliminating the practices of a small group of rich 
nations that... depress prices, gain undue market shares and compromise the food 
security and livelihood of billions of farmers across the developing countries.  The 
realization of the true potential of the agricultural sector of in developing countries has 
been impeded for far too long (G20 2005: 19). 
 
The rhetoric here and in similar releases sets the subsidy issue up as one of developed versus 
developing states and it also claims a position for the G20 as informal spokesperson for the 
developing world. 
Within the framework of hegemonic WTO politics, the G20 has a number of advantages 
making it a competitive political force.  One is the sheer collective size of its membership.  The 
G20 includes the world’s two most populous countries, India and China, as well as several of the 
more industrially advanced developing economies, such as Brazil, Argentina, Thailand, and 
South Africa.  According to Ranjan (2005: 2), the members of the G20 represent “almost 57 
percent of the world population, 70 percent of the total farmers of the world, and 26 percent of 
the total exports in agriculture.”  Their relatively large economies give them certain political 
advantages in WTO politics.  They cannot be ignored or marginalized in the negotiations to the 
same extent that most developing countries are; this also makes them less vulnerable (though 
not entirely invulnerable) to bilateral pressure.  Large countries like India, Brazil, and Indonesia 
can also afford to send large delegations to WTO meetings, comparable in size to those sent by 
developed countries (Kwa and Jawara: 86). 
The members meet frequently among themselves, no less than six times between 
Cancun and Hong Kong (Twice in Brazil, Once each in India and Pakistan, and twice in Geneva).  
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Like the Quad strategy among developed countries, this allows the G20 to hammer out 
differences among themselves beforehand, so that they can present a united front later.  The 
G20 members in their various meetings are also able to pool their technical expertise.  As one 
Indian government publication put it this “has served to overcome the serious lacuna in earlier 
rounds of negotiations when developing countries lacked individual capacity and collective 
coherence in their approach to the negotiations” (Govt. of India 2005: 7).  Many members of the 
G20 belong to other coalitions, as well (Ranjan 2005).  Its internal solidarity is bolstered by its 
close ties with other coalitions of developing countries, such as the G33 and G90 (Sharma 2005). 
It has held consultations with other coalitions of developing countries. 
The G20 has tried to keep its focus on one narrow issue that its members can all agree 
on - that of reducing farm subsidies in rich economies.  It has taken positions on other issues, 
such as non-agricultural tariffs, only when these can be used as bargaining chips on the subsidy 
issue.  The G20 is roughly divided between major agro-exporters like Brazil and Argentina, and 
countries like India and Pakistan that have protective interests regarding their domestic 
agricultural markets (Ranjan 2005: 4- 11).  By targeting subsidies in developed countries, while 
remaining indifferent to agricultural tariffs in developing countries, the G20 has forged a 
position which unites not only its own members, but is more or less acceptable to developing 
countries in general.  The G20 has achieved some qualified successes, mostly at bringing 
developed countries to the negotiating table. 
 
Post-Uruguay Round Negotiations 
 The Uruguay Round ended with a mandate for further negotiations to take place.  
Agriculture was one of the issues slated among the ‘built-in’ agendas to be renegotiated in the 
next round of talks.  At the first WTO Ministerial in Singapore in 1996 a set of new negotiating 
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issues was proposed (concerning investment, competition, government procurement, and 
customs procedures), thereafter called the ‘Singapore issues’ or simply the ‘new issues.’  This 
caused one of the initial developing-developed economy divides in the WTO, with many 
developing countries opposing the inclusion of the Singapore Issues in the current round of 
negotiations.  Next there was a brief attempt by the United States to push for the inclusion of 
labor standards, which was vehemently rejected by most developing country representatives 
and was probably the main reason for the Collapse of the 2nd Ministerial at Seattle in 1999.  
Seattle was also notable for attracting a large protest movement bringing together an eclectic 
group of interests (including labor, environmental, and anti-globalization groups) which opposed 
the WTO for a variety of reasons; such protests have become a hallmark of WTO negotiations 
ever since. 
 The Doha Ministerial in 2001 kicked off a new ‘round’ or sequence of negotiations, 
which includes Cancun and all subsequent Ministerials.  It is sometimes referred to as the Doha 
Development Round, as it was intended to address the concerns of developing members more 
than the Uruguay Round had done.  As described above, the Cancun Ministerial in 2003 was 
more contentious.  The EU and US had set out at Cancun to exclude any meaningful farm 
subsidy reform from the WTO agenda, while adding the Singapore Issues to the negotiating 
agenda.  The G20 was formed specifically to oppose this move.  It was willing to offer 
concessions on the Singapore Issues in exchange for serious commitments on subsidy reduction.   
Neither side blinked, everyone went home without an agreement, and each side blamed the 
other for their unreasonable intransigence.  The United States subsequently managed to 
convince a few Latin American countries (Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) 
to quit the G20+ by offering them favorable bilateral trade deals.  Although neither side won a 
clear victory at Cancun, the ability of the G20 to prevent an EU-US fait accompli gave the former 
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a tremendous boost in prestige and they have been at the forefront of all major WTO 
negotiations since then.  
In 2004, a small negotiating group called the ‘Five Interested Parties’ (FIPs) was formed 
to help hammer out an agreement.  It included Brazil and India, two of the leaders of the G20, 
Australia (one of the developing countries in the Cairns Group), the EU, and the US.  This led to 
the so-called “July Framework” which was approved by the WTO as a whole on August 1st.  It 
committed to the principle of subsidy reduction, by specific amounts that were to be 
determined later.  One of the concessions made in exchange was a continuance of the 
controversial ‘blue box’ (see above) under stricter limitations, also to be decided later (Ranjan 
2005: 4- 5; Chandrasekhar & Pal 2004).   Three out of four of the Singapore issues were officially 
dropped from the Doha Round, but the green light was given on one of them - trade facilitation.  
Another sub-section of the agreement on non-agricultural market access (NAMA) committed 
WTO members to further reduction of tariffs on industrial goods (WTO 2013c).  Bello and Kwa 
(2004) saw this agreement as a huge defeat for developing countries and a sell-out on the part 
of Brazil and India.  Brazil and India, two of the key leaders of developing country stand at 
Cancun, were bought off with targeted concessions.  The portion of the agreement referring to 
agriculture protection focused on cutting subsidies rather than tariffs, so they did not endanger 
India’s agricultural protection program.  Brazil was happy, because reduced subsidies meant 
that it should be able to get higher prices and greater market access for its agricultural exports.  
Kwa and Bello (2004) note that the agreement left the EU and US plenty of room to maneuver 
their threatened amber box subsidies into the blue and green boxes.  They also describe the 
new NAMA agreement as a “prescription for... deindustrialization” of developing countries 
(continuing in Uruguay Round tradition). 
25 
 
In December 2005, the sixth WTO ministerial conference was held in Hong Kong.  A 
slightly less ambiguous subsidy-reduction agreement was made here, although it committed 
developed countries to only modest reductions at best.  The centerpiece for the G20 is an 
agreement to eliminate all so-called ‘export subsidies’ by 2013.  Export subsidies are those 
subsidies which not only directly encourage production, but production specifically for export; 
that is, they are subsidies designed for intentional dumping.  In exchange, the G20 and other 
developing countries gave into certain demands in other areas, including substantial reductions 
on non-agricultural tariffs and concessions on services.  Hong Kong is variously interpreted as a 
modest victory for developing countries, where the G20 finally managed to wring a few definite 
concessions out of the developed countries, especially the EU; as a major defeat for developing 
countries, where they accepted token and ineffective gestures toward subsidy-reduction in 
exchange for onerous concessions in other areas; or a vacuous, non-committal agreement for all 
sides, designed mainly to save face for the WTO by avoiding another Cancun-style breakdown.  
Bello (2005) has suggested that the compromises at Hong Kong represented an attempt to buy 
the leaders of the G20 (Brazil and India) off with admittance to the ‘New Quad’ - the negotiating 
circle of the most powerful developed countries - in exchange for selling out the weaker 
developing economies. 
 
Contextualizing India: Multilateralism and Food Security 
 India is the world’s 2nd largest country by population with 1.2 billion people.  Moreover, 
it is expected to surpass China as the world’s most populous country within the next several 
years (US Government 2014).  India is characterized by the World Bank (2014) as a lower middle 
income economy.  It is a federal, parliamentary democracy and its population is notable for its 
linguistic and religious diversity.  Since gaining independence in 1947, India has enjoyed 
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uninterrupted civilian government, although it has fought a number of wars with neighboring 
countries during this time. 
 India has a long history of active participation in international bodies.  It officially joined 
the UN in 1945 (United Nations 2014), two years before it ceased to a British colony.  It was also 
a founding member of GATT in 1947.  Although it is often characterized as more of an observer 
than active participant in this institution (Mukherjee and Malone 2011), others have noted the 
role of the Indian representatives as advocates for developing countries in the evolution of this 
organization (Narlikar 2006; Efstathopoulos 2012).  Of key importance was India’s role in 
organizing the non-aligned movement (NAM) early in the Cold War to help keep recently 
decolonized states from entanglement in superpower diplomacy and proxy wars.  This role was 
important in building up India’s legitimacy as a representative of developing country interest 
(Mukherjee and Malone 2011; Narlikar 2006).  This history of developing world leadership later 
helped Indian delegations in the coalition-building politics of the WTO (Efstathopoulos 2012).  
 According to the 2011 Census of India (Government of India 2014a), India had a rural 
population of 833 million, out of a population of just over 1.2 billion.  Out of 402 million 
employed, 234.1 million worked in agriculture, breaking down to 127.3 million farmers and 
106.8 million laborers.  Despite employing more than half of the working population, agriculture 
only accounted for only 13.7% of Indian gross domestic product in 2012- 2013 (Government of 
India 2013).  This is a ratio which has been shrinking steadily for decades (Hoda and Gulati 2007: 
41); although the value of agricultural output (corrected for inflation) continues to grow in 
absolute terms, it has done so at a much slower rate than the rest of the economy.  In general 
Indian farms are small and shrinking, with the average farm size in 2010- 2011 being only 1.15 
hectares (GOI 2014b), while the number of landless agricultural laborers is growing 
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(Government of India 2014a).  Shrinking farm size was a topic of some concern in the 2007 
Indian Trade Policy review, as will be seen in chapter 7. 
 India contains a variety of climatic zones, and the diversity of crops grown reflects this.  
Grains for domestic consumption, however, dominate production, especially wheat and rice.  
Rice production is concentrated in the East and South, while wheat dominates the North and 
West.  These zones are not mutually exclusive, however, and rice and wheat are sometimes 
grown in the same fields at different times of year.  Other major crops include cotton, millet, 
maize, potatoes, and beans.  India has traditionally had a significant presence in world 
agricultural markets for a small number of products, notably tea and spices.  These are still 
important today, but have declined relative to other exports. 
 One of India’s crowning economic achievements of the last 50 years was the gaining of 
food self-sufficiency.  A reliable and self-sufficient agricultural economy capable of feeding a 
billion people was not achieved overnight.  This economic miracle is even more impressive when 
one factors in that it was aiming at a moving target: India’s rapidly growing population.  The 
same environment that could not feed half a billion people in the 1960s can feed twice that 
today.  
 Before independence, British India had suffered from periodic devastating famines.  The 
Bengal famine in 1943, for example, resulted in an estimated 3 million deaths (Acharya: 1983: 
52- 58).  Despite this, agriculture was not emphasized in the early economic planning of 
independent India and substantial grain had to be imported from the United States under the 
latter’s “Food for Peace” legislation or Public Law 480.  This worked for several years, but 
eventually dependence on PL 480 imports came to undermine India’s sovereignty.  In the mid-
1960s, the United States under the Johnson administration began to demand policy conditions 
in exchange for the continuation of food aid and this coincided with a period of drought which 
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made India particularly desperate for grain imports.  The most humiliating of these conditions 
was a demand that India end its opposition to the US war in Vietnam in the United Nations 
(Acharya: 1983: 81- 95; Merill, Dennis: 207- 208; Kux 1992: 255- 261; Ananth 2010: 68- 73; 
Malhotra 2010). 
 The danger of famine and the fear of compromised sovereignty which came along with 
food imports helped to prompt what became known as the ‘Green Revolution’ in India.  This 
constituted an effort beginning in the late 1960s to drastically increase India’s agricultural yields 
through the use of high-yield seed varieties, construction of irrigation works, and increased use 
of fertilizer and pesticides.  Within a decade food yields had increased to the point where India 
became a net exporter of food (Gupta 1998: 52- 60). 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
 This dissertation constitutes a study hegemonic politics in international and Indian 
agricultural trade policy.  It can be broken down into two component discourse analyses.  One of 
them is archival and deals with arguments made within one set of fora (the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism).  The other takes the form of interviews with experts and officials in India.  The 
methodological considerations for this will be discussed in the following chapter.  This chapter 
will lay out the literature and theoretical framework which informs the research and 
contextualize the research within the relevant scholarship.   Key concepts here include 
hegemony and neoliberalism, and the roles that international organizations, sovereign states, 
and think tanks play in them.  This project is meant primarily as a contribution to political 
geography.  Although it touches tangentially upon the geography of agriculture and trade and 
other aspects of economic geography, it is primarily looking at policy formation on the level of 
government bureaucracies, think tanks, and international fora.  It is a project about 
bureaucracies and policy wonks, not about farmers or firms.  Outside of geography, the most 
useful literature comes from international political economy and social theory. 
 This dissertation draws on a number of literatures.  As a project interested in policy 
formation it works with models and typologies growing out of the policy transfer literature in 
political science and the related policy mobilities literature in geography.  The literature on 
neoliberalism is also useful in contextualizing the varieties of policy spreading during the 
historical period under investigation (roughly 1995- 2010) and especially policies promoted by 
the World Trade Organization.  Models of neo-Gramscian hegemony are used in order to frame 
the interaction of sovereign states, international organizations, neoliberal ideas, and non-state 
networks.  The work on neoliberal hegemony by a number of geographers (Peet 2003, 2007; 
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Sparke 2005; Harvey 2005; Peck 2010) and other social scientists (Dezalay and Garth 2002; 
Ferguson 2006) are also drawn upon extensively.  Finally, the theoretical background for this 
project is influenced by ideas of state and sovereignty developed in political geography and 
other scholars building off the Foucauldian lineage of theory (Mitchell 1991, 2002; Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985; Ferguson 1990; Hajer 1995).  Before going into very much detail in describing how 
these bodies of literature relate to the overall project, two of the key terms need to be given 
some basic definition: hegemony and neoliberalism. 
 Hegemony is a political concept that emphasizes informal and de facto arrangements of 
power that exist in addition to or beyond formal legal structures of power.  The concept of 
hegemony has been used in various ways, ranging from its use by the realist school of 
international relations to describe the balance of power between states to its use by Marxist 
and Marxist-influenced scholars to describe the balance of power between different socio-
economic groups within a state (Sparke 2004, 2005).   
Hegemony includes both coercion and persuasion as control mechanisms, but the 
hegemony is regarded as more successful the less visible the coercive aspect is (Cox 1981: 137).  
Cox summarizes the relation of coercion and persuasion inherent in hegemony as follows: 
 
There is an enforcement potential in the material power relations underlying any 
structure, in that the strong can clobber the weak if they think it necessary.  But force 
will not have to be used in order to ensure the dominance of the strong to the extent 
that the weak accept the prevailing power relations as legitimate.  This the weak may do 
if the strong… are willing to make concessions that will secure the weak’s acquiescence 
in their leadership and if they can express this leadership in terms of universal or 
general interest, rather than just serving their own interests (Cox 1981: 137). 
 
The sense in which hegemony is in Cox and in this dissertation emerges from the 
Gramscian tradition.  Gramsci, writing in the 1920s and 1930s, developed a model of class 
struggle to describe contemporary European politics wherein the dominant class not only 
31 
 
maintained power through state military and police apparatuses, but also through institutions 
and ideology permeating what he called civil society.  Subordinate classes were enrolled in this 
power structure by a combination of implicit physical threat and the provisions of some 
concessions to their interests, while this order of social relations was promoted though civil 
society institutions like schools and churches until it was taken for granted and accepted as right 
and natural (Gramsci 1971). 
The term ‘Neoliberalism’ is often used to describe a set of prevailing orthodoxies in 
economic policy. Neoliberalism can be thought of as a form of laissez-faire capitalism that seeks 
to use markets as a form of governance (Jessop 2002; Peck 2004).  Neoliberalism can take a 
variety of forms in different contexts, but as Peck (2004, 395) points out, there are certain 
“family resemblances” that can be discerned in various local formulations.  Jessop (2002, 454) 
lists several common features of a typical neoliberal economic project: trade liberalization, 
economic deregulation, privatization of state services, and scrutiny of public welfare spending.  
The term neoliberalism is rarely used as a self-designation on the part ofits alleged practitioners, 
and this makes it more difficult to identify it as a coherent, unified project (Peck, Brenner, and 
Theodore 2009: 96; Barnett 2010).  This ambiguity does not prevent it, according to a number of 
scholars used here, from playing a key role in global hegemonic projects (Jessop 1997; Peet 
2003, 2007; Harvey 2005; Hajer 1997). 
 
Policy Transfer 
 A large set of scholarship exists addressing the process of replicating policies (of any 
kind, not just of the neoliberal variety) from one government or institution to another.  In their 
foundational paper on the subject, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) define policy transfer as: “the 
process by which actors borrow policies developed in one setting to develop programmes and 
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policies within another.”  Although these authors did not invent the term, their 1996 paper 
constituted a synthesis of a number of similar and overlapping themes within one conceptual 
framework (Benson and Jordan 2011, 2012; Prince 2012a).2  In particular they drew upon Rose’s 
(1991, 1993) work on ‘policy learning’ and Bennett’s (1991) work on ‘policy convergence.’  The 
framework which Dolowitz and Marsh proposed was organized around a series of questions, 
along with typologies or continuums of possible answers.  This was expanded and elaborated in 
a subsequent article (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 7- 17) into the following six questions: 1) Why is 
policy transferred? 2) Who is involved in transfer? 3) What is transferred? 4) From where is it 
transferred? 5) To what degree is a policy transferred; and 6) What are the constraints upon 
policy transfer? 
 In regard to the first question the authors propose a continuum of voluntary borrowing 
to coercive imposition.  For the second question, they provide a typology of actors including 
officials, bureaucrats, parties, lobbies, and supra-national institutions.  Of particular interest to 
the present study, they emphasis the role that the last category plays in non-voluntary transfers: 
 
Supra-national institutions often play a key role in coercive policy transfer.  For example, 
supra-national institutions have played a crucial role in the spread of Western monetary 
policies to Third World countries.  International Monetary Fund or World Bank loans are 
much cheaper for these countries, but in return the IMF will stipulate certain economic 
policies that have to be implemented if the loan is to be granted (1996: 348). 
 
Here they are speaking of loan conditionalities, but they later expand this to include policies 
imposed as treaty obligations in multi-government institutions (2000: 13, 15).  Here they use the 
European Union as their example, but the WTO is also based on treaty-obligated policy reforms, 
as described in chapter 2. 
2 Dussauge-Laguna (2012) disputes the originality and importance of Dolowitz and Marsh’s 
contribution to the policy transfer literature. 
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 They go on to propose descriptive of typologies for what is transferred – i.e. policy 
goals, administrative techniques, even ‘negative lessons’ of what policies not to adopt; for the 
types of entities between which transfer takes place - i.e. between national governments, 
between municipalities, etc; for the degree to which a policy is transferred – i.e. direct copying, 
combining elements of polices from multiple sources, adaptation of policies to fit unique 
contexts, etc; and for the various factors which make a policy difficult or easy to transfer – i.e. 
complexity, expense, suitability for particular administrative structures.  The authors emphasize 
that this is meant as a conceptual model or heuristic device, not a theory (Marsh and Sharman 
2009; Dolowitz and Marsh 2012). 
 Benson and Jordan (2011) note that policy transfer has evolved since Dolowitz and 
Marsh’s early work from a ‘niche’ area of study into an auxiliary concept for wider areas of 
policy analysis, including the literature on neoliberalism.  This body of work has been criticized 
from a number of perspectives.  James and Lodge (2003) argue that Dolowitz and Marsh’s 
model tries to do too much and becomes a hodgepodge of mismatched theory with 
underspecified variables and little explanatory power.  Evans (2009) holds that the policy 
transfer literature has been too preoccupied with the state scale, and calls for more focus on 
transnational organizations on non-state actors.  Others (Benson and Jordan 2012; Marsh and 
Sharman 2009) have noted that the literature has been almost entirely focused on policy 
transfer among developed countries, especially relating the European Union.   
 According to Marsh and Sharman, the lack of attention to developing countries in policy 
transfer studies may be attributable in part to the lack until recently of large, easily available 
national databases for these countries and possibly reluctance among researchers to travel 
there.  They speculate, however, that developing countries would be ideal testing grounds for 
many of the questions brought up by the policy transfer literature, such as the effectiveness of 
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coercive policy transfer through donor conditionalities, whether or not policies are converging 
toward a homogenized standard globally, or how well policies developed in advanced 
economies work in less developed conditions.  “For either confirming existing hypotheses or 
generating new ones, the answers lie disproportionately in the developing world” (Marsh and 
Sharman 2009: 280- 281)3.  The present dissertation does examine policy transfer in a 
developing country and finds that liberal/ neoliberal policy formulas are subject to a great deal 
of transformation and innovation when they have been adopted in India (see especially chapter 
9). 
 Stone (2000, 2004) has spoken most to lack of focus on non-national, non-state modes 
of policy transfer.  She argues that “methodological nationalism” has led to studies 
circumscribed by what takes place within official state hierarchies or by comparisons between 
states, at the expense of “organizations outside and between states” (2004: 549).  She further 
argues that an emphasis on state officials as being the primary agents of policy transfer has 
overlooked the role of non-state actors such as business and finance professionals, think tank 
personnel, and members of interest group organizations (550, 555- 559).  She also suggests that 
more attention should be paid to the transfer of normative standards along with policy, such as 
research metrics and gender roles (552).  With regard to international organizations, where 
others have emphasized the coercive aspect of policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 2000; 
Marsh and Sharman 2009), Stone draws our attention to non-coercive, almost ‘missionary’ 
policy-promotion activity: 
 
3 Marsh and Sharman’s (2009) article leans through a negative answer to these hypotheses 
(donor conditionalities are not always implemented or implemented as the donor intends, 
policies are not becoming globally homogenous, and policies from developed countries often do 
not work well in developing countries. 
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Institutions such as the World Bank, the WTO and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) have set up research departments or hold conferences and consultations to 
advocate the ‘scientific’ validity of their objectives, and have engaged in various 
outreach activities, data-gathering and monitoring to promote awareness and educate 
the public (Stone 2004: 554). 
 
Most of the institutions which I examine in chapter 8 use such mechanisms to promote their 
agendas and build alliances. 
 A number of geographers have also borrowed, adapted, and critiqued the concept of 
policy transfer, although Prince (2012b) argues that ‘policy mobilities’ is a more apt description 
of what geographers have done with this subject.  In general, geographers have been more 
attentive to the people participating in policy transfers, the adaptation and mutation of policy 
moving between different contexts, and transfers involving non-national scales and agencies.  
Larner and Laurie (2010) suggest that ethnographic methodologies are useful to study policy 
transfer, in their case engineers involved in the transfer of utility privatization.  McCann (2011) 
argues that the elaborate typologies developed for categories of policy transfer and agents of 
policy transfer tend to become reified abstractions, “becoming the objects of debate rather than 
facilitating analyses of the social processes that constitute policy transfer” (111).  McCann and 
Ward (2010, 2012) also argue, in relation to their focus on urban policy, that the preoccupation 
with the national scale obscures transnational city-to-city circuits of policy transfer.  A number 
of geographers (Peck and Theodore 2001, 2010; McCann 2011; Prince 2012a, 2012b) have 
emphasized that policy transfers do not often result in carbon-copies of the original policy, but 
adapt to different contexts, are subject to creative mutations, and hybridize with other policies.   
 
mobile policies rarely travel as complete “packages,” they move in bits and pieces – as 
selective discourses, inchoate ideas, and synthesized models – and they therefore 
“arrive” not as replicas but as policies already-in-transformation (Peck and Theodore 
2010: 170). 
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This tendency towards hybridization in the circulation of policy, when applied to the spread of 
neoliberalism, contributes to the difficulty in identifying a coherent project (Peck, Brenner, and 
Theodore 2010b). 
 
Neoliberalism in Historical Context 
 Histories of neoliberalism (here I rely mainly on Dezalay and Garth 2000; Peet 2003; 
Harvey 2005; and Peck 2010) emphasize that it is a hazy and indistinct cluster of ideas, 
combining multiple traditions and processes.  Friederich von Hayek is usually considered the 
founder of neoliberalism as a school of thought.  In the early to mid-twentieth century, he 
worked successively in the Austrian School of Economics, the London School of Economics, and 
the University of Chicago, helping to make these early “centers of influence and persuasion” 
(Peet 2003: 9) for neoliberalism; he also founded the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 with a group 
of like-minded intellectuals, including Milton Friedman.  Intellectual neoliberalism, however, 
remained rather marginal until the decline of Keynesianism (the previously dominant school of 
economic theory, which preserved a much greater role for government intervention in the 
economy than neoliberalism) in the 1970s, however.  Another important force behind the rise of 
neoliberalism was the business and especially the finance community, which had never fully 
accepted Keynesianism and were thus ready to embrace an alternative school of theory more 
friendly to their interests when the opportunity presented itself (Peet 2003; Dezalay and Garth 
2002: 81).  Dezalay and Garth (78- 79) also suggest that neoliberal-oriented academics made an 
early investment in complex mathematical skills that paid off with the rise of computing in 
business and finance from about the 1960s. 
 All of these authors (Dezalay and Garth 2000; Peet 2003; Harvey 2005; Peck 2010) 
emphasize the role of think tanks in the rise of neoliberalism.  Groups such as the American 
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Enterprise Institute, the Cato Institute, and the Heritage Foundation were founded by neoliberal 
intellectuals and, especially form the 1970s, funded by wealthy business interests.  Think tanks 
allowed “policy entrepreneurs” (Dezalay and Garth: 80) to bypass former academic routes to 
intellectual legitimacy by selling their ideas directly to the media, providing content for 
soundbites and pundits for televised debates (79- 80).  Harvey sums up this process as a 
“massive intervention on the part of business elites and financial interests in the production of 
ideas and ideologies: through investment in think tanks, in training of technocrats, and in the 
command of the media” (Harvey 2005: 115). 
 In the 1980s, neoliberalism took off with the election of its proponents to the executive 
in the United States (Ronald Reagan) and the United Kingdom (Margaret Thatcher).  This was 
accompanied by the increasing influence of neoliberal ideas upon the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank, which in turn pressed for the adoption of neoliberal economic 
policy in developing countries.  The IMF had been much quicker to adopt neoliberal principles, 
while the World Bank was drawn in somewhat later and more reluctantly.  The opportunity to 
impose a neoliberal policy regime globally came about with the third world debt crisis beginning 
in the early 1980s.  In response to this, the IMF and World Bank developed a set of rescue 
packages collectively called structural adjustment programs (SAPs) which allowed developing 
country governments to reschedule their loan payments if they adopted certain economic 
policies, usually involving cuts in social programs, privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
decontrol of prices, lowering barriers to foreign investment and other free market reforms (see 
Peet 2003, chapters 3 and 4 for a very detailed analysis of SAPs).  This is primarily what Dolowitz 
and Marsh (1996, 2000, 2012) were speaking of when they discussed non-voluntary transfer. 
The top-down mechanism of structural adjustment, however, was not the only means of 
transferring neoliberal policy to the developing world (and its efficacy in permanently altering 
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policy has been questioned by Stone 2008).  Dezalay and Garth describe in detail a more 
voluntary mechanism of policy transfer whereby students from developing countries are 
exposed to neoliberal thought while attending US universities and the return to their countries 
of origin where they subsequently influence economic policy there.  The archetypical early 
example of this was the role of the “Chicago Boys” in the early adoption of neoliberal economic 
policy in Chile (even before its widespread adoption in the US and UK).  In this case, a group of 
Chilean economists were trained at the University of Chicago (one of the early intellectual 
centers of neoliberalism) and were subsequently empowered by the Pinochet dictatorship in 
Chile in implement their theories in economic policy.  Dezalay and Garth document similar 
processes of intellectual diffusion occurring in other Latin American countries.  The present 
dissertation finds that the adoption of liberalization policies in India resembles much more 
closely a voluntary model of policy transfer similar to that described by Dezalay and Garth rather 
than the top-down, involuntary policy imposition of structural adjustment. 
 The 1990s was in many ways the height of neoliberalism internationally, the period of 
what is often called the ‘Washington Consensus.’  The fall of the Soviet Union, the rollback of 
the welfare state in the United States in Europe, and economic liberalization in China and India 
(Ahmed 2009) all combined to remove or weaken resistance to neoliberalization trends.  
Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2010a: 337- 339) compare global neoliberalism in the 1980s to 
1990s in terms of transition from “inter-jurisdictional policy transfer,” where the IMF and World 
Bank conducted their SAP experiments on developing countries, to the consolidation of a 
“genuinely post-Keynesian, neoliberalized rules regime,” where the essential features of SAPs 
became embodied in more permanent supranational treaty organizations like the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the WTO. 
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 Starting in the late 1990s, a series of crises led to cracks appearing in the Washington 
Consensus.  The IMF handling of the Southeast Asian economic meltdown in 1997- 1998 led to 
criticism of neoliberal orthodoxy from relatively mainstream voices (Choven and Babb 2009; 
Stiglitz 2002).  The huge protests of the WTO in Seattle in 1999 brought anti-globalization 
movements to wider public attention.  US unilateralism in the Iraq invasion of 2003 left the chief 
national proponent of the Washington Consensus more diplomatically isolated.  And finally, the 
worldwide economic crises of 2008 led to speculation that neoliberal economic policy might 
once and for all be discredited (Choven and Babb 2009; Stiglitz 2008; Krugman 2009).  
 According to Peck and Theodore (2012), however, “Most observers now agree that 
those reports of the death of neoliberalism, excitedly issued in the midst of the Wall Street crash 
of 2008, were exaggerated.”  Three earlier papers written by these two authors along with 
Brenner suggest a few hypotheses to account for the resilience of neoliberalism in the face of 
this recent crisis.  The most explicit one laid out by the authors is that the rise of neoliberalism in 
the first place was enabled by crises, thus a crisis is in many ways its forte.  “On their own, crisis 
conditions will never be enough [to end neoliberalism], not least because the tools of neoliberal 
governance were forged in, and precisely for, such conditions” (Peck, Brenner, and Theodore 
2009: 110).  They elaborate on this more in a subsequent paper: 
 
Ironically, the chronic ‘underperformance’ of neoliberal strategies has been a source of 
forward momentum for the project as a whole… neoliberal strategies frequently 
postpone or displace crisis pressures, instilling an insatiable need for ‘next stage’ 
reforms (Peck, Brenner, and Theodore 2010b: 209- 210). 
 
On another level, the international rules regimes that they describe, including the WTO, are 
entrenched and difficult to reform or dismantle.  They use the colorful phrase “zombie 
neoliberalism” for the scenario for this regime to continue to lumber forward under its own 
40 
 
inertia even as its intellectual foundations are undermined (Peck, Brenner, and Theodore 2010b: 
340- 341). 
 Interestingly, the lack of internal theoretical cohesion to neoliberal projects may explain 
some of neoliberalism’s resiliency.  Neoliberalism is “Largely a critics’ term” (Peck, Brenner, and 
Theodore 2009: 96), not generally used by ostensive ‘neoliberals’ to describe themselves.  It is 
therefore difficult to assign blame for the crisis to ‘neoliberalism’ when there are no self-
identified neoliberals to point to.  Specific neoliberal movements like supply-side economics and 
monetarism can be isolated and criticized more easily than the amorphous, technocratic 
‘common sense’ that informs them.  “Neoliberalism” is never mentioned in the hundreds of 
pages of WTO documents analyzed in chapters 5- 7 of this dissertation, yet they are filled 
(especially in documents attributed to the WTO Secretariat) with specific policy prescriptions 
(privatization, cuts in social programs, deregulation, tariff and subsidy reduction, etc.) which 
would elsewhere be described as neoliberal (WTO 1998a, 2002a, and 2007a).  They do not 
appeal to a specific body of theory to justify their policy advice, merely a sense that this advice is 
based on obvious, uncontroversial economic principles. 
 One of the key strengths of neoliberalism, according to Peck, Brenner, and Theodore 
(2010b: 210) is ability to constantly restructure itself in response to crisis, to solve a crisis which 
it caused by pulling another reform out of the same grab bag of ideas.  Peet (2003: 97- 100) 
gives an example of one approach to policy failure in his chapter on the IMF, which seems to 
illustrate this process.  After the disasters associated with structural adjustment programs 
became apparent in the 1990s, IMF economists concluded that they had not worked as 
expected because there was too little civil society involvement in their implementation.  They 
thus came up with a new version of conditionalities in 1999 with essentially the same content as 
the old SAPs, but with provisions for limited civil society consultations and renamed it “Poverty 
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Reduction and Growth Facilities.”  In this example, policy failure was explained as a defect in a 
few implementation details of a program, not as in the overarching principles conditioning the 
program (privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization, etc.).  The proposed solution was thus 
merely a slightly modified version of the original program.4   
 A similar tactic that became clear in the course of this research is the claim that previous 
applications of neoliberal policy did not work precisely because of the adaptations of policy 
prescriptions to local contexts (in this case, India) were not faithful interpretations of the 
original doctrine.  The policy failed not because the advice was wrong, but because it was not 
implemented faithfully enough.  This form of argumentation is prominent in the three 
Secretariat Reports analyzed in chapters 6 and 7 of this dissertation. 
 Harvey (2005, 2007) suggests that neoliberalism can be best understood as two distinct 
but overlapping phenomena.  First, it is a school of thought based a set of moral-philosophical 
principles.  Second, it is a political project aimed at strengthening the capitalist class.  The 
relationship between the former and the latter is the utility of the philosophy to the project.  
The philosophical component tends to highlight metrics and facts that support the project (they 
promote measures that tend to strengthen business interests) and systematically discount and 
obscure metrics and facts unfavorable to the project (options more favorable to the working 
classes).  Though the two overlap, they also sometimes contradict each other.  Where this is the 
case, where the philosophy cannot be easily fit into the project, a legion of rhetorical expertise 
is available to rationalize the logical disconnects. Think tanks play an important role in this 
process.  
4 Such a story also brings to mind the idea of trasformismo in Cox’s model of hegemony 
described below, where a potentially counter-hegemonic idea, in this case civil society 
consultation, in coopted and domesticated by the dominant hegemonic structure (Cox 1983: 
167, 173).   
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 Sparke (2005) uses the term ‘geoeconomics’ to describe a political discourse that 
promotes neoliberal globalization and a corresponding set of institutions and practices that 
serve to reinforce it, including a “whole set educational, cultural, financial, and legal practices, 
ranging from academic curricula to dominant tropes of global advertising, to management 
consultancy, to investment guides and ratings, and to interstate negotiations of free trade 
agreements” (Sparke 2003: 379).  He emphasizes the role of discourse in hegemony by 
suggesting that globalist geoeconomics serves to discursively obscure the material workings of 
power relations by making them appear natural or as articles of common sense. 
 
Neo-Gramscian Hegemony and International Institutions 
 In trying to understand the workings of power in a global, multistate organization like 
the WTO, I have found the work of Robert Cox and other Neo-Gramscian theorists (Cox 1981, 
1983, 1992; Gale 1998; Bieler and Morton 2004) useful.  These scholars have developed a 
theoretical framework for understanding hegemony on a global scale without taking states as 
the only primary actors.  This school of thought proposes that global social forces and 
international institutions are equally important in creating and maintaining what Cox calls 
“world orders,” or “historically specific configuration of power” (Cox 1992: 161).  Gale (1998: 
273) argues that previous models of international relations were too state-centric, while 
Marxist-derived critical theories tend to treat international institutions as mere functional 
derivatives of capitalism.  “Dominant states achieve hegemony not only by possessing a 
preponderance of military and economic power, but also by the legitimizing effects of a 
dominant ideology and the construction of international institutionalization” (Gale 1998: 275). 
 Cox’s schematic of hegemony consists of three overlapping and mutually conditioning 
components: material capabilities, ideas, and institutions.  Cox defines material capabilities as 
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“productive and destructive potentials,” i.e. economic and military power.  This is associated 
with the coercive mechanism underlying hegemony.  Cox divides ideas about social relations 
prevailing at a particular time and place into two general categories.  “Intersubjective ideas” are 
those which are taken for granted, while “collective images” are open to contestation by 
competing interests.  “Whereas intersubjective meanings… constitute the common ground of 
social discourse (including conflict), collective images may be several and opposed” (Cox 1981: 
136).  Institutions reinforce the power potential of material capabilities and “tend, at least 
initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations” (136).   
 The model of international hegemony proposed by Cox adopted a number of insights 
from Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks (1971) and is for that reason often called Neo-Gramscian.  Cox 
saw something similar to Gramsci’s model going on the power relations among sovereign states, 
although his model does not merely replace Gramsci’s classes with states.   
 
The hegemonic concept of world order is founded not only upon the regulation of 
interstate conflict but also upon a globally-conceived civil society, i.e., a mode of 
production of global extent which brings about links among social classes of the 
countries encompassed by it (Cox 1983: 171). 
 
Cox is particularly interested in the role of institutions in Gramsci’s model of hegemony.  
Although he was writing many years before the WTO was formed, this model of institutional 
behavior remains apt in describing the workings of this body. 
 
There is a close connection between institutionalisation and what Gramsci called 
hegemony.  Institutions provide ways of dealing with internal conflicts so as to minimise 
the use of force… [They] may become the anchors for such a hegemonic strategy, since 
they lend themselves both to the representation of diverse interests and to the 
universalisation of policy (Cox 1981: 137). 
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Cox followed this by noting, “Hegemony cannot, however, be reduced to an institutional 
dimension… They may be an expression of hegemony but cannot be taken as identical to 
hegemony” (ibid).  Cox saw institutionalization partly as a means for a hegemon to perpetuate 
its power beyond the time at which the material and/ or ideological basis for its power had 
faded.  On the other hand, he also described institutions as taking on “their own life” (136) and 
behaving in ways that its creators had not intended.  Therefore, an institution created under a 
hegemonic order could later become one of the arenas in which that order was contested.   
 Although Cox allowed for the possibility of an institution being turned against the 
hegemonic order that created it, he saw little potential for developing countries to do so with 
contemporary international organizations because “these superstructures are inadequately 
connected to any popular political base” in these countries (ibid).  Cox here had in mind existing 
international organizations like the IMF and World Bank.  Some of the more recent scholars 
building upon Cox’s work have shown more optimism about the possibility of counter-
hegemony within the WTO, as it has a much more democratic decision-making infrastructure 
than the IMF or World Bank.  Choven (2005) makes the most optimistic version of this 
argument, noting how developing countries in the WTO have successfully turned the tables on 
the Quad during the Doha Round and that even the dispute settlement mechanism has been 
used successfully against the United States and the European Union.  Other scholars are less 
optimistic, and detail ways in which the United States and the European Union are able to 
subvert the consensus mechanism and turn it to their advantage, while simultaneously enjoying 
the increased legitimacy that the consensus mechanism provides (Chimni 2006; Steinberg 2002; 
Kwa and Jawari 2004; Peet 2003).  Steinberg (2002: 342) refers to the deliberation process in the 
WTO as “organized hypocrisy.” 
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  Cox (1983: 165- 167) borrowed another concept from Gramsci, passive revolution, to 
describe a situation of incomplete hegemony.  This can be also be used describe a zone of 
transition on the edges of a successful hegemony where the hegemonic power exercises strong 
influence without the firm institutionalized power it enjoys in its center.  In this zone, ideas and 
institutions are copied and imported from more successful hegemonic orders, without however 
displacing the power of the previous local elites.  Gramsci saw this mechanism at work in 19th 
century Italy where northern industrial elites secured the cooperation of older agrarian elites in 
the south (Gramsci 1971: 57- 59).  Cox saw it at work in industrializing third world countries in 
late 20th century, where “military-bureaucratic” regimes “try to incorporate elements from the 
hegemonic model [of the United States and other developed countries] without disturbing old 
power structures” (Cox 1983: 171). 
 A subsidiary concept of passive revolution is trasformismo, which Gramsci used to 
describe alliances more makeshift alliances between a dominant and subordinate class than 
exists in a true hegemony.  According to Cox, “trasformismo worked to co-opt leaders of 
subaltern groups” and was therefore a means of “assimilating and domesticating potentially 
dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition” (166- 167).  He 
applied this concept to contemporary international institutions thusly: 
 
Elite talent from peripheral countries is co-opted into international institutions in the 
manner of trasformismo.  Individuals from peripheral countries, though they may come 
to international institutions with the idea of working from within to change the system, 
are condemned to work within the structures of passive revolution… Trasformismo also 
absorbs potentially counter-hegemonic ideas and makes these ideas consistent with 
hegemonic doctrine (173). 
 
This sort of process fits with the more pessimistic interpretations of WTO democracy described 
above.  Especially in the Doha Round of negotiations, the WTO has taken on a number of issues 
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of interest to developing countries into the negotiating agenda, but none of these are seriously 
at odds with the overall neoliberal orientation of the organization (Steinberg 2002; Chimni 2006; 
Das 2006; Choven 2005; Lee and Smith 2008; Choven and Babb 2009; Efstathopoulos 2012). 
Long before globalization became a buzzword, Cox described processes that 
transcended state boundaries, particularly what he called the “internationalization of the state” 
whereby some of the machinery of state government is displaced to international institutions 
and the “internationalization of production,” where different stages of capitalist production 
processes were carried out in different countries (Cox 1981: 144- 147).  Cox viewed the rise of 
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
as part of the internationalization of the state under what he called pax americana. 
 
Such an internationalised policy process presupposed a power structure, one in which 
central agencies of the US government were in a dominant position.  But it is not 
necessarily an entirely hierarchical power structure with lines of force running 
exclusively from the top down, nor was it one in which the units of interaction were 
whole nation-states.  It was a power structure seeking to maintain consensus through 
bargaining power and one in which the bargaining units were fragments of states (Cox 
1981: 145). 
 
Cox describes pax americana  in the past tense because he saw the United States as a declining 
hegemon and he speculated that a new non-hegemonic period was beginning, at least on the 
‘world order’ scale (Cox 1983: 170; 1992: 179- 180).  However, others have seen the period of 
American decline more as an era in which the basis of American hegemony was transformed 
from one based on early Keynesian-oriented models to one based on neoliberalism (Choven and 
Babb 2009: 470; Peet 2003; Harvey 2005; Agnew 2005).  Whether or not the current ‘world 
order’ constitutes a genuine hegemony or something more akin to Cox/ Gramsci’s passive 
revolution, however, similar ideas of hegemonic processes apply.  It may be useful then, to think 
of hegemony as more of a process than an outcome, in that Cox’s insights apply whether or not 
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the current world order is hegemonic or non-hegemonic.5  Cox in any case may have been 
caught too much upon the model as hegemony as state-based which he was trying to escape, 
seeing the dominance of one state as a necessary component for a genuinely hegemonic world 
order.   
One hypothesis which suggests itself about the WTO, based on Cox’s institutional 
model, is that it is a mechanism put in place by a declining hegemon (the United States) to 
bolster its power even as the material basis for that power was declining.  Chang (2003) argues 
that in general the argument for free trade tends to support the position of already-established 
economic powers, so the latter will tend to embrace and promote free-trade ideology (of which 
Neoliberalism is a recent variant).   According to Chang, almost all developed countries 
(including the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan) went through a period of 
protectionism, when they initially caught up with the advanced industrial economies of their 
times.  This was crucial to their initial economic growth.  Robert Hunter Wade (2003) expands 
Chang’s ideas to the specific circumstances of the WTO.  By outlawing protectionist economic 
policies via the WTO, established industrial powers take away the main means of development 
from poor countries and thus limit their trade competition. He argues that most of the WTO 
agreements have heavily favored rich countries at the expense of poor countries.  They have 
forced the latter to abandon independent industrialization by disallowing the protection of 
manufacturing, they have prevented them from copying rich country technology without paying 
for the rights to ‘intellectual property,’ and they have pried open their capital markets to foreign 
banks and currency speculators. 
5 Cox (1992: 180) uses the term ‘post-hegemonic’ as opposed to ‘non-hegemonic’ to describe a 
possible future world order without hegemonic power mechanisms or “order without 
dominance” 
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Choven (2005) makes a similar argument, although they go on to argue that the this 
attempt may have backfired upon the United States as it encountered more formidable than 
expected bargaining capacity among developing country coalitions in the WTO.  This sort of 
process, however, is also accounted for in Cox’s model, where institutions once established have 
a life of their own and may escape the intentionality of their creators or even turned against 
them.  Something like this can be seen as happening in 2003 in Cancun.  Brazil, India, and other 
developing countries took advantage of the consensus-based governing rules of the WTO, used 
up until that point to the advantage of the Quad, to shift the balance of power in their favor 
(Choven 2005, Esthatopous 2012). 
 Although Cox makes frequent use of the term ‘structure’ to describe the social orders of 
hegemony, he explicitly rejects what he calls Structural Marxism with its “ahistorical, essentialist 
epistemology” (Cox 1981: 133).  He calls himself a historical materialist and insists that the 
structures he describes are contingent and historically specific, not universal, eternal 
abstractions.  Bieler and Morton (2004: 89- 90) argue the Coxian concepts of state, class, and 
other objects of analysis are historically contingent and contextually-dependent, while 
production is understood not in narrow economic terms, but as “the production and 
reproduction of knowledge and social relations, morals and institutions that are prerequisites to 
the production of physical goods” (Cox 1989: 39, quoted in Beiler and Morton 2004: 89).   
Hegemony and Discourse 
 Foucauldian ideas of discourse, which emphasize the relations between the production 
of knowledge and the exercise of power (Foucault 1972, 1982) lend themselves well to theories 
of hegemony.  Some theorists, building on Foucault’s work, have attempted to bring hegemony 
and discourse more explicitly within the same theoretical framework.  Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
adapt hegemony to post-structuralism by getting rid of essentialist class categories and 
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economic mono-determinism.  Instead, they adopt Foucault’s notion of discursive formations to 
replace the traditional Marxist class categories.  They take this further than Foucault by insisting 
that all practices are discursive practices.   
 Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive formations are internally structured by regular, logical 
relationships and meanings, and are anchored in place only by artificial ‘nodal points’ (rather 
than iron laws of historical necessity). Nodal points are points of reference which help define (to 
partially fix) the objects (including subject positions) in a discursive formation.  Laclau and 
Mouffe refer to the creation of nodal points as articulation.  This fixation can be more or less 
successful, but it can never be entirely complete in the presence of competing discourses.  An 
important point is that discourses can never be entirely closed systems; they are always open to 
interference from other, overlapping discourses; ‘outside’ discourses can destabilize partially 
fixed subject positions, thus creating antagonism.  Hegemonic politics is created by the 
convergence of articulation and antagonism.  Hegemony occurs when a new nodal point is 
created in an attempt to resolve some antagonism; it unites, however tenuously, conflicting 
discourses by establishing chains of equivalent meaning between their objects (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985).  According to Hajer (1995: 60- 61), discourse achieves hegemony when: 1) an 
actor is required to draw upon it to achieve credibility (discursive structuration); and 2) it 
becomes the basis for an institutional arrangement (discursive institutionalization).  According 
to these criteria, it could be argued that neoliberalism has become a globally hegemonic 
discourse.  Economic policy-makers gain credibility by praising the free market and institutional 
arrangements like the WTO enforce neoliberal principals with legal force.   
 
50 
 
State and Sovereignty 
 This work touches on state theory from a few different angles.  The Indian state itself is 
both an arena and a meta-actor in the sphere of agricultural trade policy.  We look at it both 
internally, in terms of the politics of policy formation within India, and externally, as one state 
interacting with other states in the negotiating forums of the WTO.  And we must also look at, 
following Sparke (2005), networks of discourse, material, and power, which do not stay within 
the internal-external boundaries, but cross them; and which may exist somewhat autonomously 
of states, but be interlinked and interdependent with them in various ways.  The WTO (and 
similar intergovernmental bodies) itself presents a challenge to state theory.  It has many state-
like characteristics, it is ‘made up’ of states, but it lacks the essential features of a territory or a 
military. 
Political geographers, especially in the last two decades, have sought to reconceptualize 
political power in ways that go beyond traditional models of the nation state (for example Taylor 
1994; Painter 1995: Brenner, et al 2003; Agnew 1994, 2005; Sparke 2003, 2004, 2005; 
Swyngedouw 1997).  This work stresses that the traditional Westphalian notion of the nation-
state, with its more or less exact correspondence between sovereignty and territory, was and is 
a historically-contingent state form and certainly not the only way to arrange political power 
(Agnew 2005; Painter 1995).  Partly this was a response to the contemporary circumstance of 
globalization, where the nation state no longer seemed adequate to contain many of the 
political processes being observed.  Peck writes: 
 
many of the naturalized domains and normalized routines of the state have been called 
into question by, inter alia, the expanding reach of multilateral institutions, the 
ascendancy of corporate globalism, the deepening of transnational networking, the 
downwarding of risk and responsibility, the shift from government to governance, and 
neoliberal autocritiques of inherited (national) state practices. These developments 
have confounded and confused extant understandings of state spatiality, as clean lines 
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that were once imagined to exist between, say, the nation state and the offshore world, 
bureaucracy and civil society, and the local and the global have become increasingly 
blurred and porous. (Peck 2004: 397). 
 
This is not to say, however, that states ever had been an ideal Westphalian form prior to 
contemporary globalization.  “In no case... has the authority of the state ever been complete.  
There have always been competing sources of authority, from the church in the medieval 
context to international organizations, social movements, businesses, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) today” (Agnew 2005: 442).  Painter (1995: 34) argues that “there can be 
no detailed definition of the state which is both transhistorical (valid throughout time) and 
applicable to the wide variety of social forms which have been understood to be states in 
different historical and geographic settings.”  He proposes the idea of ‘quasi-states’ for 
arrangements that function like states in many respects, but do not necessarily claim statehood.  
These may include crime families, the United Nations, monastic orders, and other objects with 
state-like qualities. This concept is useful to theorize bodies like the UN or the WTO that make 
and enforce laws, but do not directly claim territory.  
 Agnew (2005) in particular argues for the disentanglement of the concepts of territory 
and sovereignty.  He asserts that theories of sovereignty (the exercise of political authority) have 
been hampered by the expectation that sovereignty must line up with territory.  He points out 
numerous exceptions to the rule of ‘one territory, one sovereignty’ in the contemporary world, 
from the EU to the West Bank.  Such exceptions multiply when one considers the de facto 
exercise of sovereignty rather than just its formal status.  Many states that are independent on 
paper are in practice dominated by stronger states (say, Haiti in relation to the United States), or 
by non-state actors.  An important qualification in Agnew’s argument is that non-territorial does 
not mean non-spatial; power networks may be complex and globe-spanning, but they are 
always anchored in specific spaces.  “Sovereignty - the socially constructed practices of political 
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authority - may be exercised non-territorially or in scattered pockets connected by flows across 
space-spanning networks, ... [but] all forms of polity... occupy some sort of space” (441).  
Sovereignty exercised non-territorially is still spatial.  
 This body of political geography is partially rooted in Foucauldian ideas of power.  
Foucault viewed power as embodied in practice and existing only in action (Foucault 1994: 326- 
348).  He argued against economism in conceptions of power, against the idea that power is a 
concrete object that can be given, taken, and exchanged (Foucault 2003: 13- 14).  Power may 
appear to be simply held or “owned” by a person or group, but in reality power must be 
maintained through constant practice.  Power is not exchanged in one discrete exchange like a 
contract.  For a power relation to exist, power must be surrendered continuously.  In other 
words, power must do a lot more work day-to-day to maintain itself than it might appear and 
part of this work is making most of the work invisible. 
 This view of power has implications for theorizing the state and sovereignty.  Power 
relations can be arranged in a hierarchical form with an apex, but “the summit and the lower 
elements of the hierarchy stand in a relationship of mutual support and conditioning, a mutual 
‘hold’ (power as mutual and indefinite ‘blackmail’)” (Foucault 1980, 159).  The apex may be the 
most visible part of a structure, but it is not necessarily the most “powerful.”  State power does 
not originate from some central point of sovereignty and is not stored there.  Power flows 
through the state rather than from it.  “The State, no more probably today than at any other 
time in its history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor, to 
speak frankly this importance” (Foucault 1991, 103). 
In deemphasizing the state, Foucault draws attention to other ensembles of social 
power relations that relate to state, but are much less subservient to it than they might appear.  
“the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole 
53 
 
field of actual power relations” (1980: 122) Foucault describes the state almost as a sort of 
second-order effect resulting from the interaction of other power networks, a “meta-power” 
which “can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations” and “consists in 
the codification of a whole number of power relations that render its functioning possible” 
(ibid). The Foucauldian state is a metapower derived from and dependent on various other 
power relations.  It derives its staying power partly from the fact that it is a convenient 
reference point to sort out and balance other power relations.   It is not difficult to extend this 
model to a multistate organization like the WTO.  In this case, the WTO “quasi-state” (to borrow 
Painter’s term) would be a third-order effect resulting from the interaction of states themselves, 
codifying the relations among them. 
Timothy Mitchell (1988, 1991) builds on Foucault, but gives a bit more prominence to 
the potential of state power.  He conceives of the state as metaphysical abstraction spread to 
individual subjects through specific embodied practices.  The fact that this abstraction is so 
widely shared, however, is itself generative of power, creating what Mitchell calls the ‘state 
effect.’ Here, the interesting thing about the state is not where it begins and ends, but how this 
abstraction comes to be shared and how this in of itself produces/ reproduces power 
relationships. 
Ferguson and Gupta (2002) also conceptualize the state as a shared abstraction created 
by social practices, which they describe as creating an imaginary space of “vertical 
encompassment.”  Encompassment indicates the state imagined as a hierarchy of containers – 
state containing regions containing communities containing families, etc; while verticality is a 
spatial metaphor for authority – the state not only contains the local community, it is ‘above’ 
the community.  They propose that global governance bodies can be incorporated into this state 
imaginary, rather than disrupting it.  Vertical encompassment is ‘stretched’ to add a new top 
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level to the nested scalar hierarchy.  This does not necessarily amount to a weakening of 
traditional nation states: “The central effect of the new forms of transnational governmentality 
is not so much to make states weak (or strong), as to reconfigure states’ abilities to spatialize 
their authority and to stake their claims to superior generality and universality” (123). 
 One of the theoretical problems faced by research of this sort is whether, and to what 
extent, to treat the state as ‘unified actor’ with interests, motivations, and intentions akin to 
that we might ascribe to a person.  James Ferguson warns against this in The Anti-Politics 
Machine (1994 [1990], 60-62; 282-283) against taking states as unified, individual actors.  He 
argues that by locating economic problematics  on the scale of the nation one “avoids the 
formulation of any issue, problem, or program for action based on entities other than the state, 
effectively excluding from the field of view both conflicts within the nation and forces which 
transcend it” (62).  Ferguson (282) suggests that the first thing we should ask when confronted 
with a question like ‘what should country X do?’ is to answer ‘who in country X?’  When we 
explore the archival material for India’s Trade Policy Reviews in chapters 5- 7, it will be seen that 
the representatives of member states are often spoken of in the Meeting Reports as 
personifying the country in question.  It was difficult at times not to use this shorthand in my 
own analysis, not to just say “India wanted X” instead of the ‘representative of India’ or the 
‘government of India’ when discussing issues on a macro international level.   
 In this dissertation, I avoid representing states as sealed, monolithic entities with a rigid 
set of interests and desires.  For all of this fuzziness and contingency, however, states are 
regarded as real objects, even actors, for the purposes of this work.  How can we consider an 
arena where groups of actors with sometimes diametrically opposed agendas to itself be an 
actor?  Partly for the same reason we can consider an individual human being, with all of their 
internal conflicts and competing desires to be an actor.  This analogy can only be taken so far, of 
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course.  I will use the term ‘meta-agency’ to describe a large group of people and objects acting 
in unison for a specific set of purposes (and with varying degrees of voluntarism), such as 
performing state functions (such as voting, obeying laws, or reporting deviations). 
 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation contributes to the political geography by examining policy arguments 
arising in the fuzzy areas of overlapping sovereignty where national state interacts with 
international organization.  As a study of how power works in the WTO, it provides a case study 
of the working of overlapping sovereignty where law created in a multilateral institution must 
then be implemented in individual states.  If the WTO was created partly as a mechanism to 
prop up the power of declining hegemons, as in Wade’s (2003) interpretation of Chang’s (2003) 
“kicking away the ladder” thesis, then it has also proven to be a forum where they hegemons 
can be challenged (whether or not successfully remains to be seen). 
 With regard to the policy transfer literature, this dissertation answers Marsh and 
Sharman’s call to examine policy transfer in a developing state.  It supports the case made 
especially by geographers working in the policy mobilities literature (Prince 2012a, 2012b; Ward 
and McCann 2010; Peck and Theodore 2012) that policy transfer, especially in regard to 
neoliberalism, is piecemeal, bidirectional, and subject to local innovation.  This study also 
reveals something about how neoliberal discourse works within the power structure of the 
WTO.  Neoliberalism is never mentioned as a coherent body of thought in the Secretariat 
Reports analyzed in chapters 5- 7, but rather is presented ‘unlabeled’ as simply a set of 
technocratic common sense.  It is recognized as in Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2009, 2010a, 
2010b) that neoliberalism is fragmented, not often self-identified, and subject to great local 
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variation.  It is argued, however, that these very features contribute to its expansiveness as 
especially to its staying power in the face of failure. 
  Within the specific context of India, at least, the transfer of neoliberal policy is indeed 
subject to the adaptation to unique local, country-specific circumstances.  Indeed, taken in 
isolation it is difficult to see how the watered-down, piecemeal, and often unorthodox 
application of neoliberal policy advice in India can be in any way described as ‘neoliberal.’  There 
is no question that the policies pushed by the WTO Secretariat fit the description of 
neoliberalism (chapter 6 especially demonstrates this), but the selective liberalization that India 
has undergone, which retains extensive regulation, government transfer payments, even price 
controls does not resemble any description of neoliberalism with which I am familiar.  It can be 
argued, however, as in Harvey (2005) has in the case of liberalization in China, that liberalization 
in India is mutually dependent on the rise of neoliberal discourse globally.  This question will be 
revisited in the concluding arguments of the dissertation in chapter 9. 
 Although the very early intellectual centers of neoliberalism were located in developed 
countries, neoliberalism is not simply a matter of diffusion from developed to developing 
countries.  Dezalay and Garth (2002) note that neoliberal policy was adopted in earlier in Chile 
than in the United States or United Kingdom, while Peck et al (2009) emphasize that developing 
countries were often involuntary laboratories for early experiments in structural adjustment.  
Even aside from this however, it is obvious especially from the heated arguments in the India’s 
Trade Policy Review meeting, that neoliberal policy was only ever selectively adopted in 
developed countries.  A good example of this is the persistence of highly protected and 
intervened-upon agricultural markets in the United States and Europe.  The association of 
neoliberal policy with powerful developed countries seems to have much more to do with the 
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rhetoric of their representatives – certainly in the context of advice and criticism given during 
the Indian TPRs - than with actual practice. 
 Chapter 8 of this dissertation, especially, takes on the recommendation of geographers 
engaged in the policy transfer literature to pay more attention to the specificity of policy 
movement, including specific institutional sites, material channels of information flow, and 
individuals embodying policy knowledge (Larner and Laurie 2010; Prince 2010 and 2012; Peck 
and Theodore 2012).  This is in part a corrective for the emphasis on archival documents in the 
three preceding chapters, or a way to look at the same process from a different angle. 
 Finally, I want to emphasize that this dissertation is first and foremost an empirical 
study.  It is hoped that the descriptions and observations presented here are valuable in of 
themselves, regardless of whether one agrees with my interpretations. 
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Chapter 4: Methods 
 
 This chapter will discuss the overall methodological framework of the project, 
approaches to the specific methods used, and the experiences and problems that accompanied 
them.  The analytic framework used in the research on which this dissertation reports generally 
emerges from the Foucauldian tradition, but is also informed by other compatible analytic 
models, specifically Policy Epistemics (Fischer 2003, 2009), and Relational Biography (Dezalay 
and Garth 2002).  Discourse, or more precisely discursive formation, is understood here to 
include not only statements themselves, but also the material and institutional contexts and 
relationships of power in which the statement is produced.  The objects of research, as noted in 
the introduction (chapter 1), were three overlapping discursive arenas: WTO space, Indian state 
space, and policy expert space.  Practically these discourses were accessed through two sets of 
data: archival records available via the WTO web site and the content of 26 semi-structured 
interviews with officials and policy experts in India. 
 The archival portion of the research focused on nine documents associated with India’s 
three Trade Policy Reviews.  Each of these Reviews produced a Secretariat Report, a 
Government Report, and Meeting Minutes.  Chapters 5- 7 contain a detailed discourse analysis 
of these documents.  The interviews were undertaken during two periods of field research in 
Delhi, the first in October 2008 to January 2009 and the second from September to December 
2010.  These are analyzed in chapter 8. 
 
Framework for Discourse Analysis 
 The method of discourse analysis was most explicitly laid out by Foucault in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (AoK) in 1972.  Discourse here is understood as a distribution of 
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statements, but this approach is specifically interested not so much in the statements 
themselves as the conditions which caused/ allowed them to exist, what Foucault calls the ‘rules 
of formation.’  These are rooted in materiality and temporality, and in the context of social 
power relations.  Specifically, AoK enumerates four overlapping systems of formation/ 
transformation contributing to a discourse, including: objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, 
and strategic options.  Objects are what the discourse refers to, and are formed and reformed 
within the discourse.  Enunciative modes, or statement style, concerns who speaks, from where, 
with what authority, and under what conditions.  Concepts, in Foucault’s terms, are the 
relations of coexistence among statements, i.e. the framework in which statements related to 
each other (their order, interdependencies, etc.).  Finally, strategy or theme concerns how 
different possible options produced by the discourse are decided upon, generally on the basis of 
relations with other discursive formations or social practices (such as the functional role a 
discourse fulfills in society or the desire for knowledge that some other discursive formation 
generates). 
 
Policy Epistemics 
 A form of discourse analysis known as Policy Epistemics was used extensively in this 
project.  This approach was developed by Fischer (2000) for the study of inter-discursive 
articulation among different communities and the effects such relationships have on policy-
making.  The units of analysis are ‘fields of argument’ - public controversies or political disputes - 
and the policy networks that form around them.  Policy Epistemics concerns itself with  
 
The movement and uses of information, the social assumptions embedded in research 
design, the specific relationship of different types of information to decision-making, the 
different ways arguments move across different disciplines and discourses, and the 
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translation of knowledge from one discursive community to another, and the 
interrelations between discourses and institutions (256).  
 
It concerns not only active policy-makers in administrative roles, but any group, such as expert 
communities, or activist citizens, and local stakeholders, concerned with the debate.   
 India’s relationships with the WTO and its policy implications for agriculture constitute a 
set of public controversies involving a variety of policy networks and discursive communities.   
This constitutes a ‘field of argument’ in Fischer’s terms.   This field is cross-articulated in WTO 
negotiations, Indian government strategy, and within the discursive community of Indian policy 
expertise, as well as in the media, stakeholder forums, and other areas.  Policy Epistemics calls 
on us to examine how understandings and agendas are transferred among these different fields 
of argument, especially where different frames of reference must be accommodated or 
complicated technical explanations simplified into more general stories or metaphors. 
 
Discursive Matrix 
 Discursive elements that will be analyzed in this project include: the construction of 
important objects and actors; the perceived logical dependencies among them; how the various 
fields of competence and intervention are discursively delimited; what authorities are 
referenced or claimed by the speaker; what stories (hypothetical or actual) are used to 
demonstrate rhetorical points; normative measures used; absent references (perhaps terms 
that are consciously avoided or replaced with euphemisms) and systematic exclusions (for 
instance issues claimed to be outside of the speakers area of competence or responsibility); and 
uncontested assumptions (especially those appearing in otherwise antagonistic discourses). 
 To further specify these elements: Objects are constructed through classificatory 
categories used to divide up and make sense of reality.  Actors are objects that are ascribed 
61 
 
agency, that have intentions and act on them.  Constructing actors involves the shorthand terms 
used in arguments to ascribe agency. Often complex articulations of political agency are 
described as a single actor as a discursive shorthand to simplify reality, what are termed here as 
group actors. For example, states are often described as actors, as discrete units with more or 
less unified intentionality (notably in statements about trade).  The ambiguity of such 
constructions (are we talking about the people of this country or the government or something 
else?) can in some cases be a rhetorical asset.  Similar unified intentionality can be ascribed to 
classes, political groupings, economic sectors, etc.  The distinction between actors and other 
objects is often blurred, as with objects, such as ‘the weather’ or ‘the market’, which are 
conceived as acting autonomously according to their own logical system, but not as having 
intention.   
 Systematic dependencies among objects and actors can range from complex theoretical 
frameworks to common sense cause-and-effect relationships. Larger and more general 
arguments are often connected to more specific arguments.  Connections can be hypothesized 
between a specific argument and a more general trope by the things it takes as a given.  For 
instance, in mainstream arguments about ‘development,’ varied arguments can be made that 
diametrically oppose one another in many respects, but which all take it as a given that the main 
goal of Indian economic policy is to strive toward an economy that more closely resembles 
those of the ‘advanced’ industrial countries. 
 Stories or tropes and metaphors are often deployed and reproduced through discourses 
and often serve as a translation mechanism between different discourses.  Some tropes fall 
somewhat to the side of the specific argument, but have to be mentioned at least in passing, if 
only to neutralize them.  Logics referred to only to neutralize them reveal something about 
current discursive conflicts.  It is a sign of neoliberal hegemony when arguments which eschews 
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neoliberal logic are compelled to assert in passing the limitations of this logic.  Other arguments 
may mention a larger conventional argumentative trope in order to establish an exception.  
Such tactics are very prevalent in statements concerning agriculture, where commentators who 
otherwise subscribe to free market arguments must explain why ‘normal’ market conditions 
(and the normative prescriptions that would follow) do not apply to the ‘special’ conditions of 
the agricultural market (Dixon and Hapke 2003).  Different normative measures often lead to 
contrary arguments.  For example, measuring poverty by per capita income might give the 
impression that poverty is declining in India, while using a proxy like per capita daily absorption 
of food grain may indicate that it is increasing. 
 Fields of intervention include what a discourse can describe legibly and conceive of as 
amenable to action.  Objects may be excluded from actionability by limits a discourse sets on its 
area of competency, what objects and processes it ascribes rights and responsibilities to act on, 
and simply by notions of what is possible.  Such limits are often unstable and fields of 
intervention can overlap between discourses (for example where regulatory policy must consult 
expert scientific communities).   Often the boundaries of a field of intervention will be marked 
by qualifiers of official status and competence, such as claims for speaking on behalf of a larger 
group or, conversely by qualifiers indicating a personal remark or indicating incompetence to set 
a boundary marker to the field (i.e. “but I am not qualified to comment on this particular issue” 
or “but this observation is purely anecdotal”). Some of these common elements of discourse are 
described in Table 4.1 below. 
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Table 4.1: Selected common discursive elements and their significance 
Selected common discursive elements and their significance 
Discursive Elements  Significance 
Objects Classificatory constructions 
Actors Objects that act intentionally or at least with 
systematic logic 
Group Actors Actor-objects pictured as having unified 
intentionality for certain purposes, even 
though they stand in for large complexes of 
people, things, and processes (i.e. states) 
Systems Functional dependencies among objects, 
actors, and processes 
Tropes Stories and metaphors systematically related 
to rhetorical points 
Normative Measures Metrics used judge 
Fields of competence and Intervention Field of objects defined by a discourse as 
amenable to manipulation 
Mark of official or unofficial statements Statements containing indications of whether 
or not they claim to express the position of a 
larger group than the speaker themselves. 
Authorities referenced Sources of legitimation used to back up claims 
Absent References Terms and concepts generally avoided or 
unrecognizable in a particular discourse 
Systematic exclusions 
 
Areas typically avoided as objects of 
intervention/ responsibility 
Uncontested Assumptions Circumstances taken as given 
 
Interviews 
Study Population  
 The study population includes Indian policy experts, makers, and administrators 
distributed in networks of overlapping public, private, and hybrid institutions.  This includes 
subjects inferred from archival research, but more importantly the population from which 
interview subjects were drawn during the fieldwork.  Specifically in reference to interview 
subjects: all were adults, most of them were male, all were of relatively elite status, and all were 
fluent in English (the lingua franca in which most government business and higher education is 
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conducted)6.  Although subjects were divided for methodological purposes into two sets, 
officials and experts, in practice the distinction between them was often blurred. 
 
Rationale for Using Interviews with this Population 
 Policy formation in Indian agricultural trade could have been approached from any 
number of angles, with different methods or subject populations than those ultimately chosen 
here.  Much could be learned by studying farmers themselves, their political leaders and 
lobbyists, state-level administrators, or members of Indian WTO delegations themselves.  It 
could be legitimately asked how this study can say anything meaningful about hegemonic 
processes in Indian agriculture without speaking to a single farmer.  Methodologically, it might 
also be pointed out that the community I did choose to study is one that produces a great deal 
of publically-available written text.  Why interview a policy expert when I could have read their 
publications? 
 In regard to the population chosen, I was less interested in the farmers themselves and 
in top political decision-makers than I was in the networks which connected them.  Choosing to 
look at the hegemonic process from the ‘middle’ has some disadvantages.  For instance, without 
understanding the labor processes, direct power relationships, and subject positions of the 
material producers of agro-commodities, this study cannot claim any direct knowledge of their 
class interests.  What we have instead is only knowledge of the interests attributed to them by 
experts and officials several steps removed from them in policy formation networks.  Rather 
than seeing this distance as a weakness of the research, however, I see it as an object of analysis 
in itself.  Similarly, the distance between the people I spoke to and top-level negotiators and 
6 It should be noted that the Indian dialect of English differed to some extent from the American 
dialect the researcher was accustomed to and this presented some difficulties at first. 
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decision-makers is also an object of analysis.  The population I spoke to held intermediate 
positions as relays between agricultural producers and key government decision makers.  As 
such they acted as interpreters, aggregators, and gatekeepers of policy discourse (of course, the 
policy expert community is not the only ‘channel’ of communication between farmers and the 
government, but it is a very important one). 
 Returning to the methodological question above, most of the people I interviewed 
belonged to institutions (both governmental departments and think tanks) which produced 
large amounts of archival material reflecting the subject I was studying (some of it written by 
the very people being interviewed).  As such, I could have analyzed a selection of these archival 
documents in the manner of the TPR documents examined in chapters 5- 7.  I could have done 
this without even leaving the United States, given the amount of such archival material available 
online.  The interview method, however, provided insights into aspects of the production of 
ideas that may have been obscured by the formal rules and conventions in the creation of 
archival records.  Through speaking directly to the interview subjects I gained insight into how 
the informants saw themselves and their institution in the larger context of policy formation.  
The anonymity of the interviews allowed for frank opinions of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the processes and institutions involved.  The interactive and dynamic nature of this method 
provided for an ‘up-close’ view of idea production.  Having to frame their ideas in terms of my 
questions may have, in some instances, caused the informants to think of them in new ways.  
Unlike working with a document, I could ask for immediate clarification for a concept I did not 
understand and for further explanation of the assumptions underlying a position. 
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Interview Questions and Analysis 
 The content of the interviews can be roughly divided into three categories.  First, I asked 
questions to contextualize the informants themselves within the discursive networks of interest 
to the project.  This information concerned the informants’ background, job responsibilities, 
areas of expertise, and schools of thought, and their day-to-day processes of gathering and 
interpreting information.  A second group of questions related to the organization they each 
represented.  I asked them about the organization’s activities; its personnel; its relation to other 
similar groups, as well as relationships with government, business, and civil society; and its 
research.  A third group of questions concerned how they looked agricultural trade policy and 
the WTO.  Here, I was interested in how they constructed actors such as the WTO, the Indian 
government, and various interest groups in India. 
 Although not all of the questions were the same for every interviewee, they were 
similar (see Appendix for a sample list of interview questions).  They evolved as I gained 
experience with the subject community and they were often altered to fit the specific 
circumstances of the informant; for example, I did not ask the government officials a lot of 
questions about think tanks (although I did ask them about what they considered reliable 
sources of information).  Given the limited time of the interviews and the difficulty of gaining 
access to elites, I sometimes had to economize my question set to delve more specifically into 
the informant’s particular and valuable set of experiences and knowledge. 
 The approach to discourse analysis here is somewhat different than in the TPR chapters.  
I pay less attention to key terms, since the use of such terms was no doubt influenced by how I 
phrased a question.  Most of the interviews were not audio-recorded, and the analysis had to 
rely on notes.  This makes for more use of paraphrasing than direct quotes.  Keeping track of 
67 
 
exact wording would have slowed interviews down unacceptably, so where direct quotes are 
used they are by necessity short.     
 
Relational Biography 
Delazay and Garth (2002) propose a method they call Relational Biography to explore political-
intellectual networks.  This involves lengthy in depth interviews with individuals occupying key 
positions in hypothesized networks, inquiring about such things as educational backgrounds, 
career paths, and familial/ social milieu.  These ideas were used in both the document analysis 
and interview design.   They informed the research by pointing out lines of force and influence 
that might otherwise be overlooked, like educational background, career trajectories, or 
connections to international organizations.  Some of these dimensions are listed in Table 4.2 
below. 
Table 4.2: Subject dimensions 
Subject dimensions 
Career History 
Family Background 
Sources of new and information 
Metrics considered reliable 
Political affiliations, allegiances 
Areas of perceived responsibility/ expertise 
 
Institutional Context of Research Subjects and Statements 
 Three overlapping discursive arenas or ‘spaces’ were proposed as organizing the 
research: the WTO, the Indian state, and the Indian policy-expert community.  Each of these 
spaces includes people, archives, institutional relationships, and technological infrastructure.  
Less tangibly, they also include fields of discourse, habit, and power that influence and constrain 
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them.  One of the goals of the analysis was to map these spaces topologically as a way to specify 
one of the dimensions from which the discourse emerges.  
 In the case of the WTO and the Indian government, mapping formal institutional 
structures was comparatively straightforward.  Most of the bodies involved fitted neatly into 
well-defined schematics based on divisions of labor and/ or nested hierarchies.  Paths of 
informal influence are, of course, far more difficult to ascertain, and consequently less certain 
and more hypothetical, and are discussed elsewhere.  The formal structure of research 
institutions and think tanks was less straightforward but usually more or less coherent and 
visible. 
 The institutional structure of the WTO is described in chapter 2.  Within the Indian 
government, two ministries in particular share the main responsibility agro-trade and WTO 
policy: the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (especially the Department of Commerce, under 
this ministry) and the Ministry of Agriculture.  Authority is further complicated by the federal 
structure of the Indian state, where that agricultural policy is technically constitutionally 
reserved for state-level governments (although this has often not true in practice, especially 
insofar as the WTO is concerned). 
Policy formation, of course, does not take place exclusively within insular government 
bodies.  Universities, research institutes, and think tanks with varying degrees of official status 
form an overall discursive environment in which agro-trade policy is discussed, critiqued, and 
developed.  I have described this as the third discursive arena, but this is a somewhat artificial 
division and there is a great deal of overlap or hybridity between the government and non-
government in the space of policy generation.  A number of the research institutes considered in 
the following chapters are publicly funded and have official responsibilities.  The Institute for 
Agricultural Research at Delhi University, for instance, is used by the government to compile 
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agricultural statistics.  In addition, the government sometimes contracts private institutes to 
collect statistics or undertake studies.  Other policy research organizations are funded by 
philanthropic trusts, chambers of commerce, private firms, and international organizations. 
 
Fieldwork 
While most of the archival portion of the research could have been conducted from anywhere 
with an internet connection, the interview component called for overseas fieldwork.  As noted 
above, this took the form of two separate research trips to India.  On my first trip, I spent 2 1/3 
months in India and conducted 13 interviews.  The second period of fieldwork lasted 
approximately 3 months and also produced 13 interviews.  Both trips were funded by a National 
Science Foundation grant.  During my fieldwork and as a prerequisite for obtaining a research 
visa, I was granted an affiliation with Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi as a foreign scholar.  I 
also benefitted tremendously from a prior network of friends and professional contacts in India, 
and especially in Delhi.  Delhi University granted me special permission to stay in one of their 
student hostels.   
 
Subject Recruitment Methods   
 I employed a number of strategies to recruit interview candidates.  I had a surprising 
number of successes with ‘cold’ contacts, where I simply emailed suitable candidates identified 
through previous archival research.  A benefit of studying elites is that most of them have 
enough of a web presence to track down contact information without much difficulty; this is 
especially true of policy experts with university posts or think tank connections.  I was also able 
to contact a number of informants through intermediaries via a pre-existing network of friends 
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and colleagues in Delhi, especially in academia.  This often took several links in a chain of 
contacts to arrive at a suitable and willing interview subject.  This Delhi social network also 
proved invaluable in providing advice for getting along in Indian bureaucratic culture.  Interview 
subjects themselves were in some cases willing to act as intermediaries to recruit more subjects, 
or at least recommend other potential research subjects for me to approach.  Although 
contacting interview subjects was a slow and complicated process, once I had established a 
small number of intermediate contacts, the rate of interviews picked up. 
In recruiting officials for interviews, my first choice was those government officials (or 
former officials) who have worked directly on WTO-agricultural issues, especially those who 
have served on delegations to Geneva, to any of the various WTO Summits or informal green 
room meetings, or to any of the G20 meetings.  Such officials are rare and difficult to access.  
During the course of the project I only succeeded in getting an interview with two such people.  
Other officials were sought who work in areas affected by WTO policy, especially in the 
Department of Commerce or the Department of Agriculture and Cooperation.  Additionally, 
some officials from state and local governments were interviewed.   
In recruiting non-official policy experts, I first selected prominent scholars active in the 
archives that I had studied.  I at first prioritized trying to interview members of the two primary 
think tanks I chose to focus on: Economic Research Foundation (ERF) and Council for Research 
on International Economic Relations (ICRIER).  This group turned out to be unresponsive to my 
overtures in most cases, but I was able to interview 1-2 subjects from each.  Members of 
publicly-funded research institutes were far more willing to be interviewed.  Most of the experts 
interviewed were economists dealing with trade and/ or agricultural issues.  In addition to 
members of think tanks and public research institutes, I also conducted interviews with 
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prominent activists working in the agro-trade area and university professors identified by other 
informants as key experts. 
 
 
Interview Procedures 
 As a setting for the interview, the subject’s office was preferred, but other settings (such 
as the subject’s home or public place such as a café) were accommodated.  Interviews were 
conducted verbally and recorded in written notes.   Each interview was about 60- 90 minutes, 
though they were shorter or longer depending on the interviewee’s schedule. Occasionally, 
additional material and clarifications were added via follow up communications. 
 All interviews were conducted under conditions of anonymity.  No names are given and 
specific information about informants’ job titles and institutional affiliation is avoided where 
possible.  Preserving the anonymity of my subjects is important because many of them work in 
government and other hierarchical institutions where frank expression of opinion may damage 
job prospects and reputation.  Some of my subjects appreciated this anonymity; others were 
indifferent.  More than one indicated that that they did not state anything in the interview that 
they would not state publicly.  Nonetheless, anonymity is preserved in all cases, whether desired 
or not.  I have not made use of fake names or any other specific informant designation system.  
It is therefore possible that two pieces of information from the same informant may not be 
identifiable as such if mentioned in different contexts. 
 A consent form approved by the University of Kentucky Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
was delivered to the subjects prior to, or at the beginning of, the interview.  These forms 
contained a brief explanation of the project, assurances of confidentiality and other research 
subject rights, and contact information, in the event of inquiries or complaints, for the 
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researcher and for the Office of Research Integrity at the University of Kentucky.  The content of 
the form was also explained verbally at the start of the interview, including the provision that 
the subject can stop the interview at any time and/ or withdraw their consent to use the 
information disclosed during the interview even after the interview has been completed.  This 
information was reiterated at the conclusion of the interview as well.  It was impractical to offer 
a translation of the consent form in the speaker’s first language.  Scholars and officials in Delhi 
come from all over India and there is no way of determining in advance what their native 
language is and the provision of consent form translations in all of the major languages of India 
(there are well over a dozen major languages and even more minor ones) would be prohibitively 
complicated and expensive.  Further, it was assumed that if the subject is fluent enough in 
English to participate in government business and academic life, then they were able to 
comprehend a document written in English. 
Approaching Semi-Structured Interviews with Elites as a Foreigner 
 The interviews were semi-structured, conversational rather than ‘questionnaire-style.’  
Interview questions were tailored to the subject, differing to some extent between officials and 
experts.  Although a prepared set of questions was developed (see appendix), the answers were 
for the most part open-ended and new questions were sometimes developed on the spot to ask 
for clarification on answers or further probe promising themes that emerged from initial 
answers.  Furthermore, experience in one interview often led to alterations to the next.  The 
data derived from the interviews provided further expert discourse for analysis and also helped 
to map out the networks through which this discourse was produced by establishing something 
about the backgrounds and network positions of the actors involved. 
 Interviews are localized and directed productions of discourse (Rose 1997).  However, 
the outcome of the interview is a special sort of discourse in that the researcher collaborates in 
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its production.  This project takes the perspective that the interview produces new knowledge, 
rather than simply uncovering pre-existing facts.  I mean ‘new knowledge’ not in the sense that 
it was plucked out of thin air or ‘made-up’ on the spot, but in the sense that the material is 
being reshaped by the researcher’s frame of interpretation and also by the creativity of the 
respondent in recombining and articulating their knowledge (for instance, the way a question is 
worded may prompt the respondent to think about something in a new way or make a 
connection they had not thought of before).  
 There are two specific sets of problems that were likely to arise in the context of the 
interviews in this project: those arising from interviewing in a cross-cultural context and those 
arising from interviewing elites.  Insofar as policy experts, who were mostly economists, were 
the subject of my interviews, I was a ‘foreigner’ in more than one sense, not only from another 
country but from another discipline. Skelton (2001) suggests that in preparing for cross-cultural 
research, it is important to read as much as possible about the community being researched 
written by members of that community.  This was not difficult in the case of this project, given 
the archival portion of the research that preceded the interviews themselves.  In some cases, 
the interview subjects were the primary authors of some of the documents I had reviewed. 
 Misunderstandings may occur during interviews due to inconsistencies between the 
frames of references between the researcher and the respondent.  The principle of reflexivity 
requires that we examine our own frames of reference (our positionality) to minimize such 
misunderstandings.  Rose (1997) notes, however, that perfect self-knowledge is impossible and 
this puts limits on the usefulness of reflexivity.  Many feminist researchers (Skelton 2001; 
Mohammad 2001; McKay 2002; Rose 1997) have suggested that paying attention to how the 
respondents construct the researcher is an important tool of reflexivity.  It is often useful to 
actively negotiate this construction to establish trust and rapport with the respondent.   
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 Interviewing elites (scholars and officials in this case) often involves difficulties in gaining 
access. Elites tend to have layers of gatekeepers controlling access to them and they tend to 
consider their time very valuable.  England (2002) recommends that one must be “shamelessly 
opportunistic” when approaching elites, exploiting contacts and intermediaries to the fullest.  In 
my own fieldwork, I was helped tremendously to gain access to elites by a small number of 
reliable intermediaries. 
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Chapter 5: Trade Policy Reviews (1998- 2007) 
 
 The characteristic form of agricultural exceptionalism that made the G20 (see chapter 2 
for an explanation of the G20) work – opposition to direct producer subsidies coupled with 
tolerance of tariffs, administered prices, and other ‘poor’ country policy instruments – did not 
emerge out of a vacuum.  Since the early years of the WTO’s operation, Indian governments 
have defended protectionist practices toward their own agricultural population, while attacking 
agricultural trade barriers in developed countries.  The improving bargaining position of India 
and other big developing countries, along with their ability to put aside their differences in other 
areas put this brand of agro-exceptionalism at the center of the ‘rebellion’ at Cancun and most 
WTO negotiations since. 
In this and the following two chapters, I will examine the evolution of India-WTO trade 
discourse, with a focus on the exceptional position of agriculture, via an analysis of documents 
produced through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.  Trade Policy Reviews or TPRs are 
periodic meetings of WTO representatives at Geneva, set aside to examine and evaluate the 
economic policies of one member.  Each member is obligated under WTO rules to periodically 
submit to a TPR, the frequency of which depends on factors including the size of its economy.  
The WTO website itself provides the following rationale: 
Surveillance of national trade policies is a fundamentally important activity running 
throughout the work of the WTO. At the centre of this work is the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM). All WTO members are reviewed, the frequency of each country’s 
review varying according to its share of world trade (WTO 2007). 
 
 India is subject to TPRs about every 4- 5 years and has undergone reviews in 1998, 2002, 
and 2007. It also underwent a similar review in 1993 under GATT, shortly before that agreement 
was superseded and absorbed by the WTO.  For this reason the ‘98, ‘02, and ‘07 reviews are 
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often numbered as India’s 2nd, 3rd, and 4th reviews.  This chapter will examine the first three 
reviews that took place after the creation of the WTO.  A fourth review conducted in 2011 is not 
considered here. 
 These meetings are in most ways less dramatic than the major WTO Ministerial 
Meetings or Dispute Settlement Cases.  They lead to no binding decisions and are not 
negotiations in the formal sense.  They could easily be dismissed as a sideshow that contributes 
little to the real work of the WTO, but to do so would overlook an important resource pertaining 
to the political-discursive environment of the WTO.  Here are a number of reasons to study the 
TPR.  First, the low-stakes nature of these meetings allows the participants to talk more freely 
and in more general terms than in forums where specific agreements or binding judgments are 
being hammered out.  Second, since all members are invited to participate, they provide a good 
survey of the current concerns, preoccupations, and sympathies of various members, especially 
with respect to the target country.  Third, they provide the target country itself with a platform 
not only to justify its own economic policies, but also to criticize those of its trading partners.  
Finally, for reasons explained below, they provide a clearer-than-usual view of the normative 
standards of the WTO in general and of the Secretariat in particular. 
 One of the most striking aspects of the TPRM is its scope.  It does, as might be expected, 
concern itself with if and how well the member is fulfilling its obligations under the WTO 
agreements.  However, this is not the only or even the primary object of scrutiny.  Rather, it 
includes a broad critique of all aspects of a country’s economic policy, regardless of whether 
that aspect is regulated by the WTO or not.  Despite its name, the review does not even limit 
itself to trade policy, but takes on any aspect of economic policy that might influence trade 
(which is almost anything).  During the course of the review, matters such as tax policy, banking 
regulation, government budgets, and social policies such as food distribution are subject to 
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evaluation and critique.  As a fundamentally evaluative exercise, the TPRs are concerned with 
examination and judgment. This leads us to the following question.  What normative standards 
do the participants use to judge policies where no formal WTO rules apply? 
 Each review involves a number of stages.  First, the Secretariat - the permanent 
bureaucratic staff of the WTO headquartered in Geneva (see chapter 2 for a more detailed 
description) - produces a report critiquing the target country’s economic policies.  The target 
country then produces its own report (called the Government Report) explaining, and if 
necessary defending its policies (it can also be used to air some of its own grievances on trade 
issues).  The next stage involves the meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB), which 
consists of representatives of each member entity (see chapter 2 for an explanation of the 
distinction between ‘member entity’ and ‘country’).  During the course of the meeting, various 
member countries take the floor and provide their own assessments of the target country’s 
economic policy.  The Secretariat Report and the Government Report serve as a starting point 
for discussion in the meeting and are often referred to by speakers there.   
 
Key Documents of the TPR 
 Each of these three stages corresponds to a key document produced during the course 
of each TPR.  These are available for download on the WTO website (the Secretariat Report is 
split into multiple documents), along with associated documents containing addendums and 
press releases.  These documents contain no specific attributions of authorship, although 
several of the key participants in the meeting are named – including the chairperson, the 
discussant, and the leader or leaders of the Indian delegation.  The other speakers in the 
meeting minutes are simply identified as the representative of the member state they are 
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speaking for.  The TPR meetings, like most WTO business aside from Ministerial Summits, take 
place in Geneva. 
 
The Secretariat Reports 
 The Secretariat plays a key role in the TPRM, not only as an organizer and facilitator, but 
as an active participant.  Prior to the meeting, the Secretariat undertakes a study of the target 
member’s economy and its economic policies and releases a comprehensive critique called the 
Secretariat Report, the contents of which inform all subsequent stages of the TPR.  In these 
reports, we have perhaps the most thorough and detailed expression of the normative 
orientation of Secretariat available (a notion which is reinforced by the non-specification of 
authors other than the ‘WTO Secretariat’ in the actual documents).  
 As noted above, compliance with WTO agreements is only a small part of what is 
discussed in TPRs.  The Secretariat Reports “cover the development of all aspects of India’s trade 
policies, including domestic laws and regulations, the institutional framework, trade policies by 
measure and by sector” (WTO 2002a).  Since virtually any aspect of economic policy can be 
argued to influence trade, there is little outside of the scope of the critique.  Everything from 
labor laws to the judiciary are examined and evaluated.  Where there are no specific WTO rules 
applying to the policy under review, the critique reveals the normative criteria that the 
Secretariat applies in the absence of official rules.  The Secretariat is ideologically neutral in 
theory; but in the case of TPRs it advocated often very specific policy reforms that are not 
covered in any WTO agreement.  The basic theme of all three Secretariat Reports is a 
combination of praise for India’s liberal reform program and criticism that it has not gone far 
enough, fast enough. 
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The Government Reports 
 The Government Report, written by representatives of the member’s government, 
follows and is informed by the Secretariat Report.  It provides the target member with an 
opportunity to explain and if necessary to justify its economic policies.  As it is a response to the 
Secretariat Report, it is constrained to some extent to defend itself within a normative 
framework already established in the Secretariat Report.  In explaining its own economic 
policies, the target country also has a platform to criticize the policies of its trading partners.  
Protectionist measures in particular can be explained as a justified reaction to the defensive or 
aggressive trade practices of other members.  In each of the three TPRs, the Indian government 
never failed to use this platform to turn the critique against its trading partners, particularly its 
developed trading partners.  Although the three TPRs took place under different Indian 
administrations, the Government Reports have consistently been a mix of economic 
triumphalism regarding India’s reform programs; defensive assertions about the pace and scope 
of liberalization; and critiques of the policies of India’s developed trading partners. 
 
The Meeting Report 
 All WTO members are invited to participate in the TPR as part of the Trade Policy Review 
Body (TPRB).   The minutes of the meeting record the comments of each speaker, but in 
paraphrasing rather than direct quotes.  Only the chairpersons, the discussants, and the heads 
of the Indian delegation are identified by name.  And they are usually referred to by their titles 
after the introduction.  The other TPRB members are only referred to as the representative of 
their respective countries.  Often (especially in the 2002 meeting minutes) they are referred to 
with only their country’s name after their initial introduction.  Thus the representative of Japan 
is introduced initially: “The representative of Japan invited India to explain...” but, two 
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paragraphs later, the statement takes the form of “Japan noted that the number of AD [anti-
dumping] measures taken by India had risen steadily,...” (WTO 2002c, para. 52, 54). The WTO 
Secretariat is not represented as a speaker in the meeting, but the initial Secretariat Report is 
frequently referred to as an authoritative text (often quoted word-for-word by meeting 
participants), and used to support various statements.  
 While India as the target country is always represented by high-ranking delegates from 
the Indian government, usually the Secretary of Commerce, the other members are represented 
by their permanent missions to the WTO in Geneva.  These usually hold the rank of ambassador 
and they meet under different functional directives as the General Council of the WTO and the 
Dispute Settlement Body (WTO 2007b).  Not all (or even most) members are recorded as 
speaking during the course of the meeting.  This could indicate that they were absent, that they 
were present but silent, or that their comments were not deemed important enough to include 
in the minutes. 
 The comments of the speaking representatives are often repetitive of one another and 
of the Secretariat report.  However, there is enough difference in tone and emphases among 
them to detect specific themes of support or opposition to India’s policies and positions.  For 
example, I argue that the 2002 meeting minutes can be read as a prelude to the developing 
members’ revolt at Cancun, demonstrating a pattern of mutual support among future members 
of the G20 and their desire for agricultural subsidy reform.   
 All three of the meetings followed a standard format.  First the chairperson made a brief 
introduction.  This was followed by a statement by the Indian delegation, explaining its 
government’s point-of-view on its own policies and economic strategies.  The discussant or 
discussants went next, reiterating and expanding on themes brought up in the Secretariat 
Report.  The 1998 meeting had two discussants, so there were four altogether.  They were 
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identified by their membership entity – Singapore, Australia, Ireland, and the EU – but it was 
stressed that they spoke only in their personal capacities, not as representatives of their 
governments.   The longest parts of each meeting were the comments (of varying lengths) by 
the member representatives.  Then the Indian delegation spoke again in response, followed by 
brief discussant statements, followed by additional comments by a few of the member 
representatives.  The chairperson then ended the meeting with a set of concluding remarks.  
Each of the meetings was split up over two days, although the documents made no mention of 
when the day split occurs.  It is implied, but not definitively asserted, that the recorded 
comments followed the same chronology as the actual meeting. 
 
Historical Contexts 
Each of the three TPRs took place under different coalition governments in India.  The 
1998 TPR took place during a period of many short-lived transitional coalitions, while in 2002 
the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party or “India People’s Party”) led a right-wing coalition.  By 2007, the 
more centrist Congress Party was back in power.  The Congress’ electoral victory in 2004 is 
sometimes attributed to a rural constituency dissatisfied with the BJP’s neglect of agriculture, 
which may be why agriculture features more prominently in the 2007 Government Report than 
the others. 
 The first trade review took place in 1998 only three years after the WTO had officially 
gone into operation.  Expectations for the future of the institution more optimistic at this time 
than they would later become, and such time-lapse provisions such as the Peace Clause in the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, the step-by-step dismantling of the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement, and various implementation periods for tariff reductions and other reforms were 
still in progress.  This was also prior to the first major impasse in Seattle in 1999, when intense 
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negative public sentiment towards the WTO became ubiquitous.  Outside of the WTO itself, the 
TPR was also coincident with the East Asian Economic crisis, which had begun the year before.  
The crisis not only affected the Indian and global economy directly, but also resulted in a 
substantial ideological challenge to the Washington Consensus (at the height of which the WTO 
had been designed – see chapter 2). 
 India itself was seven years into its liberalization program by this time and the early 
economic indications were relatively optimistic (omitting a contemporary slowdown in growth 
that could be attributed to the East Asia crisis).  Not long before, in 1996, a government 
dominated by the Congress Party had given way to a series of unstable coalition governments 
dominated by the BJP and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.  It is also worth noting that the 
1998 TPR took place just a few months prior to a nuclear weapons test that led to a diplomatic 
crisis and cooling of foreign relations with a number of trading partners, especially the United 
States. 
 The 2002 TPR took place between the ministerials at Doha (2001) and Cancun (2003).  
Confidence in the WTO had been shaken by the 1999 collapse at Seattle.  However, the Doha 
meeting had started a new round of negotiations, and there was still widespread hope that the 
Doha ‘Development’ Round would lead to a better deal for developing country members of the 
WTO.  Another major development was that China had joined the WTO in 2001.  The G20 had 
not yet been formed, but would be shortly before Cancun the following year. 
 India in 2002 was under a more stable BJP-led coalition (popular especially due to its 
perceived success in the brief 1999 Kargil War with Pakistan).  However, it was also experiencing 
a severe agricultural recession, accompanied by a growing number of farmer suicides and 
negative publicity from the ‘rotting rice store’ story (see chapter 7). Further, India had recently 
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met with a defeat within the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, forcing it to dismantle 
its regime of quantitative restrictions of imports ahead of schedule. 
By 2007, it was clear that the Doha ‘Development’ Round was deadlocked and 
expectations had been lowered on the possibility of a substantial breakthrough.  The Cancun 
revolt had led to a realignment of power in the WTO, with the profile of India, Brazil, and China 
being substantially raised by the success of the G20.  Brazil had also spearheaded two 
substantial complaints against agricultural subsidies in the United States and the EU though the 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism, which resulted in a stricter interpretation of WTO rules on 
agricultural subsidies. 
 In India, the Congress Party had retaken power in 2004 under Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh, a former finance minister who was closely associated with the initial 
liberalization program in the 1990s.  This election had also raised the profile of farmers, since 
the defeat of the BJP was attributed at least in part to a rural constituency dissatisfied with the 
government’s lack of attention to agriculture.  The new Congress government quickly made a 
show of its concern for farmers, holding a national summit on agriculture in 2005, among other 
things. 
 
Members’ Positions and Patterns 
The Secretariat Report and the Government Report are the starting point for the Trade Policy 
Review, and set the agenda for the subsequent meeting.  The meeting itself is, however, is in 
many ways the most interesting and revealing part of the TPR.  As a forum in which all members 
are invited to participate, it is in theory a survey of the current concerns, preoccupations, and 
sympathies of the participating governments at the time of the meeting, especially with (but not 
necessarily limited to) the target country.  To this we must add the qualification that we cannot 
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reduce the comments of representatives to the literal expressions of the will and sentiment of 
monolithic states or entities.  
 The meetings are structured as follows.  The chairperson speaks first, followed by the 
Indian delegation, and then the discussant or discussants.  This is followed by the highlight of 
the meetings – the comments of the members’ representatives.  The chair, Indian 
representatives, discussants, and often some members speak in the last section as well.  The 
chairs' comments here are often illuminating for their summary quality, often taking the form of 
"many members commented upon X."  It may be worth noting that all four discussants in the 
three TPRs were from developed economies.  Part III will focus mainly on the member 
comments, though some reference to the other speakers is merited.   
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Table 5.1: Speaker Wordcounts in TPR Meetings 1998, 2002, & 2007 
  1998 2002 2007 
Total, all 3 
years 
Percent 
1998 
Percent 
2002 
Percent 
2007 
Percent 
Totals 
India 3448 7063 6287 16798 21.1% 35.3% 37.4% 31.6% 
Discussants 2095 1830 1880 5805 12.8% 9.1% 11.2% 10.9% 
Chair 2646 1354 1519 5519 16.2% 6.8% 9.0% 10.4% 
European 
Union 1165 806 1174 3145 7.1% 4.0% 7.0% 5.9% 
United 
States 1040 695 1405 3140 6.4% 3.5% 8.4% 5.9% 
Canada 1082 582 303 1967 6.6% 2.9% 1.8% 3.7% 
Japan 546 475 283 1304 3.3% 2.4% 1.7% 2.5% 
Norway 630 448 115 1193 3.9% 2.2% 0.7% 2.2% 
New 
Zealand 433 451 239 1123 2.7% 2.3% 1.4% 2.1% 
Hong Kong 239 541 220 1000 1.5% 2.7% 1.3% 1.9% 
ASEAN 481 0 440 921 3.0% 0.0% 2.6% 1.7% 
Korea, S 256 405 218 879 1.6% 2.0% 1.3% 1.7% 
Switzerland 218 365 270 853 1.3% 1.8% 1.6% 1.6% 
Australia 659 0 128 787 4.0% 0.0% 0.8% 1.5% 
Sri Lanka 76 432 213 721 0.5% 2.2% 1.3% 1.4% 
Brazil 92 120 349 561 0.6% 0.6% 2.1% 1.1% 
Mauritius 22 527 0 549 0.1% 2.6% 0.0% 1.0% 
Jamaica 0 482 0 482 0.0% 2.4% 0.0% 0.9% 
Colombia 146 168 149 463 0.9% 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 
Singapore 0 340 81 421 0.0% 1.7% 0.5% 0.8% 
 
Speaking Quantity compared to Volume of Trade 
 One way to analyze the text of the Meeting Minutes is to quantify the role of each 
speaker by the number of words attributed to them.  This provides a rough proxy measure for 
gauging the interest and concern with India’s role in the WTO among the parties represented.  
Some qualifications must be added to the utility of this metric.  First, the length of a comment 
does not necessarily reflect its importance.  Second, the form of the recording – through 
paraphrasing rather than direct quotes – may introduce additional distortions and omissions.  
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There is no way of telling whether or not the transcription process lengthened or shortened 
what the speaker actually said. 
 Table 5.1 lists the contribution of the most vocal speakers according to wordcount (as 
derived via Microsoft Word 2010).  The first three columns display the number of words 
recorded for each speaker in each of the three TPRs, while the fourth shows the total wordcount 
for the speaker in all three TPRs (the ‘speaker’ here refers to the role, not the individual, i.e. the 
chairperson in each TPR is a different person).  The last four columns repeat these quantities as 
a percentage of the total words in each document.  Not all of the speakers are listed.  The top 20 
were selected based on the total wordcount in all three TPRs (column four). 
 Not surprisingly, the Indian delegation itself did the most talking in each of the three 
TPRs.  We can also note that the discussants and the chairs spoke more in each case than any 
single member delegate except for India (the discussants spoke longer than the chairs in all but 
1998). The most striking thing about the next several speakers on the list is that they are mostly 
developed economies (especially if Hong Kong and South Korea are considered developed).  It is 
notable that the top four speakers constitute the members of the informal ‘Quad’ grouping (see 
chapter 2) – The European Union, the United States, Canada, and Japan.  The Cairns Group is 
also well represented (by Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Brazil, and Colombia).  This imbalance 
among developed and developing economies appears most pronounced in the 1998 Meeting 
and least pronounced in 2002.  Among developing country members, ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) ranks the highest.  It should be noted that although in two of the 
meetings, ASEAN was represented by a delegate speaking on their behalf, each member of 
ASEAN is an individual member of the WTO; it is not counted as single entity in the manner of 
the EU. 
87 
 
 Tables 5.2- 5.5 juxtapose the wordcounts of speakers from the 2002 and 2007 TPR 
Meetings with the trade volumes of the represented entities with India for those two years.  The 
first two tables (5.2 and 5.3) rank the entities by wordcount, excluding India and non-member 
speakers from the list.  The second two (5.4 and 5.5) rank the same entities by trade volume 
with India.  Trade volume here is sum of all imports and exports between the listed entity and 
India for that year, in US Dollars (International Trade Center 2013).  
Table 5.2: Top 20 Speakers in 2002 Meeting, compared to Trade Volume, 2002 
  Trade Partner Trade Volume 2002 Wordcount  
1 European Union          23,057,414                    806  
2 United States          14,215,132                    695  
3 Canada            1,254,787                    582  
4 Hong Kong            3,261,282                    541  
5 Mauritius                170,773                    527  
6 Jamaica                  10,814                    482  
7 Japan            3,926,640                    475  
8 New Zealand                143,268                    451  
9 Norway                118,910                    448  
10 Sri Lanka                924,178                    432  
11 South  Korea            1,879,534                    405  
12 Switzerland            2,595,369                    365  
13 Singapore            2,714,085                    340  
14 Czech Republic                125,613                    278  
15 Hungary                  77,336                    277  
16 China            4,151,453                    276  
17 Philippines                600,077                    245  
18 Chile                204,531                    229  
19 Colombia                  69,013                    168  
20 Cuba                     8,995                    166  
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Table 5.3: Top 20 Speakers in 2007 Meeting, compared to Trade Volume, 2007 
 
Trade Partner Trade Volume  2007 Wordcount 
1 United States                      34,339,700  1405 
2 European Union                        64,017,300  1174 
3 ASEAN                        34,855,116  440 
4 Brazil                           2,777,501  349 
5 Canada                           3,189,050  303 
6 Japan                           9,096,215  283 
7 Switzerland                        11,209,037  270 
8 New Zealand                              441,843  239 
9 Chinese Taipei                           3,745,653  224 
10 Hong Kong                           8,665,768  220 
11 South Korea                           7,900,243  218 
12 Sri Lanka                           3,035,557  213 
13 Nigeria                           8,010,209  164 
14 Colombia                              657,649  149 
15 Uruguay                                 60,909  130 
16 Australia                           8,763,978  128 
17 Mexico                           1,632,144  123 
18 Norway                           1,285,859  115 
19 Chile                           2,114,031  110 
20 China                        34,067,750  109 
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Table 5.4: Top 20 Trade Partners 2002, compared to 2002 Meeting Wordcounts 
 
Trade Partner Trade Volume 2002 Wordcount 
1 European Union 23,057,414 806 
2 United States 14,215,132 695 
3 China 4,151,453 276 
4 United Arab Emirates 3,977,441 0 
5 Japan 3,926,640 475 
6 Hong Kong 3,261,282 541 
7 Singapore 2,714,085 340 
8 Switzerland 2,595,369 365 
9 South Africa 2,422,810 0 
10 Malaysia 2,073,291 150 
11 Indonesia 2,032,862 0 
12 South Korea 1,879,534 405 
13 Australia 1,833,091 0 
14 Saudi Arabia 1,377,979 0 
16 Russia 1,316,854 0 
17 Canada 1,254,787 582 
18 Israel 1,174,160 0 
19 Thailand 1,106,270 100 
20 Bangladesh 1,081,931 146 
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Table 5.5: Top 20 Trade Partners 2007, compared to 2007 Meeting Wordcounts 
  Trade Partner Trade Volume 2007 Wordcount 
1 European Union                                            64,017,300  1174 
2 ASEAN                                            34,855,116  440 
3 United States                                            34,339,700  1405 
4 China                                            34,067,750  109 
5 United Arab Emirates                                            26,149,847  0 
6 Saudi Arabia                                            19,791,562  0 
7 Singapore                                            13,291,675  81 
8 Switzerland                                            11,209,037  270 
9 Iran                                            11,010,837  0 
10 Japan                                               9,096,215  283 
11 Australia                                               8,763,978  128 
12 Hong Kong                                               8,665,768  220 
13 Nigeria                                               8,010,209  164 
14 South Korea                                               7,900,243  218 
15 Malaysia                                               7,575,812  0 
16 Kuwait                                               7,106,703  0 
17 Indonesia                                               6,718,542  0 
18 Iraq                                               5,640,657  0 
19 South Africa                                               5,311,296  0 
20 Thailand                                               3,865,705  0 
 
One might expect that the greater the volume of trade a country/ entity had with India, 
the more commentary their delegation would offer at the TPR meetings.  In fact, this is often the 
case.  The European Union is among India’s top trading partners and its representatives always 
rank at or near the top in terms of wordcount at the meetings (first in 1998 and 2002, second to 
the United States in 2007).  This is also true for the United States, and to a lesser extent, the 
members of ASEAN. 
 However, there are notable cases where these ranks do not correspond closely at all.  
China ranked 4th by trading volume with India in both 2002 and 2004, but had comparatively 
little to say at the meetings (China joined the WTO in 2001).  The United Arab Emirates ranked 
5th in both, but its delegation is never recorded as speaking during the meetings.  Saudi Arabia 
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joined the WTO in 2005 and was India’s 6th largest trading partner in 2007, but was silent at the 
2007 meeting. 
 Likewise, there were member delegations that spoke at much greater length than their 
importance as trading partners would suggest.  Both New Zealand and Norway spoke in all three 
meetings, and often at considerable length, yet neither ranked particularly high in the values of 
their trade with India.  Mauritius and Sri Lanka also spoke at greater length than their trade 
volume would suggest, but their greater interest could be attributed to their status as neighbors 
of, and members of regional trade agreements with, India.  Also, given the small size of 
Mauritius’ economy, what would qualify as only a fraction of a percent of India’s trade would 
compose proportionally a much larger share of Mauritius’ trade. 
 
Speaking Quantities by Economic Development Category 
 Another way to analyze the speaker wordcounts is to aggregate them by category.  
Table 5.6 breaks speakers down into three categories.  The first includes the Indian delegation 
and non-member speakers (the chairs and discussants).  The rest of the speakers are divided 
according whether they are considered advanced or developing economies, using the 
classification system of the International Monetary Fund (IMF 1998, 2002, 2007)7.  The 
percentages given represent each group’s percentage of total wordcount for each TPR and for 
all three TPRs.  Each of the four columns is then represented as a pie chart (Figure 5.1).  In each 
review, Indian representatives and non-member speakers filled a little more than half the 
wordcount.  Advanced economy representatives consistently spoke at greater length than 
7 By 2007, the European Union included some countries considered developing by the IMF 
classification scheme (at that time), mainly in Eastern Europe.  This is ignored for the purposes 
of Table 5.6 and the wordcount of the EU representative is simply included with the advanced 
economies. 
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developing country representatives (or at least were recorded as doing so), but the imbalance 
varied from Review to Review.  In 1998, advanced economy representatives spoke well over 
three times as much as developing representatives, while 2002 saw a closer to even match. 
Table 5.6: Wordcount as percentage, by category 
 
1998 
TPR 
2002 
TPR 
2007 
TPR All TPRs 
India & Non-Members 50.7% 52.3% 57.6% 53.5% 
Advanced Economies 38.4% 25.5% 27.7% 30.2% 
Developing Countries 10.9% 22.2% 14.7% 16.4% 
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Figure 5.1: Wordcount as percentage, by category, as Pie Charts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Break Down by Regions 
 Table 5.7 and the Figure 5.2 break down wordcounts in the TPRs by speakers aggregated 
by region.  “Europe & English-speaking” is a rather awkward category meant to capture the 
developed economies outside of East Asia.  It includes the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand but not smaller developing English-speaking countries in the Caribbean.  That it 
ranks first overwhelmingly (over half of all non-India Member speech in two of the TPRs) reflects 
what we learned in the last section – that representatives of developed economies were 
recorded as speaking in more in these TPRs.  East Asia, which included most developed economy 
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members not included in the last category, ranks second except in 2007.   The other regions, 
overwhelmingly consisting of developing countries, do contain some interesting results.  Latin 
American and the Caribbean consistently score high.  This may be partly an artifact of this region 
containing so many countries, although Sub-Saharan Africa, which contains even more WTO 
members, has substantially less wordcount.  One surprise is the lack of commentary by Middle 
Eastern countries, considering the high volume of trade India had with this region. 
 
Table 5.7: Wordcount as percentage by Region (not including Indian Representative and non-
member speakers) 
Regions 1998 TPR 2002 TPR 2007 TPR all three 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.53% 8.01% 5.05% 5.05% 
Middle East 2.59% 3.29% 1.49% 2.54% 
Latin America & the Caribbean 7.44% 15.32% 15.64% 12.85% 
Europe & English-speaking 66.25% 40.84% 50.96% 52.02% 
South Asia 3.27% 6.05% 4.78% 4.78% 
East Asia 12.95% 17.76% 14.78% 15.34% 
Southeast Asia 5.98% 8.74% 7.31% 7.43% 
Total non-India Member 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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Figure 5.2: Wordcount as percentage, by category, as Pie Charts
 
 
Factions in the Meetings 
 Various factional groupings within the WTO have been discussed previously in chapter 
2.  The most important alliance for India and agricultural trade was of course the G20, although 
it also belonged to the G33, an older group with a separate agro-related agenda (concerning 
'special products').  The Quad and the Cairns group, neither of which counted India as a 
member, also played extensive roles in the agricultural arguments within the WTO, often 
adversarial to the Indian government's positions. 
Table 5.8 lists once again percentage wordcounts, based on these factional groupings.  
The G20 did not officially exist in the first two TPRs (although it was formed very soon after the 
2002 TPR), but if we assume that this group of countries had similar interests prior to the 
foundation of the faction, then aggregating them for earlier meetings is still illustrative.  The G20 
figures include all current and former members, though El Salvador and Egypt had left the group 
before 2007.    
Wordcount by Region: Aggregate all TPRs 
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Table 5.8: Wordcount as percentage, by faction 
Faction 1998 2002 2007 All three 
TOTAL QUAD 23.5% 12.8% 18.8% 18.0% 
TOTAL G20 28.0% 41.8% 44.9% 37.6% 
G20 minus India 6.8% 6.5% 7.5% 6.0% 
TOTAL CAIRNS 18.9% 10.7% 9.5% 11.9% 
TOTAL G33 29.4% 50.9% 44.2% 41.3% 
G33 minus India 8.3% 15.7% 6.8% 9.7% 
 
 As noted above, the representatives of India had the highest wordcount of any speakers 
in all three TRPs, and thus the figures for the G20 and G33 which include India are 
correspondingly large.  Perhaps a better illustration of the relative voice of each faction (or 
“proto-faction” where the meeting pre-dates formation) in each meeting is the figure for the 
wordcount of non-India members only.  These are given in Table 5.8 in the shaded rows.   With 
India, the G33 and (proto-) G20 speak the most in each TPR; without India, they speak the least. 
 The (non-India) breakdown is in part representative of the advanced/ developing 
economy breakdown in the previous section.  The Quad consists entirely of developed 
economies and its representatives are responsible for 18% of the speech in the three TPRs.8  The 
Cairns group is responsible for about 12%.  It contains only three developed countries – Canada, 
New Zealand, and Australia – but these were collectively responsible for more than half of this 
percentage.   The non-India G33 and G20, consisting almost entirely of developing countries 
(South Korea, a member of the G33, is the only exception) had 9.7% and 6% of the total 
wordcount, respectively.  Observing the figures for the individual TPRs, we notice an interesting 
inversion in 2002 where the G33’s wordcount, even without India, exceeds that of the Quad 
members.    
8 Once again, IMF-designated 2007 developing country members of the EU are ignored for the 
purposes of these calculations. 
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Conclusion 
 The nine key documents examined here (the Secretariat Reports, Government Reports, 
and Meeting Reports for three TPRs) cover three out of five of India’s Trade Policy Reviews: 
1998, 2002, and 2007.  The Indian TPRs are in turn a subset of a large collection of TPR 
documents focused on each member of the WTO.  The archive of TPR documents are one set of 
vast array of documents available for public download from the official WTO site.  These 
particular nine documents were selected for reasons such as their relevance to Indian WTO 
strategy, their potential to offer a glimpse into the normative standards of the WTO Secretariat, 
and their inclusion of commentary from a diverse cross-section of members.  The documents 
excluded, such as the 1993 India TPR undertaken under GATT before the formation of the WTO, 
would doubtlessly have provided valuable additional insights.  It would be very interesting in a 
future study to compare India’s TPRs with those of other countries, and to examine the 
statements made by Indian representatives in other TPR meetings.  Finally, other sets of 
documents in the WTO’s internet archive, such policy papers submitted by the Indian 
government or the records of formal disputes involving India would also shed a great deal of 
light of the positions and strategies of successive Indian governments in the WTO.  When seen in 
this context, the nine documents analyzed, although they collectively cover hundreds of pages 
of text, seem a drop in the bucket compared to archives of relevant documents available.  
Ultimately, the archival portion of this research had to be kept to a manageable level and the 
method of close and detailed analysis use here lent itself better to a very close reading of a few 
documents then to a more cursory examination of many.  The conclusions drawn in this in the 
following chapters are limited by this modest selection of material. 
 The two chapters following this one will analyze in detail the content of the statements 
composing these documents.  In this chapter we merely looked at the context in which these 
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documents were produced, the formal procedures for their creation, the roles of various 
speakers, and the broad form and distribution of the statements.  The distribution of statements 
is especially important in the Meeting Reports, since statements are attributed to such a large 
set of individual speakers.  The second half of the chapter is dedicated to breaking down whom 
spoke, when, and how much, as well dividing them into broad groupings, like non-member 
speakers, representatives of developed or developing countries, members by region, etc.  A few 
general observations can made based on this.  In terms of Foucauldian discourse analysis, these 
observations would fall under the category of ‘enunciative modalities’ or statement style, that 
is, what we can discern about the conditions under which statements are produced. 
 One notable feature about the speakers is the lack of attribution of authorship, or rather 
the attribution of authorship to large, personified entities rather than named individuals.  The 
Secretariat Report is written by the Secretariat, the Government Report by the government of 
India.  The closest the former comes to identifying a responsible individual is (only in 2002 and 
2007 Reports) a brief note at the beginning regarding an individual to contact with any ‘technical 
questions.’  The Meeting Reports, in contrast, contain a number of named individuals: the 
chairpersons, discussants, and the representatives of India are all identified by name and 
country of origin.  The representatives of all other member entities, however, are identified only 
by the country they represent. 
 In this mode of speaking, the speaker claims and is understood to speak on behalf of or 
in place of a larger abstract entity – a country, a group of countries, or an institution (with some 
exceptions).  In some cases when a representative is speaking, the ‘representative of’ part of 
their title is dropped and the speaker is referred to as if they are their country.  In a sense the 
country or member entity is understood to be embodied within the room in the person of the 
representative.  The individuality of the representative, as well as the instructions they received 
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and whatever interests and conflicts led to these instructions, are obscured behind this 
abstraction.  For the purposes of the meeting the country is understood as a unified entity with 
a point of view and a coherent set of interests embodied in the representative empowered to 
speak for it. 
 Similarly, the small group of Secretariat personnel who prepared the Secretariat report 
is depersonalized into an abstraction of the Secretariat itself.  As a unified abstraction, the 
Secretariat is somewhat different from a country.  A country can be and often is in this context 
constructed as an individualized actor with specific material interests regarding trade with India.  
The Secretariat is constructed as a neutral facilitator and advisor.  This gives the normative 
content of its statements (described in detail in the next chapter) an air of impartiality.  It is 
important to note, that the statements of the Secretariat are not taken to be statements of “the 
WTO.”  The WTO is not abstracted into a unified actor in these documents, but the Secretariat, 
an integral component of the WTO, is. 
 Three roles in the meetings are personalized with names as well as nationalities.  
Despite being named, the Indian representative fills a role similar to that of all of the unnamed 
member representatives.  They speak for their government, not for themselves.  In contrast, the 
discussant and chairperson are clearly understood to not speak for their countries, even though 
their nationalities are given.  The discussant is the most personalized of all speakers, because 
their role is to provide their own personal assessment of India’s economic policies.  Ostensibly, 
this view does not reflect the official view of their country.  The chairperson is understood to 
neither express their own opinion or the positions of their country, but acts as a facilitator and 
interpreter of other speaker’s statements. 
 The second half of this chapter broke down breaks down the statements in the meetings 
by speaker and size (in terms of wordcount) without addressing their content.  These are 
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aggregated in different instances by the role of the speaker (i.e. whether they represented a 
WTO member other than India), and in the case of those representing WTO members, by 
categorizing the member they represented (i.e. developmental status, region, membership in a 
particular faction).  The trade volume of member economies with India is used as a rough proxy 
for the importance of their trade with India and compared to wordcounts for the years 2002 and 
2007. 
 Perhaps the most striking feature of these numerical descriptions is speaking volume of 
developed country representatives, compared to those from developing countries.  Members of 
the Quad faction were especially well represented.  This is interesting, since the Quad is often 
seen as dominating the agenda of the WTO (see chapter 2).  Members of the Cairns Group were 
also noticeably vocal. 
The lack of speaking volume for the representatives of some of India’s most important 
trading partners, especially China and a number of Middle Eastern countries, is also notable.  In 
particular, no representative for the United Arab Emirates spoke in any of the three meetings, 
despite the UAE being 4th largest trade partner by value in 2002 and 5th in 2007 and it being a 
member of the WTO since 1996.  Some of the representatives of India’s lesser trading partners, 
especially New Zealand, spoke at much greater length than representatives of members with 
much higher trade volumes.  These comparisons are merely descriptive and suggestive.  They 
especially do not take into account the size of the economy trading with India (for a very small 
economy, a relatively low volume of India’s trade might appear much more important relative to 
the size of their economies).  At the very least, however, they suggest that the amount that a 
WTO member trades with India is not the only factor influencing how much their 
representatives speak at these meetings. 
Copyright © Christopher Laurence Blackden 2014  
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Chapter 6: Major TPR Themes: Logics of Liberalization 
  
The proceeding chapter laid out the basic structure and context of the three TPRs of 
interest to this project, and examined the relative contributions of the various speakers (in the 
Meeting Minutes) mainly in terms of wordcount.  In this chapter and the next, we will look at 
the thematic content of the TPRs.  This chapter will identify and examine the general themes 
running through the critiques of Indian economic policy, while chapter 7 will focus on agriculture 
in particular.  The narrative of the TPRs was one of universal praise for the liberalization 
program which India had begun in 1991.  Not as universal, but still dominant was the addendum 
that this program was incomplete and must be continued. 
 
The Positive Consensus on Liberalization 
 Throughout the TPRs, the efficacy of liberal reform was uncontroversial, especially in 
regard to the reforms already undertaken.  This considerably narrowed the scope of critique.  
The dominant narrative running through all three TPRs was that India owed its recent economic 
success to its liberalization program and it thus followed that more reform would lead to more 
success.  “Reform” and “liberalization” were used almost interchangeably.  Wherever reforms 
are mentioned it is invariably in reference to liberal reforms – i.e. lowering trade barriers, 
privatization of state-run-enterprises, deregulation of industries, removal of price controls, etc. 
 Where differences over liberalization did emerge, this was on the topic of future 
reforms, particularly over the pace and selectivity of such reforms.  For the purposes of this 
analysis, I will classify these opposing viewpoints as the Strong Liberalization and Weak 
Liberalization arguments (although it is probably more accurate to think of them as two poles on 
a continuum than as discrete categories).  The Secretariat and many speakers in the Meeting 
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took the strong position, arguing for liberalization to be sped up and extended to more areas of 
the economy.  The Indian Government and other Meeting speakers (especially those 
representing developing countries) took the weaker position on liberalization.  They expressed 
the view that reforms should be implemented carefully to avoid socioeconomic disruption and 
that there were legitimate exceptions to logic of liberalization in some areas of economic life 
(especially in the agricultural sector).  In no case, however, were liberal reforms compared 
unfavorably to the policies which they had replaced. 
 The Strong and Weak Arguments are laid out in Table 6.1.  Labeling them ‘strong’ and 
‘weak’ is only an indication of to what extent they push for liberalization – it is not meant to 
suggest any difference in the merit of the arguments. 
 
Table 6.1: Characteristics of the Strong and Weak Arguments for Liberalization 
Argument Speakers Logic Recommendations 
Strong Liberalization Secretariat, Meeting 
Chair & Discussant, 
Some Member 
Representatives 
Liberalization -> 
Growth -> 
Development 
Faster liberalization, 
extension of 
liberalization to more 
areas of economy 
Weak Liberalization Indian Government, 
Some Member 
Representatives 
L -> G -> D with 
qualifications and 
exceptions, including 
for agriculture 
Caution, Consensus, 
Exceptions 
 
 The Secretariat Reports praise liberalization and call for it to be implemented faster and 
more thoroughly.  They generally attribute economic successes (see below) to these reforms 
while attributing failures to reforms not going far enough.  The Indian Government Reports also 
attribute successes to the reform program and announce additional planned reforms.  They, 
however, are more cautious about liberalization, emphasizing risk mitigation, autonomy, and a 
continued strong role for the state in the economy.  The speakers in the Meetings sometimes 
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formulated their comments as praise, sometimes as critique, but usually a mixture of the two 
along the lines of ‘recent reforms have been good, but more are needed.’ 
 
The Straight Arrow of Reform 
 The conflation of “reform” and “liberalization” carried with it the implication that 
reform only went in one direction – towards increasingly economic liberalization.  In the 
Secretariat Reports in particular, the wording often suggests a linear process with an identifiable 
end state, exemplified by the frequent use of the term ‘progress,’ as in the following quotes 
(italics mine): 
 
Some progress has also been made in the removal of state controls on the inter-state 
movement of certain grains and of administered prices (WTO 1998a: 15) 
 
Less progress has been made on reducing direct and indirect assistance to various 
sectors of the economy (WTO 2007a: x). 
 
Public sector reform… has been delayed by a decision in July 2006 to keep all decisions 
on disinvestment in state-owned enterprises on hold pending a review (WTO 2007a: x). 
 
…state-owned enterprises remain a considerable demand on government resources and 
the recent decision to "pause" privatization will have implications for future government 
support for these enterprises (WTO 2007a: vii). 
 
India’s reforms are frequently referred to in terms of being unfinished.  In its 2002 report, the 
Secretariat says the following: 
 
While the process of dismantling some of India’s complex system of trade and domestic 
controls has already yielded considerable results, there is a need for domestic structural 
reforms to be deepened and completed (WTO 2002a: italics mine). 
 
In the 2007 meeting minutes, the Indian representative (the Indian Secretary of Commerce G.K. 
Pillai) made an apologetic defense of the perceived slowness of Indian liberalization: “In a 
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vibrant and complex democracy such as India, the reform process could and would have some 
fits and starts, but the overall direction of reforms had always been positive” (2007c: 3; italics 
mine).  
 
Economic Triumphalism and Indian Exceptionalism 
 The representatives of the Indian government in the three TPRs (in the Government 
Reports and in their comments in the meeting minutes) expressed a triumphant optimism about 
India’s economy, despite acknowledging serious problems.  These expressions included not only 
pride in what had already been accomplished, but also expectations that success would 
continue and that problems would be overcome.  Additionally, the Reports emphasized that 
reforms were undertaken voluntarily and that they were tailored to the unique characteristics of 
the Indian economy.  This sentiment of autonomy was most strongly expressed in 2007.   
In that year’s Government Report, statistical boasts about India’s growth and economic 
rankings are frontloaded and constitute the very first paragraph. 
 
The Indian economy is the second fastest growing economy among the large economies 
of the world today.  In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP, India is the fourth 
largest economy after the US, China and Japan.  India’s share in world GDP (PPP) basis 
has increased from 4.3% in 1991 to almost 6% in 2005.  The World Bank has reported 
that India has been in the top 10% of all countries in growth performance since the 
1980s (WTO 2007b: 5).9 
 
The second section of the same report, entitled ‘Future Growth Prospects,’ further notes that 
India’s growth rates are not only high but increasing over time, up to almost 9% in the years 
2003- 2006.  The report interprets this optimistically as “a sign that the economy has cleaved 
9 Dating India’s remarkable growth performance back to the 1980s may be a subtle assertion 
that it predated the liberalization period, but is more likely just an artifact of the World Bank 
statistics being used. 
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from its past and has entered a phase of higher growth” (WTO 2007b: 5).   That is, growth is not 
only high now, but will continue to be high in the future.  In the meeting of the same TPR, the 
Indian representative expressed similar optimism that current high growth rates were only the 
beginning (WTO 2007c: 3- 6). 
 The argument for the long-term sustainability of a high growth rate is based a small 
number of perceived exceptional factors present in the Indian economy.  The 2007 Government 
report states: 
 
There exists strong evidence to believe that the economy is being propelled by strong 
fundamental growth impulses which would sustain in the years to come.  These 
impulses stem from the strengths exhibited by the economy (WTO 2007b: 5). 
 
These strengths were enumerated as: a liberal trade /investment regime (or “openness”), a 
growing middle class, a vast and growing population of working-age people, competitive 
companies, and a high (and increasing) savings rate.  Openness was connected to 
competitiveness in that international competition was seen as strengthening Indian firms.  The 
growing ratio of working age people to total population (referred to as the “demographic 
dividend” – see below) was seen as not only increasing the size of the labor force, but also as 
contributing to the growth of personal savings.  Finally, the expansion of the middle class was 
expected to provide the growing consumer demand to operationalize firms and labor (WTO 
2007b: 5- 7).  The statement of the Indian representative in the subsequent meeting added to 
this the argument that in addition to being large and rapid, Indian growth was also exceptionally 
stable: 
 
Growth in India had not only sustained itself at a high rate but also had exhibited low 
volatility and strong immunity to economic shocks.  An IMF working paper, "From 'Hindu 
Growth' to Productivity Surge:  The Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition" stated that 
between 1980 and 1999, India "outperformed all regions, save East Asia, in terms of 
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average growth, and outperformed all regions, including East Asia, in terms of the 
stability of growth" (World Bank 2006, cited in WTO 2007b: 10). 
 
 The representative’s statement went on to assert that the “rise of India would engender 
enormous benefits for the rest of the world” (WTO 2007c: 6).  In particular, it was credited with 
creating a vast new consumer market, as well as investment opportunities.  This added 
rhetorical leverage to the Indian government’s request for greater market access from its 
trading partners by implying that India’s growth was in their long-term economic interests: 
 
India's prosperity and that of the rest of the world were closely intertwined.  The world 
needed a buoyant, thriving Indian economy; it was in the rest of the world's best 
interest (WTO 2007c: 6). 
 
 In the 2007 TPR, the Indian government notably puts positive spins on some issues most 
often perceived as problems to be overcome.  For instance, in the meeting, Pillai painted India’s 
negative balance of trade as a sign of its economic openness (WTO 2007c: 3- 4).  Even service 
imports, he noted, were growing faster than service exports (5), belying any complaints that 
India’s economy was not opening quickly or extensively enough. 
 In 2007, Pillai downplayed concerns about lack of foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
noting that while low in absolute terms, FDI had increased rapidly in relative terms over the 
previous three years, indicating a surge in investor confidence: 
FDI equity inflow had increased from US$2.22 billion in 2002/03 to US$16 billion in 
2006/07, a staggering increase of 725%.  If reinvested retained earnings were included, 
in line with international practice, FDI into India had reached US$19 billion in 2006/07, 
constituting 2.3% of GDP, a quantum jump compared to 0.5% of GDP three years earlier 
(WTO 2007c: 5). 
 
The Government Report for that year asserted that “The fast increase of FDI was a strong 
indication of the effectiveness of India's policies” (WTO 2007b: 6) and further argued that 
previously low levels of FDI highlighted the strength of indigenous companies: 
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The growth in the industrial sector has hitherto been with low levels of FDI, which is 
reflective of a strong indigenous entrepreneurial sector.  A modernizing capital market; 
an increasingly liberal and competitive environment for investment, trade and 
production; a wealth of entrepreneurial talent and sustained economic growth has 
spawned strong new companies and supported the expansion of the aggressive among 
the existing (WTO 2007b: 6). 
 
 Rapid population increase is also given a positive spin.  The huge proportion of young 
people in the population was touted as a “demographic dividend” that would enhance India’s 
explosive economic growth in the future: 
 
According to most population projections, the share of the working age population in 
the total population will continue to rise for the next 30 years or so.  These 
demographics point to an augmented supply of labour and savings.  These demographic 
trends have also helped raise household savings from 15-16 percent of GDP in the late 
1980’s to 22-24 percent in recent years (WTO 2007b: 6). 
 
In the subsequent meeting, the discussant expresses a note of skepticism about the potential of 
India’s young population: “While this would provide a ready supply of labour, creating sufficient 
jobs would become an enormous challenge” (WTO 2007c: 7).  The Indian government was 
cognizant of this problem and its plans to provide employment for this vast population hinged 
upon a major expansion of manufacturing, facilitating a sectoral migration from agriculture to 
industry.  This will be further elaborated below. 
 
Positive Consensus on Liberalization in the Meetings 
 Almost all of the member representatives at the three TPRs commented favorably upon 
India’s liberalization.  Some of these took the form of glowing acclaim: 
 
The representative of Chinese Taipei [the official WTO designation for Taiwan] 
commended India's economic performance since its last Review, and noted that such 
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outstanding performance was due mainly to India's unilateral trade and structural 
reforms (WTO 2007c: 13). 
 
Others were more reserved, but expressed general approval. 
Singapore welcomed India's commitment to a more open and liberal economy (WTO 
2002c: 19).   
Many indicated their approval of liberal reforms mainly by urging that they be continued. 
 
She urged India to continue reforms to maintain its economic growth (WTO 2007c: 18, 
representative of Uruguay). 
 
While a few buried their approval within an overall critique: 
 
While India had taken important steps to bring its regime into compliance with the 
WTO, its overall trade regime remained among the most protectionist of all WTO 
Members (WTO 1998c: 14, representative of the United States).   
 
The closest any comments came to disapproval of liberalization was by omission and 
qualification.  A few scattered comments complimented India’s recent economic performance 
without specifically attributing causation to liberalization: 
He was appreciative of India's successful economic development recently with respect 
to its policies with minimum social costs (WTO 1998c: 19, representative of Cuba).   
 
The representative of Bangladesh appreciated India's economic performance in spite of 
the global economic slowdown (WTO 2002c: 22). 
 
The representative of Egypt commended India for its recent economic achievements, 
and noted that there were still challenges (WTO 2007c: 18). 
 
Lack of references does not necessarily imply that the speakers attributed economic success to 
something other than liberalization.  An additional handful of comments, however, explicitly 
expressed the belief that reforms were ‘partially’ responsible for economic growth and other 
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successes.  This does suggest that other factors than liberal reforms were seen to have 
contributed to India’s economic successes. 
 
This growth was due, in part, to continued structural reforms, including trade 
liberalization, which had fostered competition, raised efficiency, and had contributed 
greatly to alleviating poverty and reducing infant mortality (WTO 2002c: 3, Chairperson 
Mohamed). 
 
Structural reform, including trade liberalization, had played a role in India's high growth 
rate in recent years (WTO 2007c: 11, representative of New Zealand). 
 
The representative of Turkey acknowledged that trade liberalization was one of the 
main reasons behind India's impressive economic growth (WTO 2007c: 19). 
 
The economic growth, and the consequent improvement in the standard of living, was 
attributed partly to the growing opening up of the Indian economy to competition (WTO 
2007c: 17, representative of Chile). 
 
 Two comments during the 2007 Meeting added to this trope of ‘partial causation’ by 
dating India’s economic success story to before 1991 (the conventionally accepted beginning of 
India’s liberalization).  First, “The representative of Colombia commended India's economic 
performance in the past 25 years” (WTO 2007c: 15), indicating the early 1980s as a starting 
point.  The representative did, however, immediately follow this by calling for a standard list of 
liberal reforms.  The next speaker was more explicit about the timeline point: 
The representative of Brazil stated that India's impressive economic performance was 
not a recent phenomenon.  Between 1980 and 2002, the country's economy had grown 
on average at 6% annually, making India one of the best-performing nations in the last 
quarter of the 20th century (WTO 2007c: 15). 
 
Unlike most of the comments, the rest of the Brazilian representative’s 2007 commentary 
contained no advice for further liberalization. 
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Metrics of Success 
 Within the overall praise of reforms, various normative measures of policy success were 
used, ranging from very general to quite specific.  Some of the shorter statements from member 
representatives in the Meetings, for instance, simply commended India for its recent “economic 
performance” without going into specifics.  Similarly general statements referred to India’s 
progress in “development” or sometimes just acknowledged that India had complied with its 
WTO obligations.  More specific metrics of policy success included poverty reduction, 
improvements in social indicators like literacy, rising FDI, increasing exports, lower inflation, and 
job creation.  The most common metric, however, was the growth of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). 
 
Economic Growth 
 Growth, in terms of monetary value, was the metric of economic success used most 
often throughout the TPR documents.  When achievement or lack of achievement was 
measured, it was usually in terms of comparison of aggregate monetary values among different 
time periods, with success indicated but the more recent figure being higher (in a few cases, 
such as government deficits, the reverse is true).  This was applied to the Indian economy 
overall by comparing GDP for different years, and more specifically to indicators such as growth 
of specific sectors (here, importantly, the agricultural sector stands out for its lack of growth), 
growth of trade, growth of foreign investment, etc.  When claims are made in these documents 
linking liberalization to economic success, it is thus usually in terms of growth.  This is summed 
up in the following quotes from the 1998 and 2007 Secretariat Reports: 
The Indian Government initiated a major programme of economic reform and 
liberalization in 1991, reversing a policy direction followed for decades… These reforms 
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contributed to a dramatic increase in growth in the 1990s, accompanied by larger flows 
of inward foreign investment and increased international trade (WTO 1998a: xi).   
 
India’s high rates of economic growth in recent years are the result of significant 
structural reforms including trade liberalization.  If this fast growth is to be sustained, 
however, further reform will be required (WTO 2007a: xii).  
 
 GDP growth was similarly the most common attribute singled out for praise in the 
Meetings and here it was also usually attributed to liberalization (in general or to specific 
reforms), as in the following sampling of comments: 
The reforms initiated voluntarily in 1991/92 had resulted in GDP growth rates averaging 
7% per year until 1996/97 (WTO 1998c: 3, representative of India). 
 
The representative of Switzerland noted that India's courageous policy since 1991 had 
led to spectacular growth during the last few years (WTO 1998c: 12) 
 
[India] had been helped onto a higher growth path by the discontinuation of the special 
import licensing scheme; trade facilitation measures;  reforms in tax administration, 
exchange market, industrial licencing, and in banking and insurance;  and reforms in the 
control system in petroleum, sugar, agriculture, and in infrastructure, such as 
telecommunications and power (WTO 2002c: 23, representative of Sri Lanka). 
 
The representative of Pakistan commended India's reform process, which had resulted 
in fast economic growth (WTO 2007c: 17). 
 
A complete accounting of statements to this effect, made by member representatives, is as 
follows: 
1998: representatives of Canada (WTO 1998c: 9), Australia (10), Switzerland (12), the EU 
(12), Norway (15), Mexico (17), and Pakistan (18) 
 
2002: representatives of Switzerland (WTO 2002: 13), Mauritius (20), Jamaica (21), Sri 
Lanka (23), Honduras (23), Cuba (25), and Zimbabwe (26)10 
 
2007: representatives of New Zealand (WTO 2007c: 11), Argentina (17), Chile (17), 
Turkey (17), Pakistan (17), Nicaragua (18), and Zimbabwe (19).11 
 
10 The representatives of Zimbabwe and Jamaica each technically only juxtaposed praise of 
liberalization and growth in the same sentence, without explicitly attributing causation. 
11 Some of these were partial attributions; see Positive Consensus above. 
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Here and there a few comments praised India’s economic growth without specifically 
mentioning liberal reforms (WTO 2002c: 19, representative of Singapore; 20, representative of 
Mauritius; WTO 2007c: 18, representatives of Benin and Nicaragua). 
 
From Liberalization to Growth to Development 
 Other measurements of success were often described as an outcome of growth.  For 
example the first paragraph of the 2007 Secretariat Report asserts that:  “Rapid economic 
growth has translated into an improvement in social indicators, including a decline in infant 
mortality, a reduction in the percentage of the population living below the poverty line and 
improvements in literacy, sanitation and access to clean water.”  This is immediately followed by 
the assertion that “This impressive performance is largely due to unilateral trade and structural 
reform” (WTO 2007a: vii).  We see here a serial functional dependency that is common 
throughout the TPRs.  The logic is that liberalization leads to economic growth and that 
economic growth enables a whole set of other improving societal indicators, which for 
convenience we can subsume under the vague label of “development” (the use of the concept 
of development is addressed in the next section).  Sometimes the serial dependency is described 
completely in the TPR text, sometimes partially – i.e. ‘liberalization leads to growth’ or ‘growth 
leads to development.’ This formulation is not used by all commenters, but it is never 
contradicted. 
 
Usage of “Develop” 
 The concept of ‘development,’ to refer to positive economic transformation taking place 
in linear stages, was used frequently throughout the TPRs.  Its variations, ‘developed’ and 
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‘developing’ (and in a few instances ‘least developed’) were used as descriptive labels to classify 
member states.  These two groups were often described as having differing interests; 
developing countries especially were ascribed specific blanket interests in many of the 
comments.  What these interests are perceived as being is discussed later in the chapter. 
 The usage of development as a process changed in a subtle way through the three TPRS.  
In 1998, it is most often described as something that could be achieved through liberalization, 
while in later TPS (during the Doha Development Round) it is more often portrayed as related 
but separate process, which liberalization had to be adapted to or accommodated by.  In 1998, 
development was used in this sense and in describing the whole economy (not just one part, 
such as infrastructural or rural development) by at least 8 speakers, including discussant Chak-
Mun See and 7 member representatives.  Of these, five argued for liberalization as a key to 
development (although only the last three used the term ‘liberalization’): 
A trade policy based on "greater openness" contributed directly to improved economic 
performance and development; this would appear to be confirmed by India's own 
experience as it had achieved higher growth rates since 1991 (WTO 1998c: 9, 
representative of Canada).   
 
He encouraged the Indian Government to continue the reforms as this was the best way 
to maintain effective growth and to contribute to the development of the Indian 
economy (12, representative of Switzerland).   
 
He remained convinced that further comprehensive liberalization, rather than policies 
based on protection and restriction of trade, were in India's long-term interest for 
economic development (14, representative of the EU).   
 
Further liberalization of trade through reductions in tariff and non-tariff measures 
would benefit India's economic development (15, representative of Norway). 
 
Hungary's experiences showed that consistent liberalization was a major factor to 
maintain sustainable economic development (15, representative of Hungary).   
 
Three other speakers, discussant See (5) and the representatives of Cuba (19) and Mauritius (22) 
used the term without linking it directly to arguments for liberalization. 
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 In 2002, development in the whole economy sense was used more often than in 1998 – 
by 12 speakers, including 9 member representatives - and less often in connection to 
liberalization.  The very existence of the Doha Development Round could be seen as a tacit 
acknowledgement that the Uruguay Round had not addressed development concerns and by 
extension that liberalization alone could not ensure development.   A number of other 2002 
comments used the term development in such a way as to imply a separate existence from 
straightforward liberalization, including the representatives of India (4, 6, 8, 29), Hong Kong (16), 
New Zealand (18), Mauritius (20), and Cuba (25).  Where a connection between liberalization 
and development was made, they did not use the word liberalization, but rather ‘trade.’ 
 
India realized that international trade played a vital part role in economic development, 
and could be an effective instrument for raising growth, creating jobs, and alleviating 
poverty (WTO 2002c: 3, Chairperson Mohamed).   
 
Noting that the EU had spent €2 billion in development cooperation with India since 
1976, and that and the current gross annual allocation for India amounted to about €80 
million, he stated that new programmes would be prepared, inter alia, on trade and 
investment development, directly linked to the DDA (15, representative of the EU). 
 
The Secretariat Report noted that, despite progress, there were a variety barriers to 
trade and investment that still created important distortions to competition, and were 
potential impediments to India's long-term development (18, representative of the US).   
 
The representative of Hungary commended India for its economic reforms and trade 
policy based on greater openness, which had contributed to improved economic 
performance and development (22).   
 
There was an interesting variation on this development-through-trade concept, where a few 
speakers used it to critique India’s developed trade partners rather than India (11, discussant 
Whelan; 24, representative of Sri Lanka; 36, Chairperson Mohamed).  We will come back to this 
observation in the section Market Access below. 
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 Whole economy development was utilized by 9 speakers in 2007.  Again, some argued 
for the positive role of liberalization in development, they tended to do so with more qualifying 
nuance: 
Trade policy could play an important role in reinforcing social development, for 
example, through the creation of secured employment in export-oriented sectors and 
industries, as well as through supporting environmental objectives (WTO 2007c: 12, 
representative of the EU). 
 
The representative of Mexico noted two basic lessons learnt from India's economic 
development.  The first was that when structural reforms were applied properly, 
countries could grow quickly.  The second was that these reforms, including internal and 
external reforms, such as trade and investment liberalization, should not be held back 
(13). 
 
The timely completion of the DDA Round should come as a first trade policy priority for 
both developed and developing countries.  It would thus be the best way to boost the 
development of India, as well as that of all other developing countries (27, 
representative of the EU). 
 
The first conceptualizes economic and social development as distinct, if overlapping; while the 
second makes a caveat for ‘properly applied’ reform.  Picking up on the argument in the 2007 
Secretariat Report (see above), three speakers expressed concerns that India had an inadequate 
tax base to finance the public investment necessary for development (7, discussant Ric Guth; 10, 
representative of Brunei/ ASEAN; 30, Chairperson Vesa Himanen).  Other references to whole-
economy development were made by the representatives of India (3, 5, 6, 23, 24, 25), United 
States (15), China (18), Hong Kong (28), and Zimbabwe (19). 
Developed countries as an interest group were only mentioned three times in the 1998 
Meeting, twice by the representative of India (WTO 1998c: 3, 31) and once by the 
representative of New Zealand (10), always in connection to the issue of agricultural subsidies.  
The 2002 Meeting saw nine uses of this term, mostly by the representative of India (WTO 2002c: 
7- 8, 30, 32), but also by those of Hong Kong (16) and Sri Lanka (24), and also in the 
chairperson’s summary statement (36); these comments mentioned textiles and other concerns 
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as well as agricultural subsidies.  ‘Developed countries’ or some variation was used 16 times in 
2007, 13 in the comments of the representative of India (3- 6), once each in the comments of 
the discussant (8) and the representatives of Brazil (16) and the European Union (27). 
 The term developing countries or sometimes ‘developing world’ was much more 
ubiquitous throughout: It was used 18 times in 1998, by the representatives of India (WTO 
1998c: 3- 4, 21, 30), the European Union (13), Egypt (17), Brazil (18), Nigeria (18- 19), and the 
Dominican Republic (19); and by both discussants (5- 7).  It was used 36 times in 2002 (the year 
after the initiation of the Doha “Development” Round), by the representatives of India (7, 30, 
32- 33), Canada (12), Uruguay (14), Colombia (16), Hong Kong (16- 17), Brazil (17), New Zealand 
(18), Mauritius (20), Jamaica (22), Honduras (23), Sri Lanka (24), Cuba (25), Botswana (26- 27), 
and Morocco (26).  2007 saw 22 uses, almost all by the representative of India (5- 6, 20, 22, 25), 
but also by the representatives of the European Union (13, 27), the United States (15), and 
Uruguay (18). 
 Reference was made to ‘Least Developed Countries’ or LDCs only once in 2002, by the 
representative of Cuba (WTO 2002c: 25) and five times in 2007: by the chair (WTO 2007c: 30), 
the discussant (26), and by the representatives of India (20), the EU (13), and Mali (19).  All of 
these were in reference to preferential trade access for LDCs. 
 
Bringing in Poverty 
 References to poverty seemed to increase in the TPR Meetings after the Doha 
‘Development’ Round began.  Poverty is only mentioned three times in the 1998 Meeting (only 
by the discussant and the chair, always in connection to agriculture), but it is mentioned 18 
times in 2002 and 15 times in 2007.  These references to poverty can be roughly divided into 
three discursive groups (with some overlap): 1) statements simply noting the existence of 
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poverty; 2) those which note that poverty has been reduced; and 3) those suggesting that 
poverty would or could be reduced in the future.  Table 6.2 describes this in greater detail. 
 
Table 6.2: Mentions of Poverty 
  1998 Meeting 2002 Meeting 2007 Meeting 
Poverty observed discussant #2 (Wells) chair India, discussant, EU 
Poverty reduction 
observed   
chair, discussant, 
India, Philippines, 
Mauritius, Jamaica, 
Honduras 
discussant, EU, Sri 
Lanka, Mali 
Future poverty 
reduction referenced 
discussant #2 
(Wells), chair 
chair, India, EU, 
Jamaica 
Chair, Brunei, New 
Zealand, EU, Mexico 
 
Very few statements pointed out the existence of poverty without referring to its 
reduction or possible future reduction.  And almost all those that did were made by speakers 
whom elsewhere made statements of the latter two types.  Overall, but especially in 2002, most 
statements regarding poverty referred to its reduction: 
The representative noted that it was important to see economic progress also through 
the prism of social development.  The incidence of poverty, as a percentage of people 
living below the poverty line had declined from 36% to 26% (WTO 2002c: 4, 
representative of India) 
 
India deserved congratulations for the appreciable gains in poverty eradication, from 
34% to 26% between 1993/94 and 1999/00 (WTO 2002c: 19, representative of the 
Philippines). 
 
India had paid attention to the development challenge as part of its economic reforms.  
The number of people living below the poverty line had been halved in the past 20 years 
(WTO 2007c: 12, representative of the EU).   
 
Where poverty reduction was noted, this was sometimes attributed to liberalization: 
India's more open trade policies had contributed to improved social welfare and the 
alleviation of poverty (WTO 2007c: 18, representative of Sri Lanka). 
 
or to growth: 
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As the period under review had witnessed strong economic growth, there had been 
parallel developments in social policy, including reductions in the percentage of people 
living below the poverty line;  improvements in infant mortality rates;  an increase in 
literacy rates;  and a modest increase in employment (WTO 2002c: 9, disscussant 
Whelan). 
 
The rapid growth had been accompanied by an improvement in several social indicators, 
including a decline in infant mortality, a reduction of absolute poverty, as well as 
improvements in literacy, and health conditions (WTO 2007c: 7, Discussant Guth). 
 
In a few statements, a logical dependency was explicity laid out linking all three terms in the 
form of ‘liberalization causes growth, growth reduces poverty.’  This sentiment is stated most 
clearly in the summary remarks of the chairs of the 2002 and 2007 Meetings: 
 
Members all agreed that India's economic performance has been impressive, with GDP 
growth averaging over 7% between 2001/02 (fiscal year, April-March) and 2006/07; 
growth has been particularly rapid since 2003, averaging over 8.5% and has translated 
into improved social indicators, including a reduction in the percentage of the 
population living below the poverty line.  They attributed this impressive performance 
mainly to structural reforms, including unilateral trade liberalization, such as reductions 
in applied tariffs (WTO 2007c: 30, Chairperson Himanen). 
 
Members commended India for its strong economic performance over the past decade, 
with growth at an average 6% a year and a reduction in poverty.  They noted that this 
resulted, in great part, from continued economic reforms, including trade liberalization, 
lower government involvement in the economy and liberalization of key services sectors 
(WTO 2002: 35, Chairperson Mohamed).   
 
The following two quotes are the clearest statements exemplifying this logic on the parts of 
member representatives, in reference to what had already been achieved: 
 
The representative of Honduras said that India's policy reforms had resulted in high 
economic growth over the past years.  There had been a positive impact on growth and 
poverty reduction through the elimination of licences and of QRs on balance-of-
payments grounds, together with greater investment liberalization, a less restrictive 
industrial policy, reform of telecommunications, the financial sector, and other key 
areas, and tariff policies that were consistent at the regional level (WTO 2002: 23).   
 
The representative of Cuba noted India's efforts to comply with its WTO obligations, and 
welcomed the economic and trade reform it had undertaken.  These measures had 
contributed to high economic growth, and more stable trade regime, but also to 
improving social development indicators (WTO 2002c: 25). 
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This quote from the representative of Jamaica would also qualify, but only if we take 
juxtaposition to imply causation: 
Since 1991, India had embarked on a far-reaching economic reform programme, and 
had been able to achieve strong economic growth.  Other economic and social 
indicators such as inflation, foreign exchange reserves, exports, poverty, and 
employment had also improved (WTO 2002: 21, representative of Jamaica). 
 
More comments used the same three-step logical dependency, but in relation to what could be 
achieved under conditions of future liberalization instead of current successes (see below). 
 A handful of statements mentioned ‘standards of living,’ which in this context of India 
can be read as a reference to poverty. 
The representative of Nicaragua commended India's extraordinary economic growth, 
which had been translated into improved living standards (WTO 2007c: 18). 
 
The representative of Chile in the 2007 Meeting made a similar statement, which however only 
‘partly’ attributed improved living standards to growth (WTO 2007c: 17, see above).  The 1998 
representative of the United States (WTO 1998c: 14) and the 2002 representative of Barbados 
(WTO 2002c: 26) spoke of India’s efforts to improve living standards, but did not indicate 
whether or not they thought that these had been successful. 
 More general references to India’s ‘development’ may also be taken as indirect proxies 
for discussion of poverty, although with less confidence (see below).   For a discussion of 
agricultural poverty, see chapter 7. 
 
Metrics of Future Success 
 Speakers at the TPR Meetings often referred not only to the GDP growth and poverty 
reduction India had already achieved, but also the improvement of these and other metrics that 
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could be achieved, often in line with the liberalization -> growth -> poverty reduction trope.  
Expectations of future growth were usually accompanied by an ‘if’ proposition indicating that it 
was conditional upon further liberalization: 
A balanced, outward-looking framework,  including the removal of barriers on imports 
generally and not only those directly related to subsequent exports, would reinforce the 
basis for sustained growth (WTO 1998c: 9, representative of Canada). 
 
He encouraged the Indian Government to continue the reforms as this was the best way 
to maintain effective growth and to contribute to the development of the Indian 
economy (WTO 1998c: 12, representative of Switzerland).   
 
India was optimistic that, through comprehensive reforms in core sectors, including 
agriculture, the coming years would witness higher growth (WTO 2002c: 4, 
representative of India). 
 
She urged India to continue reforms to maintain its economic growth (WTO 2007c: 18, 
representative of Uruguay). 
 
Future poverty reduction was, in turn, often portrayed as dependent on growth. 
To achieve further significant cuts in poverty, the Government was currently targeting 
growth of between 7% and 9%, substantially higher than the rate of 5.4% expected in 
2001/02 (WTO 2002C: 3, Chairperson Mohamed). 
  
…to achieve further significant reduction in poverty, India needed higher GDP growth 
(WTO 2002c: 15).   
 
High growth in the medium term was expected to double per capita income over the 
next ten years, and to reduce poverty ratios significantly (WTO 2002c: 27). 
 
He expressed the confidence that, as high growth rates were to be sustained in the 
coming years, India would be able to address its social and economic needs, and to 
meet the challenges of poverty alleviation and of human capital development (WTO 
2007c: 10, representative for Brunei, speaking on behalf of ASEAN). 
 
A few speakers explicitly laid out all three steps of the liberalization -> growth -> poverty 
reduction trope in series (a variation on the three-step dependency described above). 
In its five-year development plan for 2002-07, India acknowledged the need for further 
economic reforms to ensure sustained economic development and poverty reduction 
(WTO 2002c: 22, representative of Jamaica).   
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I think we all agree that India needs to do more if growth targets are to be met and a 
serious dent is to be made in the still high rate of poverty.  In this regard, Members gave 
India their full support for its efforts to reform the economy (WTO 2002c: 36, 
Chairperson Mohamed). 
 
Continued and deepened reform was the best way towards a sustainable level of 
growth and a reduction of poverty (WTO 2007c: 11, representative of New Zealand).   
 
“Trade Engine of growth”: Exports and Jobs 
 When speakers went beyond the simple expressions of liberalization leading to further 
growth and growth reducing poverty, they often filled in the blanks with trade and jobs.  Growth 
in trade would contribute to growth in GDP, while increasing exports would provide jobs, which 
would lift people out of poverty.  Trade was sometimes referred to as an ‘engine of growth’ in 
this context. 
Given the size of India's GDP, there appeared to be high potential for India to use 
external trade as an engine of growth.  External trade still accounted for a relatively low 
share in the Indian economy (20% of GDP)… Trade could not be used as an engine of 
growth as long as the Indian Government maintained a relatively high effective tariff 
rate, and a restrictive import licensing system (WTO 1998c: 5, Discussant See). 
 
Colombia, like India, believed that exports were an engine for growth, and welcomed 
India's policy in this area (WTO 2002c: 16).   
 
The EU agreed with India that there was an important linkage between trade and 
economic growth.  Fewer restrictions and further structural reform would help India to 
raise its share in world trade, thus increasing its annual real economic growth rates, 
which would contribute in tackling its domestic problems (WTO 2002c: 15).   
 
Other statements tied trade, specifically exports, to job creation:  
The major goal and key focus of India's trade policy was to increase exports and to 
generate employment (WTO 2007c: 8, Discussant Guth).   
 
Two other comments to this effect have already been quoted in the Usage of “Development” 
section above.  Chairperson Mohamed in 2002 described trade as “an effective instrument… 
creating jobs, and alleviating poverty” (WTO 2002c: 3), while the 2007 EU representative 
suggested that trade would promote “the creation of secured employment in export-oriented 
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sectors and industries” (WTO 2007c: 12).  A few commenters in the 2007 Meeting, especially 
discussant Guth, tied their concerns about job creation to India’s growing working-age 
population, thus adding an extra sense of urgency: 
India also had one of the youngest populations.  While this would provide a ready 
supply of labour, creating sufficient jobs would become an enormous challenge (WTO 
2007c: 7, discussant Guth). 
 
With its large population, India needed to address issues such as the uniform application 
of employment standards, continued job creation, and improvement of skills, all of 
which required innovative and sensitive responses (12, representative of the EU). 
 
Solving the problem of unemployment was the most important challenge, particularly as 
India was the second most populated country in the world (15, representative of 
Colombia). 
 
Above we saw that the Indian government had put a positive spin on this (as the ‘demographic 
dividend’) in the 2007 Government Report and in the comments of Representative Pillai in the 
Meeting.  The representative of Colombia went on to endorse this trope after expressing 
concerns about unemployment and population: 
India also had a vast supply of young people in the labour market, and its population 
would continue to be active to the year 2040.  This young work force provided 
advantages not only in the labour supply, but also in saving rates, social security, and 
public finances (ibid). 
 
 The growth of the high tech service sector was emphasized in the TPRs, but a critical 
undercurrent emerged observing the smaller job-creation potential compared to sectors 
requiring less skilled labor.  Part of the Indian government’s triumphalism about its service 
industry concerned the creation of jobs in this sector, with Pillai noting that “Employment of 
professionals in the IT sector was estimated to have passed 1.5 million and was expected to 
reach 2.5 million by 2010” (WTO 2007c: 24).  It was not lost on him, however, that high-skill 
service jobs only represented a small fraction of the Indian labor force.  His earlier, extensive 
remarks on the agricultural sector included the fact that it “employed nearly 70% of the 
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workforce” (5), while his defense of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) included the argument that 
they would not just facilitate capital-intensive industries: “The large number of textile, gems, 
and leather SEZs to be established would provide employment for a less skilled labour force” 
(21).  Other meeting participants also expressed concern about the capacity of the non-service 
economy to provide jobs: 
…the policy on industrial incentives should be reviewed to ensure the objective of 
promoting labour-intensive activities, in particular if capital-intensive industries located 
in the economic zones were involved (10, representative of Brunei/ ASEAN). 
 
Despite progress already made, the services sector had much further potential.  
However, the agriculture and manufacturing sectors were equally significant for 
employment opportunities and balanced growth (12, representative of the EU). 
 
As agriculture employed a large part of the population, to integrate this population in 
the globalization process would be the target of reforms (13, representative of Mexico). 
 
In chapter 7, we will look in more detail at the idea of shifting labor from agriculture to 
manufacturing. 
 
The Strong and Weak Arguments 
The Cautious Pace: Consensus and Vulnerability 
 Throughout the TPRs, India was critiqued, by the Secretariat Report and by many of the 
speakers in the Meeting Minutes, for not pursuing its policy liberalizations at a more rapid pace.  
The Secretariat is especially insistent on this point in its first two reports.  As noted above, the 
1998 Secretariat Report concluded that: “The recent economic slowdown demonstrates the 
need for continued and even accelerated reforms” (WTO 1998a: vii).  The 2002 report states: 
In order to achieve further significant reductions in poverty, India is currently targeting 
higher real GDP growth of between 7% and 9%... to meet this goal it will be important, 
as stressed by the authorities, to continue, and even accelerate, the reform process 
(WTO 2002a: 4). 
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The slow pace of liberalization was brought up at a few points in the meetings, most consistently 
by the United States delegations, which mentioned “a slowdown in trade liberalization” in 1998 
(WTO 1998c: 14) and more critically in 2007: 
…the pace of reform has slowed over the past year, which, as predicted by many 
economists, had prevented India from achieving even greater economic growth (WTO 
2007c: 14). 
 
The few other delegations that made observations of the pacing of reforms were more qualified 
and less critical: 
…the pace of liberalization in India had been rather slow, except for capital goods and 
raw materials (WTO 1998c: 15, representative of Korea). 
 
While understanding India's gradual approach to economic reforms, Switzerland urged 
India to proceed as quickly and as sustainably as possible (WTO 2002c: 13). 
 
…in a democratic country where more than half of the population was in farming, a 
rapid change would not be realistic (WTO 2007c: 14, representative of Japan).   
 
The most attention was given to the slow pace trope by the second discussant (Ric Wells of 
Australia) in 1998: 
 
…progress [in liberalization] had been slower than expected.  While the Government of 
India had aimed at achieving an average tariff of 25% by 1997, the average tariff rate 
was currently 35%; liberalization of foreign investment in basic telecommunications had 
also been slower than planned; and agriculture remained heavily protected.  In addition, 
trade liberalization had not been consistent with greater liberalization in investment, 
creating a tendency for investment to be a substitute rather than a complement to 
trade in some sectors.  In services, some sectors had been more liberalized than others.  
He questioned the reasons for such uneven and sometimes slower than planned 
liberalization (WTO 1998c: 7). 
 
He repeated this argument later in the meeting in response to the Indian delegation’s closing 
remarks: 
The second discussant agreed with the need to see trade reforms in the broader context 
of general reforms.  Nevertheless, it was important for trade reforms to keep pace; 
125 
 
comments had been made on a disparity in the pace of investment and trade 
liberalization in some sectors (WTO 1998c: 21).   
 
Later in the chapter, critiques of the rates of liberalization in specific sector will be examined 
further. 
 The Indian government defended the cautious pace of its reforms in terms of 
democratic compromise: 
Reforms… have a greater chance of success when they are perceived as pro-people and 
public opinion regarding them is favourable.  A consensual approach therefore has to be 
evolved taking into account the democratic and federal structure of the country.  The 
gradual, but continuous progress in reforms, in spite of successive changes in 
Government, should be looked at in this backdrop (WTO 2002b: 5). 
 
the reforms undertaken had been carried out through a process of consultation and 
consensus, taking into account the varied needs of the different segments of the 
population, and within the framework of India's democratic and federal structure.  India 
wanted the changes to be sequenced carefully and their implementation to be closely 
monitored so that they had positive support from all sections of society (WTO 2002c: 5). 
 
Democracies work slowly, but steadily, and the pace of reforms was the price paid for 
inclusive growth (WTO 2007c: 3). 
 
 The decentralized federal structure of the Indian government is noted as an impediment 
to liberalization in 2007 in both the Indian Government Report and the Secretariat Report.  The 
Government Report explains: 
India had a Federal polity with the Central Government and the state governments 
having exclusive domain over various sectors with certain overlaps.  In the past two 
decades, attention had also been paid to local self-government.  The increased 
devolution of responsibilities to the local levels had increased complexities of 
administration (WTO 2007b: 3).   
 
In reference to India’s constitutional requirements for state government involvement in some 
trade and national economic policy, the Secretariat states: 
This requires continuous interaction between the Central and state governments and in 
some cases, such as changes in the structure of indirect taxation and electricity tariffs 
and provision, has led to delays in reform (WTO 2007a: viii).  
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 The Indian representatives further defended the (relatively) slow pace in terms of 
managing risk.  They noted in the 1998 meeting that India was “consciously avoiding the ‘big 
bang’ approach to economic reforms” and claimed that “the benefits and costs from each 
measure had been weighted keeping in mind the social cost” (WTO 1998c: 20).  In the 2007 
meeting, Indian Representative Pillai said in reference to the reform process: 
Stakeholders' interests had to be carefully weighed and balanced… policy shifts might 
lead to unintended consequences or unanticipated outcomes; the pace of reforms in a 
vibrant democracy was not as rapid as might be desirable.  Building consensus and 
carrying political coalitions were not simple, but would yield robust policy reforms.  
Economic shocks and unrelated events often affected the reform process.  In addition, 
policy reform now would have a bearing on the immediate future (WTO 2007c: 25). 
 
Pillai emphasized the vulnerability of India’s poor to market fluctuations.   Certain price controls 
were defended on the grounds that: 
Even a small percentage variation in the demand or the supply of canalized items (such 
as petroleum products, fertilizers, edible oils, and cereals) could cause widespread 
distress; reliance on an entirely free market was considered an extremely risky 
proposition (WTO 1998c: 23).   
 
The implication is that the instability and unpredictability of rapid policy changes would threaten 
the livelihoods of the vulnerable poor population.   A cautious attitude toward reform was 
especially emphasized with regard to agriculture, as in this quote from the Indian representative 
in the 1998 meeting:  
The representative of India stated that almost three quarters of the population was 
dependent on agriculture for their livelihood.  While reforms had taken place in the 
agricultural sector, the pace had been carefully calibrated so as to evaluate possible 
ramifications.   (WTO 1998c: 24).   
 
The construction and deployment of the vulnerable agricultural population will be examined in 
more detail in chapter 7. 
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Selectivity of Reforms 
 While calling for more rapid adoption of reforms, the Secretariat and various speakers in 
the meeting minutes also called for its extension to more areas of India’s economy, particularly 
to agriculture and consumer goods.  The argument for extension is frequently linked to 
observations about the growth rates of the different sectors of the Indian economy.  Services 
have grown the fastest, manufacturing less rapidly, and agricultural very slowly; this is 
correlated in this argument to the amount of liberal reform each sector has undergone: 
Growth has been led by the services sector, where liberalization has been most rapid.  
Manufacturing has also performed well, although further growth may be impeded by 
infrastructure and other constraints.  In contrast, agricultural growth continues to be 
slow and erratic and dependent on the weather, causing considerable distress, 
especially among small and marginal farmers (WTO 2007a: vii). 
 
Services have been the main engine of growth in recent years… largely due to greater 
progress in reforms, especially for certain services (WTO 2007a: xi). 
 
The implication is that if liberalization led to growth in the service sector it would have the same 
effect on manufacturing and agriculture. With regard to the latter, this is in effect an argument 
against agricultural exceptionalism.  We will come back to this in chapter 7. 
 The Indian government seems in many ways to be more cautious about manufacturing 
and especially agriculture than it is about services.  Although India’s representatives were not 
explicit in this regard, the ‘vulnerable population’ concept has some applicability to the sectoral 
reform observations.  By the logic that haphazard liberalization endangers people living near 
subsistence, it can be extrapolated that by introducing the most radical liberal reforms in the 
service sector the Indian government is minimizing the risk to its population.  Services employ 
only a small fraction of the population compared to manufacturing and especially to agriculture, 
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and this population is certainly less economically vulnerable.12  In any case, it must be 
emphasized that the ‘more-to-less liberalization’ observation is just that: services have 
undergone more liberalization, but the other two sectors, even agriculture, have also liberalized 
in far-reaching and radical ways. 
 Manufacturing had experienced rapid growth, but less (proportionally) than services.  
The 2007 Secretariat Report asserts that:  
…this can be attributed, in part, to continued structural reforms and a relaxation in 
licensing and FDI restrictions.  The sector, however, continues to be protected by 
relatively high tariff barriers… Further growth in manufacturing is hampered also by a 
lack of infrastructure and labour market rigidities. (WTO 2007a: xii). 
 
In his concluding remarks, the chairperson of the 2007 meeting stated: 
 
Some concerns were expressed about the development of the manufacturing sector, 
which is being held back by the complex customs duty structure, as well as the relatively 
high tariffs in textiles and clothing, and automobiles.  Members remarked on the 
superior performance of India's services sector, where liberalization has been most 
rapid (WTO 2007c: 31).   
 
By ‘some members,’ the chair is referring specifically to comments by the representatives of the 
United States, who also used the phrase “held back” in relation to India’s manufacturing 
regulations (WTO 2007c: 14) and New Zealand, the only member that directly compared growth 
in services to growth in manufacturing with a connection to liberalization. 
 
Autonomy 
 While the Secretariat and most member representatives reinforced the triumphalism of 
India’s reform program with praise and statistical observations touting its success, these often 
12 The relative newness of many service industries may also explain the relative ease of 
liberalization here (new regulations could be designed from scratch rather than through the 
reform of old regulatory regimes). 
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distinguish themselves from the tone of the Indian representatives through pessimism about the 
sustainability of India’s growth and skepticism about the specifics of India’s reform model.  
Where the Indian representatives stressed the autonomy of their model and its unique context, 
the Secretariat and many members saw its success as the outcome of the application of 
orthodox principles of liberalization and its heterodox elements as its potential downfall. 
 The representatives of the Indian government, in both the Government Reports and in 
the meeting minutes, tended to stress the unique contexts of the Indian economy, with the 
implication that the standard, one-size-fits-all model of economic liberalization was not 
necessarily appropriate here.  The opening statement of the Indian delegation during the 2007 
meeting contained an assertion to this effect: 
As each country had its own genius, history, culture, economic, political, and social 
institutions, there could be no one-size-fits-all reforms…  The manner in which reforms 
were implemented had to be country specific (WTO 2007c: 6). 
 
Towards the end of the meeting, the Indian delegation ended its response remarks with: 
India would push ahead with its autonomous, custom-tailored reform programme, and 
expected the support of other Members would continue through recognizing and 
making accommodation for the inherent complexity of the process (WTO 2007c: 25).  
 
 The Indian government emphasized that these reforms were not adopted 
indiscriminately and they resist the notion pushed in the Secretariat Report that more and faster 
liberalization is always the solution.  In describing the Eighth Five-year Plan (1992-1997), the 
1998 Government Report states: 
…for India it was not a choice between market mechanism and planning, but that the 
challenge was to effectively dovetail the two, so that they are complementary to each 
other (WTO 1998a).  
  
The Indian reports also stress the autonomy of these reforms, noting that they far exceed the 
levels of liberalization required of India under the WTO agreements.  The 2007 Government 
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Report emphasized that “radical tariff liberalization” has been undertaken unilaterally “without 
attaching any conditions of reciprocity” on India’s trading partners (WTO 2007b: 15).  There are 
also defensive assertions regarding the purview of the WTO: 
India is of the view that not all areas of economic activity can be made a subset of trade 
concerns for consideration in the WTO, since many of these areas have a development 
perspective (WTO 1998b: 7).  
 
This distinction between ‘trade’ and ‘development’ perspectives implies some skepticism 
regarding the straightforward liberalization-leads-to-development trope of the Strong 
Liberalization Argument. 
 For the Secretariat and other speakers advocating a strong liberalization argument, it is 
India’s very autonomy which is seen as a hindrance to market efficiency.  In this argument, the 
prerogative of a government to ‘change its mind’ on policy creates an environment of 
uncertainty and unpredictability.  This unpredictability in turn discourages private investment.  
They repeatedly call for India to lock-in its liberal reforms by making them part of the next round 
of WTO agreements. 
 The strongest argument to this effect is made in regard to the “gap” that existed 
between the bound and applied rates of Indian tariffs on imports (this gap was significant 
throughout the period of these three TPRs): 
With the exception of a few applied tariffs, which are at their corresponding bound 
rates, the difference between the bound and applied tariff rates is considerable.  This 
difference gives the Government considerable scope to raise applied tariffs, scope that 
was used to raise tariffs for some agricultural products in recent years (WTO 2007a: viii). 
 
To understand this argument, we first need to explain the different between ‘bound’ 
and ‘applied’ tariff rates.  Tariffs here are measured as a percentage of the value of imports.  
Under the Uruguay Round WTO agreements, maximum ceilings were set on the tariff rates India 
could charge on most of its imports.  These are the ‘bound’ rates and the Indian government 
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cannot charge a tariff higher than the bound rate for a product without violating its WTO 
obligations.  Usually, however, it charges much lower tariffs, which are called the ‘applied’ rates.  
In short, bound tariff rates are the maximum that India can charge, while applied rates are those 
that it does charge.  Part of the Indian government’s claim that its liberalization program has 
exceeded its WTO commitments is the fact that its applied tariff rates are far below its bound 
tariff rates. 
The bound-applied gap received little attention in the 1998 TPR, but was featured much 
more prominently in 2002 and 2007.  The 1998 Secretariat Report mentions it only in passing, 
without overt criticism:  
In both areas, thus, India, like most other developing countries, has put a ceiling on its 
protective structure, rather than binding it at effective levels, while pursuing unilateral 
liberalization (WTO 1998a: xiii). 
 
The representative of the European Union was the only speaker in the 1998 TPR to criticize the 
bound-applied gap: 
 
Despite a considerable increase in the number of tariff lines bound, and a substantial 
lowering of the simple average effective tariff, a notable difference remained between 
the applied rate and the bound rate.  For the sake of predictability, a narrowing of this 
gap was called for. (WTO 1998c: 13; italics mine) 
 
 Between 1998 and 2002, India raised some of its agricultural tariffs to compensate for 
the loss of Quantitative Restrictions as a policy instrument (as a result of losing a dispute within 
the WTO).  This led the Secretariat to take a more critical stance on the gap issue, based on the 
uncertainty this created for economic calculation: 
…the average bound rate considerably exceeds the average applied rate, thus imparting 
a degree of uncertainty to the tariff and providing scope for the authorities to raise 
applied MFN [most favored nation] rates;  indeed, tariffs were raised on some items 
following the recent removal of quantitative restrictions (WTO 2002a: 25, italics mine). 
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This difference lends uncertainty to economic agents in India as it provides the 
Government with considerable scope to raise applied MFN tariffs within these bindings 
(WTO 2002a: 28, italics mine). 
 
This line of critique was continued in 2007 Secretariat Report: 
As the overall applied MFN tariff declines, the gap between the bound and applied rates 
continues to grow… The difference between the high bound rates and considerably 
lower applied rates creates uncertainty for importers by giving scope to raise tariffs 
within the bound rates (WTO 2007a: 33). 
 
 In the 2002 meeting, criticism of the bound-applied gap and the uncertainty/ 
unpredictability this created for private economic agents was more widespread than in 1998 
(although the EU representative did not mention it this time).  It is first brought up by the 
discussant (Mary Whelan of Ireland): 
The average bound tariff (50.6% in 2005) was considerably higher than the current MFN 
average tariff, which lent uncertainty to economic agents in India.  She [Whelan] asked 
whether there were proposals to address this uncertainty (WTO 2002c: 10).   
 
The representative for Switzerland stated: 
The rather large proportion of unbound tariff lines as well as the gap between bound 
and applied rates provided scope for uncertainty, and diminished the predictability 
needed by economic operators (WTO 2002c: 13). 
 
The representatives for Canada, Japan, and Norway made similar observations (12, 13- 14, & 
21).  The representative of the United States expanded on the argument against the gap by 
suggesting that locking in lower bound rates would be a way to insulate India’s trade policy from 
domestic politics: 
It was worth noting that while respecting bound rates was enough within the WTO legal 
framework, tariff bindings not only benefited trading partners, and ensured security and 
predictability of the trading system, but they also protected governments from pressure 
by domestic industry and interest groups (WTO 2002c: 32). 
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In the 2007 meeting, the gap/ uncertainty critique is repeated by the discussant and the 
representatives of Switzerland, the EC, and Canada. This time they were joined by the 
representatives of Turkey and Sri Lanka.  The latter stated 
Predictability for traders would be largely improved if more tariffs were bound at lower 
rates, thus reducing this gap (WTO 2007c: 18). 
 
 The India delegations at the 2002 and 2007 meetings both directly addressed the gap 
critique in their response statements, made towards the ends of each meeting.  
India saw the issue of the gap between applied and bound rates very positively.  If the 
gap was high it was because India was able to make do with much lower applied tariff 
rates.  At the same time, when required, the flexibility provided by the bound rates had 
been used, particularly on agricultural products, after the removal of QRs [quantitative 
restrictions].  The criteria used in determining tariff rates sought a balance between 
many factors, including the need for a phased reduction in duty as part of fiscal reform, 
the level of protection needed by the domestic industry, and the needs of the user 
industry or the consumers.  A reduction in bound rates was a matter for the on-going 
negotiations on market access, where India would need to keep in view its various 
domestic imperatives, including developmental, fiscal, and other needs, as well as the 
extent to which its trading partners committed themselves to reducing export subsidies 
and domestic support (WTO 2002c: 29, italics mine). 
 
Here, the Indian representatives dismiss the complaints about the gap by asserting its need to 
consider factors other than providing an easily predictable market for traders and investors.  In 
this argument, the need for flexibility trumps the need for predictability.  The policy space 
provided by the bound-applied tariff gap enabled the Indian government to deal quickly with 
unexpected events like the loss of the use of quantitative import restrictions in a previous WTO 
dispute settlement.  Further, the representative made clear that lowering India’s bound rates in 
subsequent agreements was a bargaining chip for which it expected equivalent concessions 
from its trading partners.  The Indian representative at the 2007 meeting repeated its defense of 
the gap, although more succinctly: 
The progress in tariff reform, logically, had increased the gap between bound and 
applied rates.  This should be viewed as a positive development.  The benefit of low 
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tariffs could far outweigh the fears of a possible hike in tariffs up to the bound levels 
(WTO 2007c: 20). 
 
 
The Weak Argument in the Meetings: Limitations of Liberalization 
 Liberalization was not always a conceived as an easy and straightforward means to 
development, growth, and poverty reduction.  Some speakers supported India’s cautious pace, 
acknowledged that liberal reforms were not always popular, and even held India’s approach to 
liberalization as a model. 
 A handful of developing country representatives noted that implementing liberal 
reforms were not easy and often came with socioeconomic dislocation: 
He was appreciative of India's successful economic development recently with respect 
to its policies with minimum social costs (WTO 1998: 19, representative of Cuba).   
 
Brazil understood the difficulties for a large developing country of a complex political, 
economic and cultural nature in going through a liberalization programme (18). 
 
Honduras was aware of the high cost of these policies (WTO 2002c: 23).   
 
Barbados appreciated that India had to manage its liberalization process carefully so as 
to minimize any economic or social dislocation, and acknowledged India's economic and 
social efforts towards the improvement of living standards (26). 
 
Subsidy and price policies… would need to be rationalized, so that they could be 
reduced without the unintended adverse effect on parallel social policy directed at the 
poor (WTO 2007c: 10, representative of Brunei/ ASEAN). 
 
India needed to keep the right balance between its domestic development needs and 
international commitments (19, representative of Zimbabwe). 
 
One or two comments even suggested that the rest of the world could learn from India’s 
particular model of liberalization: 
Noting the Secretariat Report's suggestion that a re-examination of certain aspects of 
India's trade and investment regime might strengthen economic growth, Brazil was 
strikingly aware of the need to reconcile sound economic policy and social objectives, 
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and believed that there were many lessons to be derived from India's recent economic 
performance (WTO 2002c: 17, representative of Brazil). 
 
The representative of Mexico noted… that when structural reforms were applied 
properly, countries could grow quickly (WTO 2007c: 13). 
 
The representatives of the EU in 1998 and 2002, while strongly arguing the necessity of 
liberalization for development, at least acknowledged that the Indian electorate might not see it 
this way:  
The challenge for India was to demonstrate to a sometimes sceptical public that 
liberalization benefited growth, employment and overall development (WTO 1998c: 12). 
 
Everyone was aware of India's domestic situation with a sometimes hostile public 
opinion that found the WTO an easy scapegoat for home-made economic problems 
(WTO 2007c: 15).   
 
The 2007 representative of the EU still argued for liberalization as a means to development, but 
was slightly more nuanced and diplomatic: 
During the ongoing reform process, one of the main challenges for India was the 
balancing of social and economic development…  She sought India's views on how trade 
policy could best contribute to sustainable development, and how some of the social 
and environmental effects of trade liberalization could best be addressed (WTO 2007c: 
12). 
 
Although she acknowledged some distinction between social and economic development (and 
environmental concerns), she remained committed to the idea that the benefits of trade 
liberalization could only help overall development: 
Although more needed to be done to tackle the still serious level of poverty, the rising 
inter-state disparities, and the income inequalities, India was conscious of the need to 
further pursue development through trade.  This, however, would have to be 
underpinned by credible economic and structural reforms, including upgrading India's 
infrastructure.  WTO Membership would play a helpful role, as abiding by WTO 
obligations, both present and future ones under the DDA, would help lock in domestic 
reforms (ibid). 
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This recalls the argument examined in the section above entitled Autonomy, where some 
speakers (including the Secretariat and the EU representative) argued for India to bound its 
tariffs at the lower rates at which they were currently being applied, to prevent future Indian 
governments from raising them.  By lock in, the representative is proposing that liberalization 
can be made permanent by enshrining in an international agreement beyond the reach of the 
‘sceptical’ and ‘hostile’ Indian public.  The 2007 representative of Japan was also more sensitive 
to India’s pace of reform: 
In a democratic country where more than half of the population was in farming, a rapid 
change would not be realistic (14). 
 
And even the representative of the United States acknowledged that agricultural liberalization, 
at least, presented some potential socioeconomic dislocation: 
Reforming [the agricultural] sector was very challenging as it sustained the livelihoods of 
two thirds of India's vast population (14). 
 
Turning the Tables: India and the Developing World 
Turn-about Critique 
 The Indian government and delegation never failed to use the Government Reports and 
the meeting as a platform to critique its trading partners.  One of the most overt topics of 
critique was excessive farm subsidies in the European Union and the United States, which will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.  Other targets of critique included the slow pace of 
dismantling quantitative restrictions in textiles (in 1998 and 2002); the lack of attention to the 
movement of workers in services liberalization; the perceived use of safety/ health standards by 
India’s trading partners as non-tariff barriers; a perceived bias against developing-country 
137 
 
exports in developed-country tariff structures; and the abuse of anti-dumping and other 
safeguard measures by India’s trading partners. 
 A major component of the Uruguay Round was the Agreement on Clothing and Textiles 
(ACT), which outlined the gradual dismantlement of the older Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA), by 
which developed countries had protected their textile and clothing industries from developing 
economy competition via a system of import quotas.  This was done over ten years and was still 
in progress during the 2002 and 2005 TRPs.  In both of these, the Indian government 
complained that developed countries were dragging their feet and replacing quotas with other 
trade barriers. 
Amongst the import policy issues, quantitative restrictions, especially in the textiles area, 
are one of the most important of the non-tariff barriers affecting India's trade.  While the 
MFA is being phased out, there is a certain "back loading" insofar as items of interest to 
India are concerned.  Another problem in the area of textiles arose with the introduction 
of new "country of origin rules" by some of our major trading partners, limiting the 
flexibility of Indian exporters in finishing garment/textile items from other countries for 
export to the trading partners, which have invoked such rules.  (WTO 1998b: 8) 
 
“Country of origin” rules were seen in the Indian Government Reports as backdoor trade barrier 
to replace the quotas that were being phased out.  By the 2002 Government Report, two 
additional non-tariff barriers were suspected of fulfilling the same purpose.  The first was simply 
anti-dumping measures: 
Repeated anti-dumping investigations on the textile products like cotton fabrics and 
cotton bedlinen, in which India enjoys a measure of comparative advantage, had a 
debilitating effect on the Indian textile industry and exports.  The export of textile 
products has also been affected because of ban on use of Azo dyes (WTO 2002b: 15).  
 
A second trend that the Government Report saw as recreating the MFA barriers in another form 
was the proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements: 
Another area of concern regarding market access for textile trade is an increasing 
tendency to enter into bilateral pacts for conferring selective liberalization of quotas.  
The tariff preferences have also been extended bilaterally, which are otherwise meant 
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to be provided to all developing countries on a non-reciprocal basis.  There is also a 
growing regionalization of textile trade on account of formation of Free Trade Areas and 
Preferential Trading Arrangements.  It is estimated that 59% of world trade in textiles is 
presently taking place under RTAs.  Such localization of world textile trade is adversely 
affecting India's textile trade (WTO 2002b: 16). 
 
By 2007, the MFA and its quota system had been completely dismantled, but the Government 
Report still complained that Indian clothing and textiles were still the target of a 
disproportionate number of anti-dumping measures (WTO 2007b: 33) and further that the 
attention given to simply abolishing the MFA had distracted from carrying out other 
liberalization measures in the clothing and textiles sector: 
In the Uruguay Round, the efforts of the developing countries were centered on the 
more visible and immediate effects of quota restrictions and, therefore, on getting the 
sector reintegrated into the same rules and disciplines of the multilateral system as for 
any other sector of industrial goods.  Consequently, textiles and clothing tariffs escaped 
being subjected to any significant reductions and therefore remain much higher than 
other industrial products (WTO 2007b: 33).  
 
 All three government reports pushed for the liberalization of labor migration from 
developing to developed countries as part of the liberalization of services under the WTO: 
While developed countries have surplus capital to invest, most of the developing 
countries have surplus of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers.  We have a large pool 
of well-qualified professionals capable of  providing services abroad.  As developed 
countries have a comparative advantage in exporting capital intensive services, similarly 
developing countries have a comparative advantage in exporting labour intensive services 
involving movement of persons.  While GATS recognizes "movement of natural persons" 
as one of the modes for supply of services, the commitments undertaken by the 
developed countries have very little to offer to the developing countries in terms of 
opening their markets or facilitating the administrative arrangements or providing 
national treatment in the area of movement of natural persons (WTO 1998b: 11). 
 
This text was repeated almost word-for-word in 2002 Government Report (WTO 2002b: 19).  
The 2007 Government Report was more elaborate about the specific outcomes that the Indian 
government sought in the service negotiations of the Doha Round: 
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India wants the removal of the Economic Needs Test (ENT), a clear prescription of the 
duration of stay, provisions of extension, etc.  Such commitments will lead to gains for 
both developed and developing countries (WTO 2007b: 21). 
 
The Report complained that while others modes of services trade had been substantially 
liberalized under the WTO, services related to the movement of natural persons, or ‘Mode 4’ 
services in the language of the negotiations, had been left untouched: 
It needs to be noted that an estimate carried out by the WTO with regard to the share 
of the four modes of supply in the global trade in services shows that while Mode 4 
contributes only 1% of all services trade, the shares of Mode 1, Mode 2 and Mode 3 are 
28%, 14%, and 57% respectively (WTO 2007b: 21).  
 
 Another major complaint made in the Government Report was that India’s trading 
partners, particularly developed countries, were abusing food safety standards as a means to 
impose non-tariff barriers of Indian products: 
Numerous restrictions on sanitary and phytosanitary grounds on India's agricultural 
products are often not supported by adequate scientific justification (WTO 1998b: 8). 
 
The WTO Agreements recognize the diversity of standards across countries, but the 
issue of  actual needs  also needs to be factored in.  Many times these standards and 
measures are such that they impose inappropriate or unwarranted economic and social 
costs on the exporting countries – more so if the exporting countries are the developing 
and the least developed countries- without actually conferring a commensurate gain to 
the importing countries.  Such measures thus impede trade and deny a trade 
opportunity to developing countries like India.  For instance India had to wait, without 
much scientific reason, for almost two decades to secure access for its mangoes to two 
of the leading developed countries (WTO 2007b: 33). 
 
The development of standards was additionally criticized as a process dominated by developed 
countries which specifically disadvantaged developing countries 
India is concerned that although the Ministry of Health and other Ministries, BIS [Bureau 
of Indian Statistics] and expert bodies involved in the field of sanitary standards 
participate in the policy making committees of international bodies such as the ISO, the 
Codex Alimentarius etc. the developing countries are grossly outnumbered by the 
developed countries in these deliberations, at times resulting in international standards 
development not conducive to their implementation by the developing countries.  
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Simultaneous and rapid development of standards has made it even more difficult for 
developing countries to suitably respond to the proposals.  (WTO 2002b: 17). 
 
 Finally, it was claimed that India had been subject to an unfair proportion of anti-
dumping cases by its trading partners: 
India has a current share of only around 1% of global merchandise exports.  In 1995, the 
share was much less.  However, it has been subjected to a disproportionate number of 
trade defense actions.  For instance during the period 1 January 1995 to 30 June 2006, 
Indian products have been subjected to 124 out of the 2938 anti-dumping actions  
initiated globally, which amounts to more than 4% of the total.  These 124 initiations 
resulted in measures being taken in 69 cases (55.6%) (WTO 2007b: 32).   
 
Mutual Interest and Solidarity among Developing Countries 
 Being classified as a developing country for WTO purposes was not just a convenient 
descriptive label.  The WTO agreements specifically differentiated between developing and 
developed economies when operationalizing certain rules.  For example, the provision for 
Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) specifically entitled developing countries more 
flexibility in implementing WTO regulations.  Preserving, expanding, and favorably interpreting 
these official developing economy rights gave representatives from developing countries a 
strong incentive to cooperate and support one another in WTO negotiations.  Beyond rules 
concerning their official designation, developing countries often had similar economic concerns 
that tended to put them on the same side on issues within the WTO, for instance those 
concerning access to agricultural and textile markets in developed economies. 
 The representatives of India brought up several issues of particular interest for 
developing countries in the meeting (generally echoing those presented in the Government 
Report), including agricultural subsidies, food and livelihood security, ‘mode 4’ service trade 
(involving Indians working abroad), textile quotas, the use of sanitary and safety standards as 
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‘non-tariff’ barriers, intellectual property issues, and provisions for Special and Differential 
Treatment of developing economies within the WTO.   
 Several developing country representatives expressed support for India’s positions in 
general and in some cases for specific areas.  Table 6.3 below summarizes these areas in terms 
of which representatives expressed support and when. 
 
Table 6.3: Mention of Developing Country Issues by Year, by Representative 
 1998 2002 2007 
Special and 
Differential 
Treatment 
Dominican Republic, 
Nigeria 
Mauritania, Morocco  
Labor Standards Indonesia/ ASEAN, 
Egypt, Colombia, 
Nigeria, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic 
  
Market Access  Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Cuba 
Uruguay 
(Textiles)  Sri Lanka  
(Agricultural)  Sri Lanka Uruguay 
Other Issues  Sri Lanka (standards), 
Jamaica (tariffs as 
revenue generator) 
 
 
 
Making the Case for Special Treatment 
 The representatives of India made the case for developing countries needing more time 
and flexibility to implement reform than developed countries.  
Despite many constraints, India had undertaken to implement all its WTO commitments 
faithfully.  Likewise, India expected its concerns to be addressed meaningfully.  Some of 
these had been indicated in the Government Report, i.e., satisfactory resolution of  
implementation-related issues and of the Special and Differential Treatment issues.  The 
Doha Declaration had given high priority to the resolution of these issues;  developing 
countries had also submitted proposals on several of them.  India looked forward to 
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their meaningful resolution strictly in accordance with the deadlines spelt out in the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2002c: 7). 
 
Sustained economic reforms required enormous investment of both capital and of 
organizational and institutional ability to meet the challenges.  Developing countries had 
a very deep deficit in this area, resulting in uneven reforms, as well as the stops and 
starts in economic reforms… Each country had to find its way through to prosperity; 
capacity building and hand-holding were therefore essential (WTO 2007c: 6).   
 
Provisions along these lines were already written into the WTO agreement on Special and 
Differential Treatment (SDT), but the representatives of India argued that these were not well-
defined enough to be effective: 
There was particular concern about the provisions relating to special and differential 
treatment for developing countries, many of which needed to be more sharply defined 
and guidelines issued for their implementation (WTO 1998c: 3).   
 
Operationalizing special and differential treatment provisions for developing countries 
would ameliorate, to a certain extent, the difficulties of exporting to developed 
countries.  (WTO 2002c: 30).   
 
The only other representative to mention STD was the one for New Zealand in 2002: 
New Zealand looked forward to working constructively with India in areas such as 
special and differential treatment, and outstanding implementation issues to take into 
account developing countries' interests (WTO 2002c: 18). 
 
A few,  but only a few, developing country representatives made comments calling for special 
accomodations to made for developing countries, probably an indirect reference to SDT: 
The representative of the Dominican Republic echoed comments by the Indian 
delegation regarding the major effort required of developing countries in adapting their 
policy and legislation to WTO disciplines (WTO 1998c: 19).   
 
Therefore, Nigeria urged trading partners to be sensitive to these transition problems 
and to give developing countries more time for reforms to be undertaken (WTO 1998c 
18- 19).   
 
Many delegations shared India's stand… that appropriate flexibility be given for 
individual developing country Members to liberalize in line with their development, and 
national policy objectives (WTO 2002c: 20, representative of Mauritania).   
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The representative of Morocco noted that in the context of multilateral negotiations his 
country shared common preoccupations with India on reform of special and differential 
treatment, sustainable solutions to implementation, and technical assistance and 
capacity-building for developing countries (WTO 2002c: 26). 
 
Defeating Labor Standards 
 One of the clearest examples of consensus among developing country representatives in 
the TPRs relates to the rejection of labor standards in the WTO.  In the 1998 TPR Meeting only 
there was a prominent argument concerning labor standards and the appropriateness of the 
WTO as a venue to discuss this issue.  Between the 1996 Singapore Ministerial and the 1999 
Seattle Ministerial, there was a movement within the WTO led by the United States under the 
Clinton administration, to introduce labor standards into WTO rules.  This was, in fact, a primary 
reason for the breakdown of negotiations at Seattle in 1999.  The 1998 TPR, however, took place 
when this movement was in full swing and the representative of the United States at this 
meeting took the opportunity to strongly push this agenda: 
She highlighted the importance of labour and India's efforts to raise the standard of 
living for its people.  Implementation and enforcement of internationally recognized 
core labour standards was an important aspect of the human face of trade, to which 
Ministers at Singapore recently renewed their commitments.  Although India had made 
strides in recent years in addressing labour issues, concerns remained with the lack of 
implementation and/or enforcement of core labour standards, notably with regard to 
child labour, forced labour and the so-called informal sector, which by some accounts, 
was responsible for as much as 98% of the workforce in trade, commerce and the 
agricultural sectors.  It was hoped that India would take a lead on the work being done 
at the ILO on a declaration on core labour standards and that the ILO and WTO 
Secretariats could coordinate on providing technical assistance.  It was hoped that India 
would fulfill its commitments on core labour standards and inform WTO members of 
any steps taken in this direction (WTO 1998c: 14). 
 
The U.S. representative returned to this argument a couple of times during the meeting (15, 28), 
and the representative of Norway took a similar position: 
He noted India's increasing concern for core labour standards…  He underlined the 
importance of the on-going work in the ILO on core labour standards; a declaration was 
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under preparation and he urged India to take a positive and constructive position on 
this issue in accordance with the stipulations for WTO and ILO cooperation laid down in 
paragraph 4 of the text of the Ministerial Conference in Singapore in December 1996 
(WTO 1998c: 16). 
 
These two speakers were, however, alone in pushing for labor standards in the WTO.  The 
representative of India dismissed this idea in no uncertain terms, arguing that such standards 
were the purview of the International Labour Organization (ILO), not the WTO. 
Responding to questions related to core labour standards, the representative of India 
noted that as agreed at the Ministerial Conference in Singapore the ILO was the 
competent body to deal with these issues.  Therefore, it was not appropriate to deal 
with issues related to core labour standards in the WTO fora (WTO 1998c: 26). 
 
The representatives of a number of other developing countries supported the position of the 
Indian delegation here (foreshadowing events in Seattle a year later): 
It was ASEAN's view that the issue of India's labour standards was beyond the scope of 
the WTO; the issue was appropriately dealt with at the ILO (WTO 1998c: 17, 
representative of Indonesia). 
 
He stated that raising issues beyond the competence and scope of the WTO, such as 
labour standards, would not serve the objectives of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
and these issues should be raised in other competent fora (WTO 1998c: 17, 
representative of Egypt). 
 
Although  some delegations had raised the issue of core labour standards, referring to it 
as a trade-related phenomenon, the issue belonged within the ILO forum and not the 
WTO, as agreed at the Singapore Ministerial meeting.  He therefore believed that the 
issue by definition was excluded from any consideration in the present forum (WTO 
1998c: 18, representative of Colombia). 
 
He noted that comments relating to core labour standards were not for the 
consideration of the WTO and should be referred to the relevant body (WTO 1998c: 19, 
representative of Nigeria). 
 
He said that labour matters should not be treated in the TPR exercise because, as 
already pointed out, this was the remit of the ILO (WTO 1998c: 19, representative of 
Cuba). 
 
On the matter of labour standards, he pointed out that the Ministerial meeting in 
Singapore had made clear that these were not the remit of the WTO (WTO 1998c: 19, 
representative of Dominican Republic). 
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 The issue of bringing labor standards into the WTO was not brought up in the 2002 or 
2007 Meeting Minutes, with the exception of a brief reference to “the uniform application of 
employment standards” as part of a list necessary job market reforms (WTO 2007: 12). 
 
Market Access 
 Indian representatives sometimes turned the tables on the critique of the slow pace of 
reform in India by calling for developed countries to liberalize their markets first.   
Looking at the forward agenda for reform, he urged industrialized trading partners to 
support India's liberalization programme by ensuring open markets for Indian products 
and that all forms of disguised protection were avoided (WTO 1998c: 4).   
  
For India to reach its goal… India's efforts would need to be complemented by action 
from its WTO trading partners to meet its legitimate concerns and aspirations.  In this 
regard, India looked forward to increased market access in the developed countries, a 
bridging of the gap between preferential and non-preferential tariffs, harmonization of 
rules of origin, and reduction of non-tariff barriers (WTO 2002c: 7- 8). 
 
In this argument, the lowering of trade barriers in developed economies was not merely a fair 
bargain for developing economies lowering their trade barriers; rather, the former was 
portrayed as something which would enable the latter. 
 The 2002 Meeting was in particular framed by this ‘developed countries first’ trope in 
that it was picked up by both of the non-member speakers.  Chairperson Mohammed 
referenced it in both her opening remarks and closing summary: 
There was also an expectation, however, that India's trading partners in the WTO would 
take steps to remove impediments to its exports (WTO 2002c: 3). 
  
Many Members added that these efforts would be greatly enhanced by steps on the 
part of India's trading partners to reduce, if not remove, their impediments to India's 
exports, especially in the context of new negotiations in line with the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA).  India has clearly stated its support for the WTO and the 
DDA but considers that if further progress is to be made, the onus remains on the 
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developed countries to keep the promises made in Doha.  This view was endorsed by 
many other Members, who look to India for leadership in these negotiations (WTO 
2002c: 36) 
 
Discussant Whelan similarly argued for greater market access for Indian products in terms of the 
Doha Development Round, bringing in dollar estimates to support it (WTO 2002c: 11, see 
above). 
 A handful of developing country representatives in 2002 made specific reference India’s 
market access concerns vis-à-vis developed economies: 
In order for India to justify further reform to its stakeholders, the  international 
community needed to ensure market access rather than selective preferences or, even 
worse, non-MFN treatment in important markets for both goods and services of interest 
to India (WTO 2002c: 19, representative of the Philippines). 
 
Sri Lanka believed that international trade was vital for development, and developed 
country Members of the WTO should address India's market access concerns (WTO 
2002c: 24). 
 
Cuba hoped that in the framework of the DDA, India's efforts would be compensated by 
the elimination of trade restrictions and other barriers to trade, which restricted market 
access for products and services originating from India (WTO 2002c: 25). 
 
The above quotes did not allude to specific types of markets, but the Indian representatives’ 
comments made it clear that India considered its access to foreign markets blocked by farm 
subsidies 2002c: 7), textile quotas (WTO 2002c: 7, 32), and health and safety standards (WTO 
1998c: 4, 2002c: 7, 2007c: 3- 5, 22).  The 2002 representative of Sri Lanka was especially 
supportive of these arguments and specifically listed many of them: 
In the Government Report, India had highlighted impediments to growth of its 
international trade, including non-tariff barriers, such as restrictive import policy 
regimes, standards, testing, labelling and certification requirements, export subsidies, 
and barriers on services.  Quantitative restrictions especially in textiles were identified 
as one of the most important non-tariff barriers to trade.  Sri Lanka shared India's 
concerns.  The Report also highlighted issues relating to agriculture, technical barriers to 
trade, intellectual property rights, and services negotiations.  Sri Lanka believed that 
these would be addressed in the ongoing negotiations.  The Report stated that although 
agriculture's contribution to employment and GDP were large, India's share of world 
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exports remained less than 2%.  The situation in countries like Sri Lanka, was similar.  
Therefore, the ongoing negotiations should provide flexibility to developing countries to 
address food security concerns, while market access for their agricultural products 
became extremely important (WTO 2002c: 24). 
 
Although the representative does not state that these problems are specific to India’s trade with 
developed countries, the types of barriers described – textile quotas, agricultural issues, 
standards, intellectual property rights – strongly suggest this. 
 Although not representing a developing country the New Zealand representatives 
tended to express explicit support for lower farm subsidies (in accordance with the views of the 
Cairns Group). 
He noted India's concern at the high levels of agricultural subsidies in many developed 
countries and the negative effect on   countries.  Such subsidies artificially lowered the 
world price of agricultural products - exactly those products that developing and least-
developed countries had a comparative advantage in producing.  He hoped that others 
would take note of this concern and refine their policies accordingly (WTO 1998c: 10). 
 
The representative of New Zealand said his country shared India's recognition of the 
need for fundamental reform of the global agricultural trading system.  This required 
substantial improvements in market access, the elimination of export subsidies, and 
substantial reductions in domestic support (WTO 2002c: 17). 
 
Health and Safety Standards 
 The representatives of India used the TPR meetings to complain of “unjustified non-
tariff barriers created by local health and environmental concerns, but which did not have 
transboundary effects” (WTO 1998c: 4).  They also emphasized that this was not a problem of 
concern to just India, but also to developing countries in general: 
Non-tariff barriers to imports from developing countries were ubiquitous… The frequent 
and abusive use of non-tariff barriers, more than serving the ostensible purposes of 
consumer safety, environment protection, and ethical business practices, had 
increasingly become a hindrance to global trade.  Developed countries' non-tariff 
barriers were constantly changing and full compliance was nearly impossible as 
developing countries lacked the financial resources to comply with the standards 
prescribed.  Moreover, standards were revised, mostly upwards, at regular intervals and 
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not necessarily on the basis of objective scientific criteria or reasonable risk assessment, 
making it very difficult for developing countries to adapt to these ever-changing 
requirements (WTO 2007c: 5- 6). 
 
India appreciated that its products should meet international standards, and had made 
considerable progress by harmonizing Indian standards with international standards.  
However, India felt outnumbered in the deliberations of various international bodies, 
such as the International Standards Organization (ISO) and the Codex Alimentarius, 
which resulted in the adoption of standards that developing countries could not 
implement.  India hoped, therefore, that efforts made by the DG and the WTO would 
enhance participation by developing countries in the work of the international standard-
setting bodies (WTO 2002c: 7) 
 
The representative of Sri Lanka in 2002 was the only developing country representative to 
explicitly support the Indian representatives on this issue, adding “labelling and certification 
requirements” to a list of non-tariff barriers to India’s trade (WTO 2002c: 24). 
 
Speaking for the Developing World 
 It did not escape the Indian representatives in the Meetings that many Indian economic 
concerns were common to the developing world in general.  They frequently phrased their 
arguments as being for developing country concerns.   
Even though India was committed to meeting its obligations under the WTO, developing 
countries such as India faced difficulties in implementing these commitments, especially 
in new disciplines such as intellectual property rights and services (WTO 1998c: 3, 
representative of India). 
 
India's problems concerning market access for textile products were well known, and 
needed no repetition.  India stressed that this was an important sector for developing 
countries, and that further opening up would help them to increase their share in world 
trade.  India looked forward to improved market access for its agricultural products in 
the on-going negotiations under the Agreement on Agriculture through the reduction of 
high tariffs and subsidies prevalent in the developed countries (WTO 2002c: 7, 
representative of India). 
 
For developing countries, the multilateral forum was the best insurance against 
arbitrariness in trade practices.  Moreover, this was the only way to realize the ultimate 
goal of fair trade.  India was thus strongly committed to ensuring a successful conclusion 
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of the Doha Round, a Development Round, where greater benefits had to flow to 
developing countries not developed countries (WTO 2007c: 25). 
 
This positioning gave the representatives’ arguments the rhetorical weight of claiming to speak 
for most of the members of the WTO, not just one.  This weight was enhanced with the start of 
the Doha ‘Development’ Round of talks, during which the last two TPRs took place. 
 Reinforcing this position as spokescountry for the developing world, the Indian 
representatives frequently set up developed countries in a somewhat adversarial position vis-à-
vis developing countries.  This partially accounts by the more frequent usage of the term 
‘developed countries’ by Indian representatives than other speakers in the meeting.  The 
developing versus developed world trope was most strongly stated in the opening remarks of 
India representative Pillai in the 2007 Meeting.  He built up the case for developing 
disadvantage on one level by simply describing the economic imbalance between the two 
worlds was described in stark terms: 
Even after more than two decades of rapid trade growth, the pattern of trade remained 
highly skewed in favour of the developed world.  High-income countries, representing 
15% of the world's population, accounted for two thirds of world's exports.  The share 
of world exports of sub-Saharan Africa, with 689 million people, was less than one half 
of that of Belgium, with 10 million people.  The current Doha Development Round was a 
historic opportunity to partially correct this imbalance (WTO 2007c: 6). 
 
This statement, in of itself, only constructs the low participation of developing countries in world 
trade as a problem to solve.  Pillai did not end his analysis here, he also made the case that bias 
and hypocrisy on the part of negotiators from developed countries were actively working 
against solving the problem: 
Developed countries had a tendency to talk about market access in developing countries 
for goods and services of export interest to them.  However, market access to 
developed countries was sometimes thwarted by a phalanx of protectionist measures, 
some of which were legal, and some not.  The Human Development Report 2005 stated 
that "developed country governments seldom waste an opportunity to emphasize the 
virtues of open markets, level playing fields and free trade, especially in their 
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prescriptions for poor countries.  Yet the same governments maintain a formidable 
array of protectionist barriers against developing countries."  On average, low-income 
countries faced tariffs three to four times higher than the barriers applied in trade 
between high-income countries.  Developing countries accounted for less than one third 
of developed country imports, but for two thirds of tariff revenues collected (5- 6). 
 
Pillai here makes the argument for economic fairness entirely within the framework of free 
trade ideology, accusing developed countries of hypocrisy within the neoliberal ideology that 
their representatives had often promoted internationally.  He then blamed the breakdown of 
breakdown of the negotiations on the unwillingness of developing countries to compromise 
(while also making the case that the improvement of developing economies would ultimately 
benefit developed countries in the future): 
India was extremely concerned at the slow pace of negotiations.  While the suspended 
talks had resumed, the political will of developed countries was still not evident.  Unless 
the development dimension of the Doha Round was met and the developing countries 
prospered, global trade would always be at risk.  The rapid economic growth of 
developing countries was a must for a truly global trade order to flourish.  India was 
committed to meeting its obligations under the mandate of the July Framework and the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.  Developed countries needed to recognize that the 
destinies of developed and developing countries were intertwined (6).   
 
Throughout his remarks, Pillai consistently argues in terms of the interests of developing 
countries in general and not merely the interests of India. 
 
Leadership and Responsibility 
 Many speakers in the Meetings remarked on India’s key role in the on-going WTO 
negotiations and especially on its advocacy of developing country interests.  This lends some 
credibility to the implicit claims of the Indian representatives to speak for the developing world.  
Some of these comments specifically referred to India as a ‘leader’ among developing countries, 
while others merely expressed an appreciation of mutual interests within the context of WTO 
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negotiations.  One variant of this group of statements asserted that India’s leadership came with 
weighty responsibilities; this sentiment was mainly expressed by non-member speakers and 
representatives from developed economies. 
 A few developing country representatives specifically used the term ‘leadership’ to 
describe India’s position (italics mine): 
He also recognized the important role played by India in the multilateral trading system 
and its leadership in questions of development, raised in the WTO and elsewhere (WTO 
1998c: 19, representative of Cuba). 
 
Developing countries greatly valued India's leadership in the WTO and the UN, as it was 
clearly a major player in both organizations.  The representative recalled India's 
prominent role at the Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, which testified to 
India's commitment to the multilateral trading system… Botswana looked forward to 
India's continued leadership in negotiations under the DDA (WTO 2002c: 25- 26, 
representative of Botswana). 
 
The representative of Nigeria acknowledged India's leadership role in the multilateral 
trading system, particularly its strong commitment and support for an early conclusion 
of the DDA negotiations (WTO 2007c: 19) 
 
Other developing country representatives also made strong statements asserting India’s key role 
in advocating developing world interests: 
The representative of Brazil reiterated his country's appreciation for India's role in the 
WTO.  India had been extremely influential in denouncing the inequities faced by 
developing countries in the international economic arena, as well as in promoting a 
more equitable multilateral trading system (WTO 1998c: 17). 
 
The representative of Uruguay noted India's active role in the WTO and as a defender of 
developing countries to achieve a more equitable multilateral trading system (WTO 
2002c: 14). 
 
As a key player in the multilateral trading system and a leading member of the G20 and 
G33, India played an important and constructive role in pursuing development as the 
core issue of the Doha Round negotiations (WTO 2007c: 18, representative of China). 
 
The representative acknowledged India's role in the GATT and the WTO in helping 
developing countries to reap the benefits of the multilateral trading system (WTO 
2002c: 16, representative of Colombia).   
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As a strong supporter of the multilateral trading system and the rights of developing 
countries, India was an example to many developing countries (WTO 2002c: 25, 
representative of Cuba). 
 
The representative of Uruguay highlighted India's active role in the G20, whose goal was 
to achieve fundamental reform to bring agriculture to the same level as other sectors in 
global trade, so as to achieve a fairer multilateral trading system (WTO 2007c: 18).   
 
He emphasized the important role played by India in the institutional consolidation of 
the multilateral trading system and said that its active participation in the various WTO 
bodies and its ongoing contribution made it one of the principle players of this system 
(WTO 1998c: 18, representative of Colombia). 
 
Some developing country representatives expressed a more subdued version of this sentiment, 
acknowledging India as speaking for developing country concerns, in general or in reference to 
specific issues. 
India's policies had been accompanied by its active participation in the WTO, in 
particular the functioning of the multilateral trading system, and support developing 
countries' interests.  Honduras encouraged India to continue to support the promotion 
of preferential access for developing country exports thus increasing their participation 
in world trade (WTO 2002c: 23, representative of Honduras). 
 
The representative of Morocco noted that in the context of multilateral negotiations his 
country shared common preoccupations with India on reform of special and differential 
treatment, sustainable solutions to implementation, and technical assistance and 
capacity-building for  developing countries (WTO 2002c: 26). 
 
He expressed support for India's continued reforms, as well as an interest in ensuring 
that the concerns of developing countries be duly taken into consideration in order to 
further strengthen the multilateral trading system (WTO 1998c: 19, representative of 
the Dominican Republic). 
 
The representative of Egypt noted that the Trade Policy Review of India acquired special 
importance, because of India's weight in world trade as a developing country, and its 
active and effective participation in the multilateral trading system (WTO 1998c: 17). 
 
The representative of Ecuador stated that the two countries shared a global vision for 
the multilateral trading system (WTO 2007c: 19). 
 
 A few comments, all by representatives of African countries, directly thanked India for 
assistance and support provided by India to specific groups of developing countries: 
153 
 
 
Mauritius appreciated India's support for the Work Programme on Small Economies for 
the fuller integration of small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading 
system, and for the concerns expressed by single commodity producers and small island 
developing states in agriculture (WTO 1998c: 20). 
 
He also commended India for providing trade-related technical assistance and capacity 
building for African countries (WTO 2007c: 19, representative of Nigeria) 
 
Mali appreciated India's efforts in providing duty-free and quota-free access of cotton 
from LDCs, in keeping with the Hong Kong Declarations, and in providing technical 
assistance for African countries (WTO 2007c: 19).   
 
 A few comments used ‘leadership’ in terms of economic performance, especially in 
terms of its high-tech service sector: 
India was one of the leaders among developing countries in telecommunications and 
information technology (WTO 2002c: 25, representative of Botswana). 
 
The representative of Jamaica recalled that over the last few years, India had been 
ranked among the world's 25 emerging markets, pointing to the country's potential to 
become one of the largest and leading economies in the world (WTO 2002c: 21). 
 
These simply noted an economic leadership status, but the following quote from the United 
States tacitly implies the dependence of this status on liberalization: 
All these [reform] efforts had contributed to India's rise to the fourth largest economy in 
the world in purchasing power parity terms, and its emergence as a leading competitor 
in information technology (WTO 2007c: 14, representative of the United States). 
 
Below, we will examine a subtle undercurrent in a few developed member statements 
suggesting a challenge to the trope that India’s economic rise was simply a result of the 
application of a standard set of liberal reforms. 
 The leadership trope was also used in a few cases in terms of future action.  The 
representatives of the United States in both 1998 and 2007 called on India to set an example for 
the rest of the world through economic liberalization: 
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India had clearly benefited from the international trading environment and all the 
Members of the WTO looked to India to play a leading role in further liberalization of 
trade and investment (WTO 1998c: 15). 
 
India would be one of the biggest beneficiaries of an ambitious and successful outcome 
of the DDA negotiations, thus it was one of the key stakeholders in the work to ensure 
an open and rules-based multilateral trading system.  The TPR dialogue had been 
particularly important given India's new role as a major player in the trading system 
(WTO 2007c: 28).   
 
The representative of South Korea made a similar remark in 2007: 
As trade liberalization had been highly beneficial to the Indian economy, he urged India 
to play a leadership role in the DDA negotiations (WTO 2007c: 15). 
 
The 2007 representative of the EU in 2007, after making similar claims about the benefits of 
WTO membership to India (WTO 2007c: 12- 13), was paraphrased as stating: 
As a leading representative of the developing world, India's membership of the G4 in the 
DDA carried significant weight and expectations (13). 
 
The G4 was not a faction in the WTO but rather a temporary negotiating body consisting only of 
the two leading members of the Quad (the EU and US) and the two leading G20 developing 
countries – India and Brazil.  The EU representative quoted above clearly saw India’s admittance 
to this exclusive club as entailing grave responsibilities towards the project of global trade 
liberalization. 
 It was discussant Guth in the 2007 Meeting who made the clearest statement asserting 
that India had major responsibilities and specifying what these were: 
India's position as a world player came with responsibilities.  For example, some 
Members had urged India to provide improved access to its markets for LDCs.  Social 
challenges had also been mentioned.  In addition, a country of the size of India would 
not only have an impact on global environmental development, but was also likely to be 
among the first major nations affected by global climate change.  Thus India had to 
emphasize global environmental policy in its own interest and for the interest of all 
(WTO 2007c: 26). 
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Although Guth (as seen in previous quotes) strongly urged more liberalization for India, it is 
notable that he deploys the responsibility trope not for India to be a liberalizing role model, but 
in terms of obligations to poorer economies (the LDCs or Least Developed Countries) and to the 
global environment.  The 2007 EU representatives also called on India to make market access 
concessions for LDCs (WTO 2007c: 13), while the 2002 representative of Cuba noted that India 
had already done something like this under the Global System of Trade Preferences (WTO 
2002c: 25).  Guth later in the meeting “encouraged India to show a leadership role in SAFTA 
[South Asian Free Trade Area]” (WTO 2007c: 25) as a means to increase regional trade. 
 Chairperson Himanen in 2007 simply noted that: “Members encouraged it to continue 
to show leadership in bringing the Doha Round to a successful conclusion” (WTO 2007c: 30).  At 
least two representatives of developed economies, Hong Kong (WTO 2002c: 16) and Japan 
(WTO 2007c: 14), remarked on India’s leadership role without implying that this came with any 
specific obligations for future action. 
 
Conclusion  
 The Trade Policy Reviews of India during the period 1998- 2007 reveal strikingly little 
deviation or dissent from the overall argument for liberalization.  There were no arguments 
against reforms already undertaken or against the proposition that more liberalization should 
take place in the future.  At best there were disagreements as to the pace and 
comprehensiveness of future reform.  Whether explicitly stated or tacitly supported, the 
systematic logic of “liberalization leads to economic growth, economic growth leads to 
development” went unchallenged throughout.  These observations tend to support Peet’s 
(2003: 198) argument that the WTO is “restrictive discursive environment” where the logic of 
neoliberalism is accepted as common sense. 
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 That being said, there was also room for maneuver within the overall discourse of 
neoliberalism.  What I have labeled the ‘weak argument’ for liberalization in this chapter does 
not question the effectiveness of liberalization in general, but it does make room for more 
qualifications and exceptions than what I have called the ‘strong argument.’  The exception of 
agriculture from neoliberal logic will be the subject of the next chapter.  In general, the Indian 
Government Reports made the case for the weak argument, while the Secretariat Reports 
tended to support the strong argument, and the Meeting Reports contained statements leaning 
in both directions.   
 The weak argument sees liberal reforms as promising, but also untested and risky.  They 
should be implemented, but in a slow, incremental, and cautious fashion.  In this argument 
there is also a case made that liberal reforms must be adapted to the context in which they take 
place, there can be no “one-size-fits-all” reform program (WTO 2007c: 6).  In addition, it is 
argued that reforms cannot be undertaken in a top-down fashion, but must be submitted to 
democratic processes, which again justifies the incremental pace.  In the strong argument we 
see unwavering confidence in the efficacy of liberal reforms.  Problems with past reforms are 
blamed on them not going far enough.  Reforms are not seen as risky, because there no doubt 
that they will work.  Lack of reform is considered riskier because the old way of doing things is 
unsustainable and will inevitably break down.  There is little room for made for context-
dependency in this set of arguments.  For instance, it is assumed that the same reforms that 
worked for services will work for manufacturing and agriculture.  And the autonomy and 
flexibility argued for in the weak argument are in the strong argument seen as an unstable 
element, engendering ‘unpredictabilty.’ 
 The role of the Secretariat in this process is of considerable interest.  In most other 
aspects of the WTO, the Secretariat is seen merely as an administrative infrastructure, a 
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bureaucracy to organize meetings, process paperwork, and carry out other routine bureaucratic 
functions.  But it is also assigned a role as a ‘technical advisor’ to member entities, and the 
preparation of Trade Policy Review reports is major aspect of this role.  As noted earlier, the 
normative criteria for these reports is not to what extent the target country has fulfilled its WTO 
obligations, but rather to what extent the target country has liberalized its entire economy 
(regardless of whether a given reform was required by the WTO agreements or not).  Whom is 
the Secretariat representing when it lays out the strong liberalization argument in its reports?  It 
is not representing the varied positions of all WTO members on this subject, certainly not those 
of the Indian government, which made a strong case for the weak argument in these three TPRs.  
This observation supports the idea that the Secretariat is more than just a neutral appendage of 
the collective membership of the WTO.  Rather it seems to be a semi-autonomous institution 
with its own worldview and agenda.  This agenda includes counseling members to implement 
liberal reforms well beyond those required by standing WTO agreements. 
 There has been debate in both the policy transfer and neoliberalization literatures about 
whether and to what extent national economic policies around the world have become more 
homogenous (see chapter 3).  Global governance institutions like the WTO are seen as key 
drivers of policy homogenization.  However, the formal WTO agreements do include flexibility 
for implementation and notably apply differentially based on the developmental status of the 
members (i.e. developing countries generally had more time to implement certain provisions, 
were allowed more exceptions, and often had to meet less demanding benchmarks than those 
required of developed economies).  The Indian government’s insistence on context-dependency 
and autonomy in its reform program demonstrate that adjustments for neoliberalism are not 
the same everywhere.  On the other hand, there is directionality to the reforms; there may be 
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variation and flexibility, but in general most of them are moving toward a mode of using 
markets more government less as a social regulatory mechanism. 
 Is there room for genuine counter-hegemony within this restrictive discursive 
environment?  Towards the end of the chapter, we examined some instances of dissent and 
solidarity among developing country representatives, often with India in an acknowledged 
position of leadership.  The Indian representatives and other developing country delegates 
challenged developed members on farm subsidies, labor standards, textile quotas, special and 
differential treatment, food safety regulations, and other issues.  Large and relatively 
industrialized developing countries like India and Brazil were especially in positions where they 
could use their bargaining power to wrest some concessions out of the Quad. 
 A generation ago, Cox argued that international organizations were poor grounds for 
Third World counter-hegemony, not least of all because such institutions were structurally 
keyed to advantage wealthier states (Cox 1981).  The WTO did not exist when Cox wrote that 
and in some ways it allocates more power to developing country delegates than is the case with 
the IMF or World Bank.  For instance, there is a tradition within the WTO of consensus decision-
making and where voting procedures are in place, they act on the principle of one country, one 
vote.  However, the WTO institution remains effectively dominated by a small group of wealthy 
states and is thoroughly geared towards advancing neoliberal doctrine.  Even the arguments 
made against the Quad by developing upstarts are generally phrased in terms of free market 
logic, i.e. reducing government support for agriculture or preventing the spread of regulatory 
mechanisms like labor rights and food safety.  If anything, most of this dissent sought a more 
consistent application of neoliberalism rather than challenging neoliberalism per se.  Even if a 
group like the G20 managed to extract substantial concessions from the Quad in this context, it 
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would represent less a counter-hegemony, and more of an adjustment of an existing hegemony 
through which a faction is brought into the fold though the offering of strategic concessions.  
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Chapter 7: Agricultural Exceptionalism and Anti-exceptionalism 
 
Agricultural Exceptionalism 
The exceptional position of agriculture within the WTO is demonstrated by the existence of a 
separate agreement specifically governing agricultural trade.  This agreement left agriculture 
subject to less severe liberalization than other sectors subject to WTO agreements.  Note that 
unless otherwise specified, this work uses the phrase “agricultural exceptionalism” to refer to 
exceptions from economic liberalization.  As noted in other chapters, Indian governments have 
been strong advocates for curtailing the extremely high agricultural subsidies in the EU and US.  
In this sense, India has been consistently against agro-exceptionalism within the WTO. 
 However, Indian economic policy contains its own exceptions for agriculture, including 
relatively high tariffs; subsidies for certain inputs; and the Public Distribution System, which 
buys and sells certain products, especially food, at set prices.  Indian agricultural exceptionalism 
is in large part a response to two overriding national priorities: food security and livelihood 
security.  During the colonial period, India suffered from periodic severe famines, which the 
post-independence governments have sought to prevent through increasing food production.  
Food self-sufficiency was also seen as a way of ensuring India’s foreign policy independence 
(which has been compromised by pressure from food exporters in the past).  The Livelihood 
Security argument is based on the simple fact that most Indians are farmers.  Ensuring that this 
vast population is capable of making a living from their land and labor is a major justification for 
maintaining trade barriers and subsidies. 
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Agriculture as Crisis 
 In all three TPRs, India’s agricultural sector is usually portrayed in negative terms, but 
this is most evident in the 2007 documents.  In the TPRs, agriculture is often associated with 
poverty, neglect, inefficiency, and under-productivity.  This negative characterization is 
heightened by the juxtaposition with glowing praise for other sectors of India’s economy, 
especially services.  While the Indian Government, the Secretariat, and other speaking parties 
started from a similar set of assumptions about rural underdevelopment, they came to very 
different conclusions about of how to address the problem.  The Secretariat, discussants, and 
many member representatives use the poor performance of agriculture to support their 
arguments for extending more liberal reform to this sector.  The Government Report and the 
Indian representatives, on the other hand, use the perceived poverty and economic vulnerability 
of this sector to justify the maintenance of stronger protections here (and to appeal to their 
trading partners to open up their markets to Indian exports). 
 The first two government reports (1998 and 2002) do not dwell on rural poverty and 
refer to agriculture mostly to demand greater market access form India’s trading partners.  The 
2007 Government Report, however, made rural poverty a key theme.  The problem of 
agricultural stagnation was frontloaded to the second paragraph of the report.  Here it was 
emphasized that in contrast to the rapid growth of the rest of the Indian economy, the 
agricultural sector growth rate had actually declined during the liberalization period (despite a 
few good years):  
Since the mid-1990s the growth rate in agriculture has dropped to 2% compared to the 
earlier trend rate of 2.5-3.0 percent.  The growth in 2003-04 was 10% but it came down 
to 0% in 2004-05.  The growth rate went up to 6% in 2005-06 and the advance estimate 
for 2006-07 puts the growth at 2.7% (WTO 2007b: 5).   
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The magnitude of the problem of agricultural stagnation is magnified by reference to the 
proportion of the Indian population dependent on this sector: 
Agriculture in India constitutes the backbone of the rural livelihood security system 
since it provides employment to about 58.5% of the work force (WTO 2007b: 12).   
 
The 2007 Government Report was specifically organized so that national poverty statistics are 
not mentioned until a subsection entitled “Low Agricultural Growth,” thus drawing a clear and 
specific connection between agriculture and poverty.   
At the beginning of the new millennium, 260 million people in the country did not have 
incomes to access a consumption basket, which defines the poverty line.  Of these, 75% 
were in the rural areas.  It has to be noted that India is home to 22% of the world’s poor.  
Agricultural wage earners, small and marginal farmers and casual workers engaged in 
non-agricultural activities, constitute the bulk of the rural poor (WTO 2007b: 13). 
 
In the subsequent meeting, the Indian representative reiterated this statistical portrait in his 
opening remarks, with if anything an even stronger identification between the rural economy 
and poverty. 
Over 81% of India's farmers (over 127 million cultivators) were small and marginal 
farmers with holdings of 2 hectares or less.  In addition, there were over 100 million 
landless agricultural labourers.  India had 22% of the world’s poor, and rural poverty was 
far higher than urban poverty.  The development pattern had left nearly 60% of the 
population dependent on agriculture (WTO 2007c: 3). 
 
The flip side of this conceptual merger between ‘rural’ and ‘poor’ is an absence of any 
substantial commentary upon non-rural poverty.  The brief aside that “rural poverty was far 
higher than urban poverty” was one of the only indications from the Indian government that 
urban poverty existed.  Perhaps the latter was simply obscured by the idea that cities were the 
home of the rising Indian middle class and the burgeoning high-tech service sector.  Another 
possibility is that rural poverty was seen as more directly relating to WTO negotiations, as it 
bolstered the Indian negotiators’ argument against developed country farm subsidies. 
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 The Secretariat Reports painted a similarly bleak picture of agricultural stagnation (and 
similarly seemed to especially emphasize it in 2007).  All three of these quotes come from the 
2007 Report: 
Agricultural growth continues to be slow and erratic and dependent on the weather, 
causing considerable distress, especially among small and marginal farmers (WTO 
2007a: vii). 
 
further efforts are needed to address the [agricultural] sector’s relatively low 
productivity and the problems of marginal farmers, reflected in social indicators, such as 
poverty and infant mortality (WTO 2007a: xii). 
 
Agriculture is characterized by low labour productivity, which is about one-sixth of the 
level in the other sectors of the economy, with obvious implications for living standards 
and poverty in rural areas (WTO 2007a: 99).   
 
The last two connect the perceived shortcomings of the agricultural sector directly to poverty.  
The emphasis on small and marginal farmers hints at the problem of population to land ratios, 
which will be explored below. 
 Non-member speakers in the 2007 Meeting continued with the theme of agricultural 
underperformance.  In fact, the first of the three quotes from the 2007 Secretariat Report is 
reproduced word-for-word in the closing remarks of Chairperson Himamen (WTO 2007c: 31) 
and partially by discussant Guth: 
Agriculture employed roughly 57% of the working-age population in India, but 
contributed only one fifth to output.  Growth in agriculture continued to be slow and 
erratic (8).  
 
Guth also connected his earlier discussion of poverty to the agricultural sector. 
India was a land of big contrast, combining the capacities of a first-world country with 
extreme poverty and underdevelopment rates.  There were considerable income 
disparities:  35% of the population (350 million) lived below the poverty line of US$1 per 
day.  Many of these people made their living as subsistence farmers, with limited 
prospect for improving their situation (WTO 2007c: 7). 
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While India’s “capacities of a first-world country” are not explicitly identified with the urban, 
“extreme poverty and underdevelopment rates” are clearly associated with agriculture. 
 
Vulnerability versus Neglect 
 Although they both start from a similar perception of rural poverty and agricultural 
backwardness, the Secretariat and the Indian Government Reports come up with very different 
policy prescriptions.  The divergence begins with how the problem is framed.  In the 2007 
Government Report, the vulnerability of the agricultural sector is emphasized.  Its relative 
underdevelopment justifies an exception from the logic of liberalization, a slower and more 
cautious approach than elsewhere in the economy.  The Secretariat Reports on the other hand, 
see the underdevelopment of agriculture in terms of neglect.  The lack of liberalization here is 
seen as at least partially responsible for the backwards state of the agricultural economy. 
The Government Report uses the strong correlation between agriculture and poverty to 
justify its own agricultural protections as well as to argue for its trading partners (specifically 
developed countries) to open their markets to Indian products: 
…this vulnerable sector of the economy need special care and protection … This is the 
reason why India’s agricultural tariffs are comparatively high in comparison to its non-
agricultural ones and also of its high expectations in the negotiations in NAMA [Non-
agricultural Market Access] and Services of providing substantial market access in the 
developed markets of the world (WTO 2007b: 13; italics mine). 
 
Later, during the meeting of the same TPR, the Indian Representative replied to several member 
complaints about high agricultural tariffs by stating:  
India's tariffs on agricultural products were relatively high, but were well below the 
bindings.  The tariffs on farm products were fixed, taking into consideration several 
factors including, inter alia, affording a reasonable degree of protection of domestic 
farmers, for whom farming was a livelihood issue (WTO 2007c: 20).   
 
165 
 
The Indian Government emphasizes the economic vulnerability of farmers, and worries about 
the unpredictable effects of sudden shifts in policy on a population already living so close to 
subsistence level.   
The Secretariat, as noted, similarly viewed India’s agricultural sector as unproductive 
and impoverished:  
The reasons for this low productivity include fragmented landholdings, a low level of 
mechanization and much of the cropped area dependent on rainfall for irrigation, which 
has made output in the sector rather variable; crop yields have also been declining, in 
part due to poor seed quality and overuse of land and inputs (WTO 2007a: 99).   
 
However, it went on to propose that the very government programs designed to benefit farmers 
are hindering its development.  
The sector also remains subject to considerable government intervention, notably in the 
form of price support and input subsidies, which have become a fiscal burden, and 
restrictive marketing practices.  Public investment in infrastructure and research has 
been inadequate and crowded out by spending on subsidies and, while private 
investment has grown in recent years, it has not been sufficient (WTO 2007a: 99).   
 
Here, low productivity is attributed to, among other things, the government’s allocation of 
scarce resources to input subsidies.  The hypothesis that subsidies have ‘crowded out’ public 
investment is repeated elsewhere in the 2007 Report. 
Low productivity is due in part to fragmented landholdings, low mechanization levels, 
and dependence on rainfall, but also because public investment in infrastructure and 
research has been inadequate due to crowding out by spending on direct and indirect 
subsidies to the sector (WTO 2007a: xi). 
 
In agriculture...  subsidies continue to crowd out public investment in infrastructure and 
research, and the sector remains relatively unproductive (WTO 2007a: 18).   
 
This is another example of the Secretariat distinguishing between what it saw as productive and 
unproductive government spending.  In agriculture, it asserted a stark either-or choice between 
productive investment in infrastructure and the provision of subsidies. 
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Higher investment in agriculture and rural infrastructure, instead of the provision of 
subsidies, is a necessary condition for the sector to grow and for productivity to increase 
(WTO 2002a: 100). 
 
In the 2007 meeting minutes, the chairperson and discussant, as well as many of the 
member representatives, expressed similar sentiment.  The 2007 meeting chairperson stated in 
his summary remarks:  
Members noted continued government intervention in agriculture through, inter alia, 
high tariffs, price supports, and direct subsidies to inputs.  Moreover, agricultural 
growth remains slow and erratic, causing considerable distress, especially among small 
and marginal farmers (WTO 2007c: 31) 
 
The second sentence is, as noted above, a word-for-word quote from the Secretariat Report.  
Although not explicitly attributing agricultural distress to lack of liberalization, the juxtaposition 
of the two statements seems to suggest a cause-and effect relationship.   
Where the Indian Government sees agricultural poverty as justification for intervention 
and aid, the Secretariat and likeminded commenters see the latter as a cause of continuing 
agricultural poverty.  This enables a counterintuitive leap in the Strong Liberalization Argument, 
where government intervention designed to help farmers and the poor is seen as a form of 
neglect.   
…the agricultural sector has not been a significant beneficiary of the overall reform 
programme initiated in 1991 (WTO 1998a: 11). 
 
The bias that was created against agriculture has been difficult to change; efforts to 
reform this sector have so far been piecemeal… Reforms in the sector remain constrained 
largely because of the Government's commitment to the Public Distribution System, 
although a more targeted system may allow greater flexibility with regard to policy reform 
(WTO 1998a: 107). 
 
By this logic, agriculture has been ‘left out’ of a liberalization that has benefitted the rest of the 
economy.  Government subsidies, price controls, and food distribution are conceived as passive 
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neglect – a ‘bias’ against agriculture -  while scaling back and dismantling such programs is 
conceived as active concern. 
 
Discussion of Agriculture in the Meetings 
 Agricultural issues were often brought up in the Meetings, especially in 2007 and to 
lesser extent 1998.  Comments regarding India’s own agricultural policies (by non-Indian 
representatives) were mostly critical.  Often they referred vaguely to a lack of reform in this 
sector; where the critiques were specific, they complained of high tariffs, subsidies, and price 
controls (the specific critique of India’s public distribution system (PDS) will be discussed later in 
this part of the chapter).   
The theme of agriculture being ‘left out’ of the liberalization program was particularly 
prominent in the 1998 meeting: 
The representative of New Zealand noted that despite the reforms undertaken by India 
since 1991, much remained to be done.  Little or no emphasis had been laid, for 
example, on reforms to agriculture (WTO 1998c: 10) 
 
The agricultural sector, for instance, was largely untouched to date, despite the 
commendable absence of export subsidies.  He urged India not to shirk from extending 
its outward-oriented reform policies to this important sector (WTO 1998c: 10- 11, 
representative of Australia). 
 
She highlighted a number of concerns, including … little or no reform in the agricultural 
and labour sectors (WTO 1998c: 14, representative of the United States). 
 
…the agricultural sector had remained relatively untouched by the reform programme 
(WTO 1998c: 17, representative of Indonesia/ ASEAN). 
 
Hungary noted that India followed the gradual trade liberalization approach 
commencing with industry, and preliminary processing industries.  However, agriculture 
had so far fallen out of the scope of these reforms (WTO 1998c: 18) 
 
…agriculture itself remained relatively untouched by the reform programme so far (WTO 
1998c: 21, discussant Wells). 
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Some members stated that the agriculture sector in India had been almost unaffected 
by the reform process (WTO 1998c: 31, Chairperson Mchumo). 
 
 The representatives of New Zealand always commented on India’s agricultural sector in 
the TPRs, but the 1998 representative was particularly persistent, bringing it up every time he 
spoke.  He expressed an unyielding faith in the efficacy of liberalization for agriculture: 
Although positive effects on trade in agricultural products were expected as a result of 
indirect effects of non-agricultural reforms, the potential for long-lasting effects of trade 
liberalization in agriculture were reduced or may not be achieved until that sector and 
related trade policies were reformed.  He encouraged India to consolidate the gains 
made in the reform process thus far, extend the process to the agricultural sector (WTO 
1998c: 10). 
 
Later, in response to the Indian Representative’s closing responses, he explained his position in 
terms resembling a textbook: 
Any protection, either in the form of subsidies or tariff protection, would imply that the 
sector did not have comparative advantage, implying that when this protection was 
removed, resources would move into the sector with comparative advantage. He 
recalled his earlier point that reforms in the manufacturing sector only scratched the 
surface as to the potential gains in efficiency and competiveness that could result in the 
agricultural sector through more direct agriculture and agricultural trade reforms (WTO 
1998c: 22). 
 
Discussant Wells, who also emphatically urged agricultural liberalization, also questioned India’s 
reluctance to liberalize in terms of orthodox economic models: 
…while India maintained restrictive import licensing on a large number of agricultural 
products, and high tariff bindings, prices in India in most cases seemed to be lower than 
international prices.  It was not clear, therefore, that India would face intense import 
competition if it liberalized its trade regime (WTO 1998c: 7). 
 
Wells, in speaking of tariff bindings (which would permanently restrict India’s ability to raise its 
tariffs in the future) fails to take into account that while India’s agricultural prices were lower at 
the moment, this might not always be the case.  Wells also explicitly connected agriculture to 
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poverty years before it became it a major theme in the 2007 TPR, stating “the needs and costs 
of poverty alleviation were greatest in rural areas” (WTO 1998c: 7). 
India’s agricultural sector was referenced less in 2002, perhaps because more attention 
was focused on the developed country farm subsidy issue at this time.  There was a more 
focused critique by a few speakers on India’s approach to food security, with reference to the 
‘grain stocks’ trope (see below).  Discussant Whelan and the representatives of New Zealand, 
Norway, and Hungary complained about recent hikes in agricultural tariffs (WTO 2002c: 10, 17, 
21, 22).  The representative of Canada “encouraged the authorities to examine subsidies, 
particularly in agricultural production and procurement” (12), which can be partially read as an 
indirect critique of the PDS, as can this quote from the representative of Chile: 
The agriculture sector also needed reforms, including reduction of price controls, 
commercializing enterprises, exports restrictions, minimum prices, and production 
incentives (23). 
 
Chairperson Mohamed made a general reference to India’s agriculture in her closing remarks: 
Members noted the importance of the agriculture sector in India and stressed the need 
to further liberalize it in order to develop its full potential (35). 
 
There was more commentary on agriculture in the 2007 Meeting.  Some, along the lines 
of most of the 1998 agriculture comments, simply called for general ‘reform’ in agriculture 
(WTO 2007c: 15, representative of Colombia; 17, representative of Chile).  We have seen that 
discussant Guth picked up on the Government Report’s theme of connecting agriculture to 
poverty, but the only member representative to make the same connection explicitly was the 
one for Mexico: 
More efforts were needed to reform agriculture, the weakest sector of the economy, so 
as to reduce poverty.  As agriculture employed a large part of the population, to 
integrate this population in the globalization process would be the target of reforms 
(WTO 2007c: 13). 
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Most of the other critical comments related to either low productivity (2, Chairperson Himanen; 
8, Guth; 18, representative of Nicaragua; 19, representative of El Salvador) or high tariffs (10, 
representative of Brunei/ ASEAN; 11, representative of new Zealand; 13, representative of 
Australia; 16, representative of Canada; 17, representative of Argentina; 19, representative of 
Ecuador; 30, Chairperson Himanen).  It may be worth noting that all those complaining about 
high agricultural tariffs, except for the representative for Ecuador, represented members of the 
Cairns Group. 
The representatives of Zimbabwe and Nicaragua also expressed concern for India’s 
agricultural sector, but notably did not explicitly call for liberalization here.  
Given the large rural population, particularly those largely dependent on agriculture for 
food and livelihood security, the agriculture sector needed urgent attention.  India 
needed to keep the right balance between its domestic development needs and 
international commitments (19 representative of Zimbabwe). 
 
The problem of small and marginalized farmers, and subsequently the related food-
security and rural-development issues continued to be priorities for the further 
development of India (WTO 2007c: 18, representative of Nicaragua). 
 
Couching their advice in terms of ‘development’ rather than liberalization or ‘reform’ (which in 
the TPRs is more or less a synonym for liberalization) may indicate less of a commitment to WTO 
orthodoxy.  It is especially notable that the Zimbabwean representative separated 
‘development’ and ‘international commitments’ as distinct objects, even implying competition 
between them. 
 Discussant Guth and the 2007 representative of the United States, while both taking 
pro-liberalization stances with regard to agriculture, made some concession to the practical 
difficulty of reform in this sector: 
The agricultural sector had undergone significantly less liberalization [than other 
sectors].  Reforming this sector was very challenging as it sustained the livelihoods of 
two thirds of India's vast population (WTO 2007c: 14, representative of the United 
States) 
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While recognizing the multi-facetted dimension of the agriculture issue, he regretted 
that the sector was still lagging considerably behind other sectors (26, discussant Guth).   
 
The only uncritical comment on India’s agricultural sector was made by the representative of 
Benin in 2007, where “agricultural development” was praised in passing as part of long list 
positive developments in the Indian economy (WTO 2007c: 18). 
 
Indian Defense of Agricultural Policy: We have Reformed Agriculture 
 The Indian representatives, as we have seen, responded to criticism that their 
government had not done enough to reform the agricultural sector partly by claiming that this 
sector’s vulnerability justified caution.  They also, however, emphasized that they had 
undertaken reforms here. 
Examples of recent reforms in the sector included improved public distribution and 
support price systems to take into account the interest of both producers and 
consumers; relaxation of restrictions on movement of food grains across the Indian 
States; removal of restrictions on agro-processing units; increased public investment; 
and some agricultural products were front-loaded in the proposed phase-out plan on 
quantitative restrictions.  Agriculture had also benefited from other reforms, including 
the reduction of high tariffs and of controls on imports of manufactures.   (WTO 1998c: 
24).   
 
India had taken various initiatives [with regard to agriculture], such as progressive 
dismantling of restrictions on the domestic movement and export of agricultural 
commodities;  improvement of rural infrastructure;  promotion of private sector 
participation in agriculture;  and creation of Agricultural Export Zones.  The sugar and 
fertilizer sectors were being decontrolled in a phased manner (WTO 2002c: 5). 
 
In 2007, when the Indian government focused on agricultural poverty, representative Pillai 
spent almost an entire page of meeting text describing various agricultural reform initiatives 
(WTO 2007c: 23- 24).  Clearly, it was inaccurate to state that India’s agricultural sector had been 
untouched by the policy reforms of the period.  Those criticizing the lack of ‘reforms’ here, 
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however, were conceptualizing reform as more or less identical to liberalization.  Many of the 
reforms that the Indian representatives described were state-led, planned development 
schemes.  Pillai began his explanation of agricultural reforms by describing their place in India’s 
latest Five Year Plan:   
The 11th Five Year Plan, to be finalized shortly, focused agriculture on a more inclusive 
development process.  A meeting of the Planning Commission, chaired by the Prime 
Minister, had been held last week, to discuss the strategy for agriculture development in 
the short and medium term (23). 
 
The reforms included various areas the government sought to promote, including horticulture, 
irrigation, agro-processing, and research and development.  There was some mention of 
encouraging market competition, but even these aspects included public-private partnerships 
and government-administered information network to report price data to farmers (23- 24).  
Although these plans included private participation and competitive markets, it was hardly the 
laissez faire approach called for by the representatives of New Zealand and other proponents of 
the Strong Liberalization Argument.  As we have seen, the Secretariat regarded even export 
zones as a deviation from liberalizing orthodoxy. 
 
Purview of the WTO 
 Finally, the Indian representatives defended their agricultural policies in terms of 
existing WTO rules.  The 1998 Government Report stated: 
The only commitment India has undertaken under the Agreement is to bind its 
agricultural tariffs. This commitment has been fulfilled by India binding its tariffs for 
primary agricultural products at 100%, processed food products at 150% and edible oils 
at 300%.  India's prevailing agricultural tariffs are well within the bound rates (WTO 
1998b: 10). 
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The 1998 representative noted that “India's domestic support measures continued to be below 
the de minimis level [required by the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture] and no export 
subsidies were being provided at present” (WTO 1998c: 31) and the 2002 representative said: 
“India's tariffs on agricultural products were relatively high, but were well below the bindings” 
(WTO 2002c: 20). 
 
Food and Livelihood Security 
 The Indian government’s rationale for protecting its agricultural markets to the extent 
that it did was summed up in the phrase ‘food and livelihood security.’  Food security and 
livelihood issues were often discussed separately, but in the 2002 and 2007 TPRs they were 
often connected through the use of this phrase (WTO 2002b: 16; 2002c: 5; 2007c: 19).  ‘Food 
and livelihood security’ describes the two dimensions of farmer vulnerability in the same breath 
– consumption and production.  Food security was not entirely a rural problem, of course, but it 
was to a substantial extent; most of the Indian population was farmers and most of the poor 
were farmers.  Poor farmers needed on one hand to be able to sell their crops at prices at which 
they could make a living, which was only possible if food and other necessities were affordable 
with this income.  Thus tariffs, price controls, and other mechanisms were in place to ensure 
that food prices did not get too high and that crop prices did not get too low.  The Indian 
representatives in all three TPR Meetings made this case: 
The representative of India stated that almost three quarters of the population was 
dependent on agriculture for their livelihood.  While reforms had taken place in the 
agricultural sector, the pace had been carefully calibrated so as to evaluate possible 
ramifications (WTO 1998c: 24). 
   
…trade policy had to be tailored to safeguard the food and livelihood security of the 
population, and to actively promote rural development (WTO 2002c: 5). 
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The tariffs on farm products were fixed, taking into consideration several factors 
including, inter alia, affording a reasonable degree of protection of domestic farmers, 
for whom farming was a livelihood issue (WTO 2007c: 20). 
 
The concept of food and livelihood security was not only useful in justifying protection, in regard 
to India itself, but also in attacking agricultural protection in developed countries (where the 
farmers were presumably not so vulnerable): 
…in the ongoing negotiations on the Agreement on Agriculture India has submitted 
detailed proposals with a view to safeguarding the food and livelihood security of the 
large subsistence level farming community in India and maximizing export opportunities 
for Indian agricultural products by seeking a reduction in the high tariffs and subsidies 
prevalent in developed countries (WTO 2002b: 16). 
 
The Food Corporation of India and the (Targeted) Public Distribution System 
 The core of India’s food security system was the Public Distribution System (PDS).  For 
this program, the Food Corporation of India (FCI) - an agency under the Ministry of Consumer 
Affairs, Food, and Public Distribution - bought certain crops from farmers at a government-set 
Minimum Support Price (MSP) and sold them to consumers at a government-set Central Issue 
Price (CIP) through Fair Price Shops (FPSs).  A reformed version of the program called the 
Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) was set up in 1997, which created a tiered system 
with different prices for those considered above and those considered below an officially-
defined poverty line.  The Indian representative in the 2002 Meeting, explaining the system, 
noted that additionally it was “used to generate employment, and to create physical 
infrastructure in the rural areas” (WTO 2002c: 33). 
 This set up contained a number of elements which the Secretariat and other advocates 
of the Strong Liberalization Argument regarded with suspicion – subsidies, price controls, state-
run corporations, and complex administration (WTO 1998a: 115- 116; 2002a: 49; 2007a: xi, 103, 
109- 110).  The FCI operated at a loss and the Secretariat defined this loss as a subsidy: 
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The subsidy is the difference between the economic cost (acquisition and distribution 
costs), and the Central Issue Price (WTO 2002a: 79).    
 
To the extent that the CIP does not include the cost to the FCI of purchasing, storage, 
and transportation, the Central Government subsidizes the FCI (WTO 2007a: 103). 
 
The 1998 Secretariat Report described the subsidy as increasing with the rising market prices for 
food and other price-controlled goods: 
…the Government has faced pressure to raise minimum support prices in the face of 
difficulties in procuring grain, especially wheat, thus potentially increasing Government 
spending for the food subsidy (WTO 1998a: 121). 
 
While the minimum support and procurement prices for wheat and rice were raised each 
year, the Government's Central Issue Price (CIP) for the PDS remained unchanged 
between 1994 and the introduction of TPDS in June 1997.  Subsequent increases in MSPs 
to align them more closely with market prices have added to the cost of the subsidy (WTO 
1998a: 116). 
 
It was also skeptical about the potential of the ‘targeted’ reform to moderate the increasing 
expense: 
The TPDS began in June 1997 and it is estimated that some 320 million people living below 
the poverty line will be helped, at an expected cost of around Rs 76 billion per year 
depending upon the level of stocks purchased; this compares to the 1996/97 cost of 
Rs 51.66 billion under the present PDS.  The additional subsidy burden will, however, only 
become apparent once the amount of additional stocks purchased becomes known (WTO 
1998: 115). 
 
With the introduction of the TPDS, however, it is not clear whether the increases in CIPs 
for the PDS and retail prices will be sufficient to reduce the cost of the total food 
subsidy. (WTO 1998a: 117) 
 
It did however also note that these basic policies were unlikely change soon given the Indian 
government’s sense of priorities: 
Progress in changing the structure of agricultural incentives and subsidies is likely to 
remain constrained by the Government's policy of providing support prices to farmers 
and ensuring low cost supplies to the population through the public distribution system 
(WTO 1998a: xi). 
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In the 1998 Report, the Secretariat’s main concern with the PDS seems to be its cost in terms of 
government revenue.  The last quote, however, suggests a disapproval of its perceived 
interference with market signals; “changing the structure of agricultural incentives” would be 
regarded as progress. 
 The PDS was attacked directly in the 1998 Meeting by the representative of Australia 
and by discussant Wells (though the discussant does not speak on behalf of the country they 
come from, it is worth noting that Ric Wells was also from Australia). 
Although there had been some reforms of minimum pricing and export restrictions, 
agriculture remained tied up in a complex web of public distribution, credit subsidies, 
subsidized inputs, minimum support and procurement prices, quantitative restrictions 
and import licensing, and high bound and applied tariff rates.  He questioned whether 
the system, with enormous fiscal costs, was working; whether the most effective way to 
alleviate poverty was through public distribution and minimum prices, which sometimes 
discouraged farmers from providing goods; and whether India could afford the costs of 
subsidizing inputs to farmers (WTO 1998c: 7, discussant Wells). 
 
[The representative of Australia] urged India to re-instrument its agricultural support 
policies.  The existing public distribution system and the provision of support prices to 
farmers were costly to sustain in the long-run and detracted from trade liberalization 
(WTO 1998c: 11). 
 
Chairperson Mchumo reiterated these sentiments in his closing remarks: 
It was suggested that the public distribution system, with minimum prices, was a 
disincentive to agricultural development and an ineffective means of poverty alleviation.  
Some delegations urged India to extend outward-oriented reform policies to agriculture 
(WTO 1998c: 31). 
 
The other 1998 discussant, See, had a more tolerant view of this system, but still described it as 
an impediment to liberalization: 
Expenditure on subsidies still accounted for 14% of GDP, largely for maintaining food 
security, e.g. farm production support, or for ensuring reasonable, low-level basic food 
prices for the vulnerable section of society (WTO 1998c: 6). 
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Use of the adverb ‘still’ indicates a hope or expectation that farm and food subsidies were a 
temporary expedient rather than a permanent feature. 
The PDS was not directly mentioned in critiques in the 2002 and 2007 Meetings, but 
critiques of food security measures involving price controls and subsidies can be read at 
addressing the system.  The representatives for New Zealand took the lead in denouncing 
redistributive food security policies in general: 
New Zealand agreed with India that the need to eradicate hunger, and to ensure 
sufficient domestic supplies of food to meet demand was important.  However, 
attempts to achieve food security had created distortions in the economy, through 
higher support prices and financially and environmentally unsustainable input subsidies.  
In New Zealand's view, food security could only be achieved through open markets, 
rather than striving for self-sufficiency, while isolating markets led to greater climatic 
and input risks, and an inefficient global market.  He encouraged India to take these 
views into account (WTO 2002c: 17). 
 
…direct and indirect subsidies on agriculture had been at the expense of public 
investment in infrastructure and research.  While India was concerned about food 
security, the benefits from more market-oriented approaches could help address those 
concerns.  He noted the moves by India's corporate sector to invest in agriculture, and 
new development in retail marketing (WTO 2007c: 11).   
  
The views expressed by the representatives of Australia and New Zealand in regard to 
agricultural liberalization were consistent with their membership in the Cairns Group. 
 
Overcrowding and Sectoral Migration 
 A key component of this rural poverty is perceived to be overcrowding in the 
agricultural workforce.  This is supported with statistical tropes about decreasing farm size. This 
is again from the 2007 Government Report and describes the average farm size in India 
shrinking by more than 50% from 1970- 2003. 
About 81% of Indian farmers are small and marginal farmers with holdings of 2 hectares 
or less… The average size of land holdings has reduced from 2.28 hectares in 1970-71 to 
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1.57 hectares in 1990-91.  The estimate for the average size of land holdings for 2002-03 
is only 1.06 hectares (WTO 2007b: 12- 13).   
 
Implicit in this trope is the idea that there are too many farmers and not enough land.  While the 
Indian Government Report had put a positive spin on rapid population growth in general as a 
‘demographic dividend’ (see above), the shrinking farm size trope implies that from the 
government’s point of view many of these young workers were entering the wrong sector. 
 In the 2007 Meeting, the discussant, Eckhardt Guth of Germany, was more explicit 
about the need for farm consolidation: 
Largely dominated by small farmers, agriculture lacked the economies of scale to 
encourage the necessary investment:  consolidating the sector into bigger agriculture 
units would be more viable (WTO 2007c: 8). 
 
He continued along this theme by arguing for the historical inevitability of some kind of 
enclosure movement in India: 
India faced tremendous social and economic challenges in transforming the agriculture 
sector and the rural economy into an industry- and services-based economy.  All 
developed countries had gone through this process by moving the labour force from 
activities with lower productivity to those with higher productivity (WTO 2007c: 8). 
 
This would of course be contingent upon the ability of other sectors, especially manufacturing, 
to absorb more and more labor. 
The growth of manufacturing was particularly important in absorbing the growing 
labour force and in allowing labour to shift away from the agriculture sector (8 
discussant Guth). 
 
Along the lines of the Strong Liberalization Argument, he proposed that further liberalization of 
the manufacturing sector, including lower tariffs and the elimination of “labor market rigidities,” 
could provide the industrial growth necessary for this task (WTO 2007c: 8). 
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 This assumption of the necessity of sectoral migration is built into to the agricultural 
development strategy built into the 2007 Government Report.  In many ways, the government’s 
long-term plans to relieve rural poverty depended more on the growth of manufacturing than 
on the growth in agriculture.  To revisit part of a longer quote used above, the 2007 
Government Report links its assertions about the vulnerability of the rural population to its 
“high expectations in the negotiations in NAMA and Services of providing substantial market 
access in the developed markets of the world” (WTO 2007b: 13).  NAMA stands for Non-
agricultural Market Access.  The reason that the report links this (and also trade in services) with 
rural development is because it is counting on the growth in non-agricultural jobs to siphon 
what is seen as excess labor out of the agricultural sector.   
…the pressure on land also needs to be relieved by providing alternative avenues of 
employment in manufacturing and services to the millions joining the agricultural 
workforce every year (WTO 2007b: 13).   
 
The implication is that with fewer farmers, the problem of shrinking farm size can be arrested 
and with fewer non-landowning farm laborers, the problem of rural unemployment will lessen.  
Sectoral migration, it should be noted, does not necessarily imply rural-to-urban migration.  The 
Government Report also outlines plans to expand rural industry, especially food processing 
(WTO 2007b: 14). 
 In the subsequent meeting, Pillai reiterated this plan, but also the argument for 
incremental and cautious reform: 
The pressure on land needed to be relieved by providing alternative avenues of 
employment and income, through crop diversification, and the development of rural 
non-farm sector, manufacturing, and services.  Horticulture and food processing 
industries were obvious direct linkages (WTO 2007c: 3).   
 
…because of the magnitude of the task, and the complexity of the [agricultural] sector, it 
would take years to transform the entire sector.  The pattern of development, 
particularly the creation of employment opportunities in the secondary and tertiary 
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sectors would also have an impact on the pace of reform in the agriculture sector (WTO 
2007c: 24). 
 
The last sentence especially seems to indicate a preference to wait until after sufficient growth 
kicked in in manufacturing to pursue more radical agricultural reforms.  Additionally, it is 
suggested in that the pace of this manufacturing (and services) growth depended on how 
quickly and to what degree developed economies opened up their markets 
…transformation [of the agricultural sector] would entail absorption of labour in 
manufacturing and services.  In addition, India's domestic reform process would be 
facilitated if access to industrial goods and services markets in the developed countries 
could be accelerated.  The development dimension of the Doha Development Round 
gave an immediate and sharp focus to this crying need (WTO 2007c: 3). 
 
Tropes of the Agricultural Crisis: Rotting Food and Farmer Suicides 
 Speaking parties at the TPRs often used specific stories or tropes to illustrate their 
arguments.  This was especially true in relation to agriculture. We have already discussed the 
tropes regarding the shrinking farm sizes and comparisons of agricultural growth to the growth 
of other sectors.  Two other, more specific stories, relate to stories in the media at the times, 
respectively of the 2002 and 2007 TPRs, which related to and reflected poorly upon, Indian 
agriculture.  The first is the story of ‘rotting food stocks’ which was current at the time of the 
2002 TRP.  The second is the farmer suicide story, which had garnered a great deal of notoriety 
for Indian agriculture by the time of the 2007 TPR. 
 
The Food Stocks Trope 
 The food stocks trope was directly tied to criticism of the Public Distribution System.  As 
seen above, the Secretariat was critical of the PDS already in 1998, mainly on account of its 
revenue cost.  By 2002, reforms to the system (the new Targeted PDS or TPDS) had led to period 
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where grain procurement had exceeded distribution enough to tax the storage capacity of 
government grain stock. 
Over the years the PDS [public distribution system] has become more targeted, while 
procurement by Government agencies has continued to increase (in part due to a rise in 
minimum support prices). The result has been a substantial increase in stocks, which 
greatly exceed the levels considered necessary to ensure food security, and in the costs 
associated with maintaining these stocks (WTO 2002a: x).  
 
Again, the issue is costs; this time storage costs.  The mechanisms behind the growth in food 
stocks is explained in greater detail in a later section of the Report specifically looking at the 
agricultural sector: 
Sharp increases in MSPs in recent years have been a major reason for a large increase in 
procurement volumes, which has led to the accumulation of huge surplus stocks much 
above the minimum buffer stock norms required for food security; for example, in 
January 2002, the FCI stock of wheat and rice was 58.1 million tonnes compared with 
the minimum buffer norm of 16.8 million tonnes.  In addition, along with good grain 
production in recent years, the central issue price for APL [Above Poverty Line] families 
was raised, thereby reducing their consumption of these subsidized products.  The 
outcome is that the associated food subsidy bill increased from Rs 28.5 billion in 
1991/92 to Rs 120 billion in 2000/01.  For 2001/02 the food subsidy is estimated at Rs 
136.7 billion, of which Rs 56.8 billion accounts for buffer stock subsidy or the carrying 
cost of the public stock of foodgrains (105- 106). 
 
The critique might at first seem to be targeted at the reform of the system, contrasting the TPDS 
unfavorably to the old PDS which it replaced.  Specifically, reducing the consumption of poor 
families seems to have contributed the growth of food stocks.  However, earlier in this section, 
the Secretariat makes it clear that it blames agricultural protectionism in general for the 
problem, not a specific form of it: 
Policy in this sector has been driven mainly by self-sufficiency; import and export 
controls, together with domestic support, have been used to ensure that domestic 
demands are met largely by domestic supplies.  The agriculture sector has traditionally 
been shielded from foreign competition by tariffs and non-tariff barriers, including 
quantitative restrictions, import licensing, price controls (on inputs and final goods), and 
marketing restrictions.  One important result of these policies has been an accumulation 
of large surplus grain stocks, which has contributed to meeting India's goals of self-
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sufficiency in food supplies; however, the food stocks now pose problems of storage 
and higher food subsidy costs (98). 
 
This is an example of not questioning a reform when a problem arises with it, but rather 
assuming that problems are caused by the reforms not going far enough.  This reasoning is 
clearer on the next page, where it is noted that in reference to the agricultural sector in general 
that “Few changes were made to these controls until recently” (99) in one paragraph and in the 
next notes: 
…the distortions created by these policies have recently become more evident;  
subsidies have continued to grow and are considered to be fiscally unsustainable;  food 
stocks have increased because of the high support prices for producers;  and misuse of 
inputs (water and fertilizer), due to distorted price signals, have led to environmental 
problems (land degradation, water-logging, depletion of groundwater resources, etc.) 
(99). 
 
Recent reforms and recent problems are painted as entirely coincidental, while the latter are 
blamed rather on the distortions inherent in larger policy goals of maintaining food and 
livelihood security though government controls. 
 The 2007 Secretariat Report reiterates this critique, although it notes that after the 
excess food stocks had been sold off in 2002- 2004, “stocks fell below buffer stock 
requirements, requiring imports, especially of wheat” (WTO 2007a: 111).  Again, it recommends 
further reforms along the same lines. 
There is also concern that because the FCI's costs are covered by the Central 
Government, it has little incentive to improve efficiency, while the targeting of the TPDS 
could be improved significantly (111). 
 
The 2007 Report also added a potential causal factor to the previous overstock problem: 
There has also been a significant change in consumption patterns:  per capita cereal 
consumption has declined while consumption of milk, eggs, horticultural products, and 
meat has increased...  In recent years, these changing patterns of consumption, 
accompanied by growth in production of cereals, have resulted in a surplus of grain 
production, and growing costs associated with maintaining stocks of wheat and rice and 
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providing certain essential foods to the poor at low prices...  In this regard, the distinct 
bias in agriculture price support policies in favour of food grains in the past probably 
distorted cropping patterns and would need to be rectified (WTO 2007a: 101). 
 
In this hypothesis, it is not merely the rise in grain prices for families officially above the poverty 
line under the TPDS, but also changing consumption patterns, that had resulted in the 
previously large grain stock. 
 In the 2002 Meeting, the food stock trope was brought up by discussant Whelan, but 
only briefly in reference to the Secretariat Report (WTO 2002c: 11).  In her concluding remarks, 
Chairperson Mohamed noted that: “Concerns were expressed over subsidies for agricultural 
products and inputs, which have contributed to large grain stocks” (35).  No non-India member 
representatives specifically referred to food stocks as being a problem.  Indian representative 
Chatterjee even put a positive spin on by calling “51 million tons of food stocks” one of India’s 
strong macroeconomic fundamentals in his opening statement (4), although later in the Indian 
replies section he addressed it as a problem which was being managed: 
Novel schemes had been established to use the food grains to set up grain banks to be 
used by families with inadequate income.  These measures would certainly bring down 
the food grain stocks built up in the country (33). 
 
Farmers’ Suicides 
 By the time of the 2007 TPR, a series of suicides by cotton farmers, especially in the 
state of Maharashtra, had become international news.  This negative publicity may have been 
one reason for the emphasis on agricultural poverty in the 2007 TPR.  Various commenters came 
up with various explanations for the phenomenon, which are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
Here, we will scrutinize its rhetorical use in the 2007 TPR, which was not extensive.  It was 
brought up once in the Secretariat Report and once in the Government Report, both of which 
emphasized indebtedness as a causal factor: 
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…it appears that small and marginal farmers face considerable difficulty in access to 
credit and their share in total credit to the agricultural sector is falling.  Moreover, while 
the share of total credit that seems to be non-institutional (i.e. moneylenders who tend 
to charge high rates of interest), while declining, remains significant and is likely to be 
especially high for marginal farmers.  Indebtedness and poor harvests appear also to be 
the major causes for the recent cases of suicides among small and marginal farmers 
(WTO 2007a: 113). 
 
A major problem faced by the small and marginal farmers is access to institutional credit 
on equitable terms.  It has been estimated that in the large state of Maharashtra, over 
55% of the farm households are in debt.  Mechanisms for risk mitigation are poor or 
absent.  Hardly 10% of the farmers are covered by crop insurance.  An unfortunate 
consequence of the constellation of hardships faced by small farm families is the 
growing number of suicides among farmers (WTO 2007a: 13). 
 
No member representatives brought up the issue at the Meeting, but it was mentioned by 
discussant Guth: 
Prolonged stagnation of production, rising food prices, and indebtedness of farmers, 
had led to numerous suicides of farmers, which was a major national concern in India 
(WTO 2007c: 8). 
 
Guth also notes the role of debt, but puts more emphasis on agricultural stagnation in general.  
This quote directly follows several sentences addressing low productivity, low growth, and lack 
of investment.  He blamed the last problem on small farm sizes, and used the suicides to bolster 
his argument for sectoral migration (see above). 
 Representative Pillai did not address farmer suicides in his opening statement, despite 
his theme of agricultural poverty and vulnerability.  He did, however, reference them in his 
replies near the end the end of the Meeting as part of a list of issues that had been brought up 
by Guth and other speakers: 
He appreciated the discussant's comments on India's agriculture, including the need to 
increase production and productivity.  The discussant also referred to aspects such as 
the lack of economies of scale in farming, as well as farmers' suicides.  Several Members 
suggested the need to protect the agriculture sector, and at the same time to undertake 
reforms of the sector (WTO 2007c: 23). 
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During his long list of agricultural reforms, he went on to mention that: “A special programme 
was being implemented in 31 districts where a number of farmers' suicides had occurred” (WTO 
2007c: 23). 
 
Exceptionalism and Anti-exceptionalism 
 As explained earlier in the chapter, what sets the Weak Liberalization Argument apart 
from the Strong Liberalization is argument is the greater room that it leaves for exceptions.  
Minimally regulated markets are held in general to promote growth in both arguments, but in 
the weak argument there are more limits placed on the applicability of this principle.  Never is 
this exceptionalism more clear than in the case of agriculture.  As noted above I use the term 
agricultural exceptionalism to mean exceptions from liberalization; and thus for the 
preservation of programs such as input subsidies, price controls, and government procurement 
and distribution. 
 The different solutions offered to the perceived problem of agricultural stagnation hinge 
on whether or not agricultural is seen as an exception to straight-forward market logic, or at 
least, how much of an exception.  The Indian governments, especially the one in power in 2007, 
argues that agriculture is different from other sectors largely because it guarantees the 
country’s food supply on one hand and provides livelihood for most of the population on the 
other. 
 As noted earlier in chapter 5, the change in ruling parties in the 2004 election was partly 
attributed to rural economic dissatisfaction.  The new Congress-led government moved to 
quickly to demonstrate its commitment to rural development with a flurry of studies and 
programs (including a series of stakeholder meetings which will be discussed in chapter 8).  This 
concern is demonstrated in the TPR documents by the heavy emphasis on agriculture and rural 
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poverty in the 2007 Government Report.  The following quote (all one sentence) outlines some 
of schemes agricultural planners had busied themselves with between the election and the 2007 
TPR: 
 
Programmes like watershed development in rainfed areas, expansion of irrigated areas 
along with efficient water resources management, agro bio-diversity and environmental 
protection, agro-forestry, harnessing of traditional knowledge, a regionally 
differentiated growth strategy for food and nutrition security, introduction of schemes 
for the development of allied sectors like horticulture, improvement of livestock, and 
fisheries, generation and transfer of technology, adequate and timely supply of quality 
inputs, protection of plant varieties, integrated pest management, etc. have been 
initiated by the government (WTO 2007b: 14). 
 
This buzzword soup is a small sampling of ambitious measures proposed to revitalize agriculture 
in India’s 11th Five Year Plan.  The core aims boil down to increasing the growth rate of the 
agricultural sector, increasing farmer incomes, and diversifying production. 
 The Strong Liberalization Argument with regard to agriculture is partly based on a 
principle of anti-exceptionalism.  It expects the agricultural sector to respond to liberalization in 
ways similar to the services sector (see section Selectivity of Reforms in chapter 6).  If 
liberalization ‘worked’ for services (in that it was correlated with higher growth rates) and to a 
lesser extent for manufacturing, then it should also work for agriculture.  This argument is 
summarized in the Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1: Liberalization of Different Sectors 
Sector Characterization 
Services Most liberalized, very high growth 
Manufacturing Somewhat liberalized, high growth 
Agriculture Less liberalized, low growth 
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In any case, it must be emphasized that the ‘more-to-less liberalization’ observation is just that: 
services have undergone more liberalization, but the other two sectors, even agriculture, have 
also liberalized in far-reaching and radical ways. 
 
The arguments for agricultural exceptionalism in the WTO regime are not limited to 
either developed or developing economies, but the variety of exceptions adopted tends to vary 
between them.  Developed economies can afford to simply subsidize production, while 
developing countries are forced to resort to more indirect measure such as tariffs and price 
controls.  But aside from differences in policy instruments, the striking difference between 
agricultural protection in developed and developing economies is the size and economic 
vulnerability of the populations they are protecting.  Farmers in Europe and the United States 
constitute a very small portion of their populations, while Indian farmers and farmers in many 
developing countries constitute a majority of their populations.  Therefore although developed 
countries spend vastly more money to support their farmers, India has a much higher stake in its 
agriculture exceptions. 
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Chapter 8: Agricultural Trade Policy and Expertise in India 
 
 Chapters 5- 7 dealt with statements produced within the institutional procedures of the 
WTO, specifically the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.  This set of statements was to a large 
extent (notwithstanding the roles of discussant, chairperson, and the Secretariat itself) formally 
modelled as being among governments.  What is said or unsaid by the delegates is meant to 
reflect the official positions arrived at by the governments which sent them (to what extent they 
actually do is another question).  The process by which these officials’ positions are arrived at 
may be hinted at in this discourse (we saw, for example, that the Indian representatives 
sometimes made reference to the political difficulties of building domestic support for liberal 
reforms).  For more insight into this process, however, we must look elsewhere. 
 Chapter 8 examines the process of agricultural trade policy formation in one country, 
India, by examining ideas produced within the community of policy expertise in India.  As 
explained in chapter 4, the statements analyzed here were produced through a set of semi-
structured interviews with representatives of this community, including officials and experts.  
Most of the informants I spoke to were economists, with agricultural economists particularly 
well represented.  Others were civil servants, lawyers, and activists.  Most worked for research 
institutions which can be broadly characterized as think tanks, while a few worked in the 
government bureaucracy or were unaffiliated.  Some of these think tanks from whom I drew 
informants were identified prior to fieldwork by their large internet presence.  Most, however, 
were chosen during the course of research as informants recommended possible contacts and 
listed think tanks besides their own which they thought were most influential. 
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Institutional Contexts 
 The government officials whom I interviewed belonged to the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), or were district level administrators in the 
Public Distribution System.  One of my informants was from the board of a government 
‘authority’ which was attached to the Ministry of Agriculture as an advisory committee, but 
whose members were not technically part of the MoA.  Most of the rest of my informants came 
from think tanks.  A think tank can be broadly defined as a group of people conducting research 
and/ or advocacy on a certain set of issues.  All of the think tanks from which I drew informants 
worked on issues of Indian agricultural and trade policy, although this was often one of several 
issues that they focused on.  Not all of the groups I spoke with used the term ‘think tank’ to 
describe themselves, but most conformed to the broad definition used here.  For instance, the 
Indian branch of the United Nations organization UNCTAD (UN Conference of Trade and 
Development) carried out the functions of a think tank.  A complete list of the institutions from 
which interview subjects were drawn is provided in table 8.1. 
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Table 8.1: Institutions Referenced in this Chapter 
Institution Abbreviation Web Page where available 
Institute of Economic Growth IEG http://www.iegindia.org/ 
Protection of Plant Varieties & 
Farmers' Rights Authority PPVFRA http://www.plantauthority.gov.in/ 
National Centre for Agricultural 
Economics & Policy Research NCAP 
http://www.ncap.res.in/Home_ncap.as
p 
Agricultural Economics Research 
Centre AERC none 
Department of Commerce DoC http://commerce.nic.in/ 
Department of Agriculture & 
Cooperation DoAC http://agricoop.nic.in/ 
WTO Centre WTOC http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/ 
Indian Council For Research on 
International Economic Relations ICRIER http://www.icrier.org/ 
Research and Information System 
for Developing Countries RIS http://www.ris.org.in/ 
National Council of Applied 
Economic Research NCAER http://www.ncaer.org/ 
International Food Policy Research 
Institute IFPRI http://www.ifpri.org/ 
Focus on the Global South FGS http://focusweb.org/ 
Economic Research Foundation ERF http://www.networkideas.org/ 
Third World Network TWN http://www.twnside.org.sg/ 
United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development UNCTAD http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Home.aspx 
Confederation of Indian Industry CII http://www.cii.in/ 
Consortium for trade and 
Development CENTAD http://www.centad.org/ 
 
My informants sometimes spoke in terms of ‘public’ and ‘private’ think tanks, based on 
where the funding came from.  Most of think tanks in the study set fell somewhere in between, 
however, with some government funding and some private funding.  The informants who talked 
about private think tanks usually cited ICRIER (Indian Council for Research on International 
Economic Relations) as the archetypical example.  Even ICRIER however was originally founded 
with a grant from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.  Many of the think tanks in the set, 
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even if they weren’t completely dependent on the government for funding, had a particular 
government ministry or department with whom they worked the most.  For example, a group 
called the Research and information System for Developing Countries or RIS (which was 
characterized by some of my informants as the most influential think tank in India) worked with/ 
for the Ministry of External Affairs.  The India Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT), which includes the 
WTO Centre, works with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.  The Agricultural Economics 
Research Centre (AERC) at the University of Delhi is funded by the Ministry of Agriculture.  Some 
groups were associated with particular universities.  ERF (Economic Research Foundation), for 
instance, was strongly associated with Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), while the Institute of 
Economic Growth (IEG) and AERC were both part of Delhi University.  The WTO Centre itself was 
technically registered as officially as a university, offering degrees, although it focused mostly on 
research. 
 The two main funding mechanisms for these think tanks were project contracts and 
grants.  Both could come from either the private sector or the government.  The WTO Centre 
was funded by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the AERC by the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  ERF had grant funding through non-governmental organizations such as the Ford 
Foundation and Action Aid.  An FGS informant had said that his group had formerly received 
Ford Foundation money, but that it was cut off after they refused to remove a controversial 
article from their website.  International agencies such as the World Bank and Oxfam also 
provided grants.  Other groups, such as ICRIER and NCAER, relied on project-specific funding, 
either from the government (including state governments) or private entities.  An informant 
with NCAER noted that government projects dried up during economic hard times, and at such 
times his group had to rely more on private-sector projects.  He also noted that NCAER had 
formerly received a lot of business from state governments, but had lately been squeezed out of 
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this market by the rise of private think tanks (he considered NCAER a public think tank despite 
its lack of grant-funding, perhaps because its primary mission remained to provide statistical 
data to the government). 
 Informants from the WTO Centre and the AERC were careful to stress that their 
organizations were autonomous for the purposes of research.  Those whose groups had 
international connections also often made statements along the same lines.  Informants from 
FGS and TWN asserted that the Indian branches of these organizations had a large degree of 
autonomy.  An informant from UNCTAD India said that her office was “totally autonomous” 
from the rest of UNCTAD. 
 
Flows of Information and Influence 
Connections 
 Some of my informants rated the relative influence of the top thinks in agriculture and 
trade policy and provided me their interpretation of the history of think tanks in India.  RIS, 
UNCTAD, and ICRIER were generally given as the most influential, although two of my 
informants were of the opinion that ICRIER was less influential at the time of the interviews than 
it had formerly been (these were both in the 2010 batch of interviews).  Two of my informants 
explained that the rise of private think tanks (or probably more accurately, the ratio of private 
funding to mixed public-private thinks) was a recent phenomenon, starting in the 1980s.  One 
agricultural economist, who worked for government-funded institute, complained that the 
government was increasingly outsourcing data collection to private groups, which was 
squeezing out public groups like his (he was also of the opinion that this had led to a decline in 
data quality).  Another agricultural economist who worked for a partially-publicly funded group 
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noted that they had formally done much work for state governments, but that this had now 
been taken over by the private sector.  His group now specialized in the provision of national-
level data, for private sector clients as well as the government.  He noted that the government 
cannot afford to commission studies during a crisis. 
 My informants described a number of specific mechanisms of think tank influence over 
government policy.  The most obvious was through projects specifically commissioned by the 
government with particular think tanks.  It was noted that policy experts sometimes served on 
government advisory committees and in think thanks at the same time.  One of my informants 
noted that government ministers sometimes attended ICRIER meetings.  The WTO Centre had a 
very clear advisory role to the government in regard to WTO policy.  I was told that some of the 
Centre’s professors had participated in WTO negotiations and this helped to gear their research 
towards “what negotiators want to know.”  A government official directly involved in WTO 
negotiations emphasized NCAP as well as the WTO Centre as valued expert advisory bodies.  She 
also mentioned NCAER, ICRIER, and UNCTAD as groups used by the government to carry out 
specific studies related to WTO negotiations.  AERC played an important role in generating cost 
of production data used by the government in determining procurement prices for grain (see 
below).  The CII acted as an industrial lobby to the government.  An informant from a less well-
connected group told me that he had informal contacts in the government. 
 There was a great deal of exchange of personnel among Indian think thanks.  One of my 
informants (who was still quite young) said that that she had already worked for two other 
thinks previously.  There were many researchers who went back and forth between university 
and think tank posts, and some moved between think tanks and international groups such as 
the World Bank.  There was, however, very little interchange of personnel between think tanks 
and the government, although one informant noted that there was more now than in the past.  
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Another said that it was difficult for a policy expert to join the government as anything other 
than an advisor, but that some officials joined think tanks after their retirements from 
government.  There were also distinctions among how reliant experts were on think tanks for 
their incomes.  While most were full-time employees, one of my informants explained that 
“everyone at ERF has other jobs.”  The dominant field of the researchers in these think tanks 
was economics, followed by law.  My IFPRI informant also noted that lately they had been 
recruiting health and nutrition specialists. 
 Many of the groups I spoke with were part of larger international networks.  The 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was headquartered in the United States, 
with a substantial office in India.  Both Third World Network (TWN) and Focus on the Global 
South (FGS) were research/ advocacy organizations originating in Southeast Asia and having 
branched into India in recent years.  Conversely, ERF was formed in India, but also acts as the 
secretariat of an international network of heterodox economists called International 
Development Economics Associates (IDEAs).    
 
Sources of Information 
Each interview included questions about what sources of information the informant 
consulted and considered reliable in relation to their field of expertise.  Here, I was interested in 
how subjects gained information to base decisions on, and to more generally inform their 
worldviews.  Those concerned directly with the WTO cited the WTO’s own website as a primary 
source of information.  Many think tank researchers cited the website of their own group and 
those of other think tanks as sources of information.  International organizations like the 
UNCTAD, the World Bank, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) were also frequently 
listed, as well as Indian government data and national statistical databases maintained by other 
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governments.  A few listed specific journals or newspapers, the Economist being the only one 
mentioned by more than one informant.  Some also cited workshops and conferences as 
sources of information.  Many of my informants, on the other hand were very vague about this 
question, answering with abstract categories like ‘the internet’ and ‘newspapers.’ 
 To elicit more specific responses, I eventually began to ask a follow up question along 
the lines of ‘if there was a major development in your field tomorrow, where would you hear 
about it first?’  Sometimes the answer was simply the TV or the internet, suggesting that they 
had no special access and would hear about major developments in the manner of the affluent 
and interested public.  Others, however, described internal memo systems for their 
organization, specialized listserves that they belonged to, and formal and informal government 
contacts that would allow them to access key information before it became general public 
knowledge.  One informant told me that the CII maintains 15 offices abroad to which report on 
developments in foreign countries.  A Department of Commerce official said that each member 
of the Indian WTO delegation in Geneva had a counterpart in India that they reported to as talks 
progressed. 
 
Creating Data  
Many of the informants I spoke to were in the business of creating their own data.  An 
economist at the WTO Centre said that one of his duties was to maintain a huge database of 
notifications submitted to the WTO by members, which was initially adapted from a similar 
database created by the WTO, but which he and his colleagues had subsequently greatly 
expanded.  An UNCTAD economist described her organization collecting its data directly from 
surveys of farmers, traders, and consumers.   
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One of the major functions of the AERC was to conduct a biannual crop-cutting survey 
to measure agricultural productivity in different parts of India, which was used to help 
determine a politically vital set of ‘cost of cultivation’ figures.  This data was generated for a 
subsection of the Ministry of Agriculture called the Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices 
(CACP).  One of my informants was part of an office (also in the MoA) that acted as an 
intermediate between CACP and the Indian cabinet.  He received reports and recommendations 
from CACP and then used this as the basis for notes passed on to the cabinet.  These cost of 
production and associated data sets were vitally important for Indian agricultural policy in that 
they were used to help determine the government’s Marginal Support Prices (MPS) for rice and 
wheat.  However, there were strong political pressures also in play when setting the MPS.  The 
government purchased grain at the MPS to sell at subsidized prices to the poor via the Targeted 
Public Distribution System (TPDS) and the larger the gap between these two numbers, the larger 
the cost to the government (see chapter 7).  Farm groups lobbied the MoA for MPS increases 
and higher MPS was often politically popular, but it also cost revenue and indirectly raised the 
market prices of grain.  State governments consulted during the CACP analysis often pushed for 
raising or lowering the MPS based on whether their state was a net exporter or net importer of 
grain. 
 
Stakeholder Input 
 One interesting mechanism of gathering input from farmers and others affected by 
agricultural trade policy was the institution of the stakeholder meeting.  These came up in 
several of my interviews and involved multiple institutions.  Many informants talked about 
communicating with interest groups through workshops and seminars, but a few groups in 
particular were involved in organizing large scale gatherings across the country specifically 
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referred to as Stakeholder Meetings.  UNCTAD and the WTO Centre facilitated these meetings 
and invited government officials and representatives of concerned interest groups.  Such 
meetings are designed in large part to put the people participating in WTO negotiations in 
contact with the people who will be economically affected by their work. 
 UNCTAD and the WTO Centre do not organize these meetings directly, but rather put a 
call to one of the four major national industry lobbies (“Tier 1” groups in UNCTAD parlance) to 
organize the stakeholder representatives, which include representatives of farmers.  As 
described above, farmers groups, lacking a strong national organization of their own, tended to 
join one these umbrella industry groups.  According to a researcher who worked directly for one 
the four national industrial lobbies, this representation was patchy at best and only drew in 
farmers’ groups that were at least regionally organized.  He stated that if the CII wants to 
partner with farmers, it can only do so with groups that already exist: “Industry can’t create 
them.”  The same WTO Centre informant who described the stakeholder meetings to me was 
well aware of their deficiencies in connecting to the poor.  He described most of the attendees 
as middle managers from large companies.  He was of the opinion that survey questionnaires 
were the best available (but still far from perfect) mechanism to get direct input from small 
farmers.  My UNCTAD informant expressed the belief that by working with these Tier 1 
organizations, UNCTAD’s project had helped make them more representative of the poor.   
 
Dissemination of Findings 
 Think tank informants were asked how they their groups disseminated their findings.  All 
but one of these groups (AERC) had their own webpages.  These usually contained articles or 
links to articles written by their members.  Some had regular newsletters and internet bulletin 
boards.  Commissioned research projects often led to papers in academic journals.  Findings 
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were also disseminated via workshops, seminars, and conferences.  My informants from NCAER 
and UNCTAD pointed out that, in the case of a commissioned project, the findings were given to 
the project sponsors (often the Indian government), with the latter deciding whether or not to 
publicize them.   
 
Construction of Actors and Processes 
Agency in the WTO 
 Some of my informants were clearly pro- or anti-WTO, but most were ambivalent about 
it.  Informants who were left-leaning were more likely to view the WTO negatively, while those 
who viewed the WTO in a positive light also tended to be pro-liberalization, but this was not a 
hard and fast rule.  Many who saw the Uruguay Round as flawed remained optimistic about the 
Doha Round (this will be further elaborated below).  Neither pro- or anti-liberalization 
informants seemed to think of the WTO itself as an autonomous actor.  One government 
informant corrected me early in her interview when I referred to the relationship between India 
and the WTO.  She said the use of “between” was inappropriate because the WTO itself had no 
separate existence apart from its members.  India was the WTO, as were its other members.  
Most of my informants saw the WTO as merely an inert forum where India contended with 
other governments, in particular with the United States and the European Union.  Strongly anti-
WTO informants viewed the WTO in an almost sinister light, but viewed it as a pawn of 
transnational corporate interests rather than as an autonomous actor. 
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The Impact of the WTO on Indian Agriculture 
 Perhaps the question that met with the most disagreement among the officials and 
experts I interviewed was if and to what extent the existence of the WTO had affected Indian 
agriculture.  One specific question I asked was if WTO obligations required the Indian state to do 
anything that it would not have done in any case as part of its own liberalization program?  
Some informants answered this with an unambiguous no.  The rural officials whom I interviewed 
stated they had seen no impact form the WTO agreement on their locality (they were all, 
however, from a poor state which did not produce an agricultural surplus).  A Ministry of 
Commerce official stated that there was some controversy over this point, but that she thought 
the empirical evidence pointed to there being little impact, though she then qualified this by 
saying it may have helped exports.  Others pointed out that most of the limits the WTO placed 
on agricultural protections were above those India had in place at the time. 
 Many of the informants pointed to two specific instances where the WTO directly 
impacted Indian agriculture.  One was the removal of India’s system of quantitative import 
restrictions (this is an instrument to cut off imports once they pass a certain amount, rather 
than simply taxing them).  Quantitative restrictions (or QRs) were deemed illegal in the Uruguay 
Round, except under certain conditions, which the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
determined that India did not meet in 2001.  This affected some agricultural products. 
 A larger impact seemed to be the virtual elimination of the tariffs on (non-cotton) 
oilseeds.  The Indian government made an exception from its usual agricultural protection 
policies to include this tariff line in batch to be reduced during the Uruguay Round.  One 
informant described this as “wiping out” oilseed farmers and small-scale oilseed processors.  
Another described it causing oilseed farmers to switch to other crops (especially wheat, which 
had a guaranteed market though the PDS).  But there was general agreement that an impact 
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had been made here.  One informant noted that oilseeds had been added to the tariff 
elimination list under pressure from the United States, but Brazil had been the exporter that 
benefitted most from this market opening. 
 Beyond these specific impacts, a few experts pointed to two more intangible effects of 
WTO membership.  One was the influence of expectations on policy and markets.  At the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, there was a widespread optimism that the creation of the 
WTO would result in lower agricultural trade barriers globally and that this would lead to an 
export boom for India, especially to developed economies.  One of my informants also 
suggested that the expectation of an agro-export boom marshalled some crucial farmer support 
for India to sign on to the original agreement.  These hopes were eventually dashed upon Quad 
intransigence on farm subsidies and the capacity for health and safety regulations to act as non-
tariff barriers to Indian exports.  Although export markets did not live up to expectations, 
preparations for them altered the behavior of economic actors, especially the government itself, 
which instituted numerous programs to promote agricultural exports.  Further, the convergence 
of the WTO’s creation, India’s liberalization program, and the height of the Washington 
Consensus in the 1990s, may have created a general trend of liberalization as ‘common sense,’ 
the effects of which went well beyond the letter of WTO law. 
 Finally, some of my informants brought up the issue of policy space.  While most WTO 
obligations may not have required the alteration of existing policy, they did have the effect of 
limiting the possibility of future changes in policy.  As one informant put it, India’s autonomous 
liberalization program, not the WTO, initially lowered agricultural tariffs; but the WTO had 
resulted in the subsequent binding of these tariffs, which set a quantitative maximum amount 
for tariffs (as a percentage of market value).  By doing this, the Indian government gave up the 
right to change its mind in the future.  To make a visual analogy, India walked through the door, 
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but the WTO locked it behind them.  The policy space within which tariffs operated was now 
smaller.    
 
Interpretations of Past, Current, and Future Negotiations 
 Some way into an interview with a senior agricultural policy advisor, I realized that an 
important question about the benefits of WTO membership had led to a misunderstanding.  This 
was an important lesson in formulating my questions more clearly, but it also revealed an 
important distinction in how Indian policy experts viewed the WTO at the time.  The expert was 
describing the benefits of multilateral negotiation in principle and all of the gains developing 
countries had made because the WTO was based on this principle.  When I asked him for 
clarification on what specific gains he meant, we realized that I was talking about the WTO as a 
set of finalized agreements in force as international law and he was talking about the WTO as a 
negotiating process.  I was thinking of the static, finished, and signed Uruguay Round and he was 
thinking of the current Doha Round, where nothing had been signed and the negotiating process 
continued in Geneva even as we spoke.  When he realized this he paused and said “Nothing I’ve 
said you should think of as applying to the Uruguay Round.” 
 He was not the only expert that I spoke to who expressed ambivalence about the 
Uruguay Round, while remaining relatively positive about the WTO in general.  One the 
agricultural economists I interviewed stated that India had been “unprepared for the Uruguay 
Round,” although he argued that the UR agreements contained some provisions that were very 
favorable to developing countries if only they could be properly exploited.  But, in the sense that 
he was speaking of interpreting existing WTO law in a way more favorable to India and the 
developing world, he too was speaking of a dynamic negotiating process.  The advisor I 
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discussed in the last paragraph went on to say that “developing countries did not take it [the 
UR] seriously enough.” 
 An ICRIER trade economist explained to me that “GATT was a two-tiered organization” 
and that countries like India and Brazil, although they had always been GATT members, were 
mainly “just attendees.”  Most of the trade liberalization prior to the Uruguay Round was among 
developed countries and thus when GATT transformed into the WTO it was “better adapted to 
developing country needs.”  GATT also lacked a strong, formal enforcement system like the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism.  A lawyer who specialized in WTO trade disputes told me 
that India had expected the Uruguay Round to be “soft law,” which I take to mean something 
that is not really binding, that could be easily side-stepped or evaded – something more like the 
GATT agreements that had preceded it. 
 The attitude towards the Doha Round, at least among the pro-WTO informants, was a 
different story.  Even though the round had not been concluded (and still is not as of this 
writing), there was at least in my 2008 batch of interviews a great deal of optimism that they 
would be concluded with favorable conditions for India.  There was reasonable hope at the time 
(at least according to my two informants who were closest to the negotiations) that the US and 
EU were on the verge of making a major concession on subsidies.  India, the G20, and the 
developing world in general had proven that they could bargain hard and stand up to the Quad 
in the WTO.  Even some of the anti-WTO policy experts I interviewed noted that the bargaining 
power of developing countries had increased.  An economist specializing in international 
intellectual property rights told me that from 2001- 2010 (he was in the second batch of 
interviewees in late 2010), there had been an “incremental advance in developing country 
interests” in the WTO, but “after 15 years the benefits are not visible.” 
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  A few of the anti-WTO informants viewed the rising profile of India in the negotiations 
in an almost sinister light.  One informant described the Indian government as “playing a double 
game” with developing and developed countries and as “drifting toward a role as one of the 
hegemons.”  Another who worked in the Indian branch of an international research/ advocacy 
group, said in 2010 that the Indian delegations are now “being told to look more to India’s 
interest rather than their allies’ interests” and that “India’s interests” in this case “is really only 
the interest of 40,000 IT workers.” 
 In my 2010 interviews, optimism about the WTO negotiations had largely evaporated, 
and the WTO seemed increasingly irrelevant.  When I asked a food security specialist how 
important the WTO was to her institute’s research, she said that it would be important “if 
anything were happening there.”  Many of the 2010 informants were far more interested in a 
series of free trade agreements or FTAs that India was negotiating with specific groups of 
countries (particularly at the time the EU and ASEAN).  These were seen by them as less of 
compliment to the Doha Round than as a replacement for it.  As one trade specialist working for 
one of the big Indian chambers termed it as the government “shifting its ambitions” from the 
WTO to FTAs.  On one hand this was a way to bypass the recalcitrance of the United States in 
the WTO.  In another sense, it was a way for the government to continue its trade liberalization 
program without attaching it to the negative public image the WTO had gained in India.  One 
informant described this as “liberalization through the back door.”  FTAs had a lower profile 
than the WTO and another informant explained that farmers were less aware what crops were 
on the table for tariff reductions. 
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Food Security 
 Some of my informants talked about the importance of food self-sufficiency to India.  An 
official in the Ministry of Agriculture, who was elsewhere critical of government intervention in 
agricultural markets, stated “you can’t rely on international markets to feed a billion people.”  
This mirrors similar sentiment seen in the Indian delegations to the TPRs reviewed in chapters 5- 
7.  Beyond being a practical concern with the most effective way to feed its population, food 
self-sufficiency was also connected to the independence of India’s foreign policy.  Two my 
informants (including the official above) brought up a diplomatic episode in the 1960s where the 
United States threatened to withhold food aid during an famine in India unless India toned 
down its opposition to the U.S. intervention in Vietnam.   This constituted something a national 
humiliation for the India government and encouraged the government to pursue food self-
sufficiency more zealously.  
 
Stakeholder Dimensions and the Construction of Farmers 
 In a country of 700 million farmers, it is important to examine how policy-makers and 
experts see this population.  I asked each interview subject to roughly categorize and describe 
different interest groups in India in regard to agricultural and agricultural trade policy, including 
the relative influence of each.  Answers were varied, but some commonalities emerged. 
 The first division almost all the informants made was between big and small farmers, or 
often big and “small and marginal” farmers.  Most Indian farmers fell in the small and marginal 
category.  More than one of them pointed out that the category of ‘big farms’ here was relative 
to India, where farms were not typically large by global standards.  A big farm in India would not 
be considered a big farm in the United States.  Still, there was a distinction drawn based on the 
relative size of the farm.  Those informants that went into enough detail to define this divide 
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systematically tended to do so in terms of production and consumption.  A big farm was one 
that could support its owners and have a surplus to sell.  A small or marginal farm was one that 
could barely or could not support the owners.  This would include subsistence farms that grew 
food entirely or mostly to feed the family growing it, as well as farm families that could not 
support themselves with their land and had to supplement their income with wage work or 
subsidize their consumption through credit.  In practice, one expert told me, this divide was not 
so simple and most farmers managed to sell at least some of their produce. 
 The division of economic interest between these two groups was mainly based on food 
prices.  An official in the Ministry of Agriculture went into the most detail here, explaining that 
“net consumers” (farmers that consumed more food than they produced) had an interest in 
keeping food prices low, while farmers that produced more than they consumed preferred 
higher prices.  The government tried to keep this delicate balance in check via Minimum Support 
Prices and the Public Distribution System.  It subsidized the production of certain crops (mainly 
grain) by buying them from farmers at a guaranteed price and then selling them to consumers 
(who met certain income requirements) at a loss.  The higher the MSP or the lower the PDS 
price, the greater the government’s revenue loss.  Big farmers lobbied for higher MSPs, while 
lower food prices were popular with consumers.  One trade policy expert explained that this 
government between the opposing interest of producers and consumers was successful enough 
that the two were “not usually framed as opposites.” 
 Another dimension of farmer interest was pictured at the regional level.  Some states, 
like Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, and Haryana, had prosperous (relatively speaking) commercial 
agricultural sectors and sold their surpluses to other states and on the international market.   
Groups in these states tended to be more interested in keeping the support prices (mainly for 
wheat and rice) and tariff protection high.  However, there was some interest among 
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commercial farmers, especially from the prosperous agricultural states, in opening export 
markets.  This did not necessarily lead them to whole-heartedly support trade liberalization and 
the WTO project (after all, commercial farmers sold far more in the protected domestic market 
than they did abroad), but it seems to have moderated resistance to it. 
 There was also some division of interest described between agriculture and industry, 
particularly industries that used agricultural inputs, like textiles and food processing.  These 
stood to benefit from lower agricultural prices.  Finally, there was some divide specific to certain 
crops.  The MSPs were important to rice and wheat farmers.  Some cash crops (i.e. mangoes) 
had bigger export markets than others.  Farmers in Southern India tended to be more concerned 
about an FTA with ASEAN, because they were more likely to grow the same kinds of crops as 
Southeast Asia. 
 Many of my informants emphasized that Indian farmers were not well-organized on the 
national level.  Some were organized on a state-level, especially in the agro-surplus states like 
Punjab.  A CII informant blamed the lack of organization of farmers in many states on caste-
politics and lack of land reform.  He reasoned that here caste loyalties trumped farmer solidarity 
and lack of firm land-tenure fostered a disinterest in investing in land improvement.  He was the 
only informant that mentioned caste politics, but not the only one who correlated lack of land 
reform with lack of farmer organization (again, this study cannot speak directly to the accuracy 
of such hypotheses, only their place in constructing policy arguments). 
 Informants described a variety of mechanisms through which farmer interests were 
filtered into national politics.  Many suggested that WTO membership was unpopular among 
farmers, but it was not and had never been a major election issue.  One WTO specialist 
described WTO issues as “mainly a debate among intellectuals,” not of concern to average 
voters.  Another informant from a left-leaning think tank insisted that the WTO was always an 
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election issue, even before 1995, in the negotiations leading up the WTO’s creation.  A Ministry 
of Agriculture informant suggested that WTO membership would become an election issue if 
the Indian government accepted a “bad deal” in the current Doha Round negotiations.  Both of 
the major national parties, Congress and the BJP, were described as being pro-liberalization, but 
both having to carefully consider farmer interests, since the latter constituted the bulk of voters.  
Farmers (especially small farmers) were described by some informants as having more influence 
in left-wing parties and regional parties (which often played a role in coalitions led by larger 
parties). 
 Without an effective national organization for farmers, regional farm lobbies tended to 
join the national industrial lobbies, like the CII or FICCI.  This was also true of agricultural 
processors and traders.  This is reflected in the organization of stakeholder meetings described 
above.  My CII informant insisted that farmer groups had a real influence in CII internal politics.  
He provided as an example an internal CII debate about whether or not to actively lobby for the 
creation of “Walmart-type” agro-retail chains in India.  While this proposal had support from 
many quarters within the CII, it was ultimately left off of their lobbying agenda because of the 
lack of consensus. 
 It was noted by many of my informants, including those in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and in think tanks with formal advisory roles to the government, that large farmers had more 
political influence than small farmers.  Where effective farm organization existed, large farmers 
tended to dominate the organizations.  Coalitions of large and small farmers may have a 
common interest in lobbying for higher MPS, agricultural subsidies, and protected domestic 
markets, although some of my informants were of the opinion that large farmers benefitted 
more from these things than small farmers.  For example, my MoA informant even suggested 
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that small and marginal farmers who were net food consumers might suffer if high MPS led to 
higher market and TPDS prices for food. 
 
Conclusion 
 At the beginning of the chapter, some advantages and disadvantages of examining 
hegemonic processes from the “middle” were noted.  The population studied could not shed 
much light on the subject position of agricultural producers and some of my informants were 
frankly baffled by the thinking of top-level decision-makers.  However, their positions are as 
intermediaries provided them a unique vantage where they could ‘see’ the former and the latter 
within the same frame.  This is why their descriptions of group actors and processes were so 
valuable.  Connected to large-scale mechanisms for gathering information on farmers and 
producing ideas used by government decision-makers, these actors and the narratives and logics 
they put together occupied an exceptionally powerful position. 
 Many of the informants that I spoke to expressed the belief that they were receiving 
information on farmer interests through imperfect and sometimes distorted lenses.  Small 
farmers had less of a voice in national discourse than large farmers, and thus the concerns of the 
latter were often portrayed as the concerns of farmers in general.  Another layer of distortion 
was introduced by farmer groups joining industrial lobbies to act to gain access to the latters’ 
well-established channels of influence.  They thus described a sort of double hegemony of large 
farmers over small farmers and industry groups over farmers in general.  This may partly explain 
how enough popular support or at least acquiescence was organized for India to join the WTO. 
 They also described an Indian government which seemed to be committed to the idea 
of liberalization and multilateralism regardless of which party coalition was in power.  There 
seemed to be a sentiment here that even an imperfect multilateral trade institution was better 
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than none at all.  Some informants thought that India might have conceded too much in the 
Uruguay Round, but held higher hopes for the Doha Round.  By 2010, when the Doha Round was 
looking increasingly less promising, there was a sense that FTAs had become an alternative 
means to multilateral trade liberalization. 
 The intellectual milieu in which these informants participated had undergone 
substantial change in their lifetimes.  The rise of think-tanks, especially those privately funded 
and internationally connected, was described as a phenomenon of recent decades.  It was 
suggested by one informant that university intellectuals tended to be more skeptical of 
liberalization than think tank intellectuals (although many intellectuals participated in both 
worlds).  It may be that the rise of the think tanks may have helped pave the way for 
liberalization (and perhaps vice-versa). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Christopher Laurence Blackden 2014
210 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
This dissertation has presented an empirical case study of the development of 
agricultural trade policy in conditions of overlapping sovereignty between a multilateral law-
making body and a large developing country.  In doing so, it has provided a number of insights 
into the interaction of neoliberal discourse, international organizations, and sovereign states.  
These insights contribute to political geography and related literatures in at least three broad 
areas.  In relation to the literature on policy transfer and policy mobilities, this dissertation finds 
that although the World Trade Organization does push a standard set of liberalization policies, 
there remains much flexibility and opportunity for creativity in their practical implementation.  
Policy transfer to India involved some obligatory or ‘coercive’ elements (most notably, the 
outlawing of quantitative restrictions in 2001), but overall India’s liberalization program was, in 
Dolowitz and Marsh’s (1996, 2000) terms, mostly a case of voluntary transfer.  With regard to 
the literature on neoliberalism, this research found that the WTO Secretariat played a large role 
in maintaining neoliberal orthodoxy in the WTO, even if this worldview did not necessarily 
reflect the convictions of all or most of member governments.  Analysis of the Secretariat 
Reports and other TPR documents was instructive in fleshing out some patterns of neoliberal 
argumentation which might help to explain its persistence in the face of policy failure.  The 
analyses presented in chapters 6 and 7 also illustrated that neoliberal principles do not always 
work in favor of developed countries, and can be used to, for instance, attack farm subsidies in 
the United States and European Union.  This observation also has implications for the Neo-
Gramscian literature, in that it shows an institution created to bolster hegemonic power (in this 
case the US and EU), can also serve as an arena in which these powers can be contested. 
 The two methodological components, one archival and the other based on individual 
interviews, looked at the issues described above from quite different vantage points.  The first 
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emphasized statements made in highly formal circumstances and filtered through procedures 
and processes which tended to efface individual authorship and promote an image of states and 
institutions personified in mostly unnamed representatives.  The second, conversely, took into 
account the individual informants’ specific position within one or more interlocking institutions, 
the flow of information and authority to and from them, and their personal interpretations of 
the processes, events, and actors involved in the formation of agricultural trade policy.  The 
juxtaposition of both vantage points not only broadens the perspective on the objects of 
research, they in some ways correct for the shortcomings of each other.   For instance, the 
individual and anonymous viewpoints of experts and officials in India (some of whom had direct 
links the WTO negotiations, but all of whom contributed to related policy debates within India 
one way or another) hinted at the processes behind the personifications of “India” represented 
in the TPRs and other WTO forums. 
 In chapter 1, the following eight research questions were presented: 
 
1) What are the positions and strategies of the Indian government in the WTO system, especially 
with regard to agriculture? 
2) How has the Indian government presented WTO membership and its consequence to the 
public?  
3) How is the WTO and its relation to Indian agriculture understood and represented among the 
policy expert community in India?  
4) What, if any, are understood (by officials and experts) to be the specific effects of the WTO 
agreements on Indian agriculture?  
5) What do the first four questions suggest about the configuration of hegemonic knowledge 
production across transnational, state, and expert spaces? 
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6) How does hegemony work within the WTO? 
7) How can we conceptualize the articulations of sovereignty between an individual sovereign 
state and an institution of transnational governance? 
8) Can questions six and seven tell us why developing countries remain in the WTO? 
 
At the conclusion of this dissertation, I can state that these questions have been answered, at 
least in a tentative and suggestive fashion. 
 
India in the WTO 
 The positions which the Indian government takes within the World Trade Organization 
were explored in chapters 5- 7, specifically through the analysis of the TPR Government Report 
and through the statements of the Indian representatives in the Meeting Minutes.  These 
statements trumpeted the success of India’s liberalization program, which was in broad 
agreement with the statements of the Secretariat and other Meeting speakers.  They also, 
however, insisted that India’s liberalization program must remain autonomous, cautious, and 
based on political consensus.  The representatives of India took especially firm positions 
regarding agriculture.  On one hand, they criticized the hypocrisy their developed trading 
partners for asking developing countries to open their markets while refusing to make real 
concessions on their own agricultural protections.  The 1998 Indian Government Report 
expressed this sentiment well before the G20 formed around this issue: 
 
The retention of domestic subsidies at a high rate by many developed countries 
continues to give us cause for concern.  In our view, the clamour for greater market 
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access for agricultural products would carry more conviction if a definite effort is also 
made to force the pace in respect of bringing down such subsidies (WTO 1998b: 10). 
 
On the other hand, the Indian representatives insisted that in its domestic agricultural markets, 
considerations of food security and livelihood security took priority over free market ideology.  
 Discerning the strategies behind these positions is a murkier proposition, but a careful 
reading of the text suggests at least three likely strategic considerations.  First, the very 
neoliberal principles which developed country governments had been preaching for years could 
be turned against them.  The representatives of India used the rhetoric of neoliberalism to 
attack the EU and the US for their protectionism.  In this way, they turned the tenets of the 
Washington Consensus against its own key proponents, making Quad criticisms of India’s 
protections ring somewhat hollow.   
Second, India could argue from a position of leadership among developing countries.  
Indian speakers often framed their interests as the interests of the developing world in general.  
After 2001, they had a rhetorical asset in the thematic prominence of development in the Doha 
Development Round.  Marshalling the support of developing country representatives was an 
important strategic move, as developing countries constituted the bulk of WTO membership.  
Developed countries may have had larger economies and more powerful governments, but they 
were decidedly outnumbered. 
Finally, I believe that the Indian government is willing to forego a substantial reform of 
the WTO in the Doha Round if this does not include enough concessions to Indian and other 
developing country interests.  From my discussion with policy experts, described in chapter 8, I 
suspect that the Indian government would like to see a new WTO agreement, but would prefer 
no deal to a bad deal.   
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 The material in chapter 8 suggests that the original political consensus built in India was 
partly based on the expectation that the WTO would allow for expanded agricultural export 
markets.  Whether or not this is how the Indian government portrayed the situation in its official 
publications is a question that must await future research.  The institution of stakeholder 
meetings, also described in chapter 8, suggests that the government of India at the time was 
concerned with the political mood of agricultural leaders with regard to liberalization and the 
WTO. 
 Chapter 8 made clear that the policy expert community in India viewed the WTO as a 
negotiating forum rather than as a group actor in of itself with any autonomous agency.  Actors 
seen as opposing India’s interests were individual members within the WTO, particularly the EU 
and the United States.  To some left-leaning experts, the actors seen as opposing the interests of 
India’s farmers were corporate interests, both domestic and transnational, with which the WTO 
and the governments that composed it were complicit.  Among pro-WTO experts, there was 
often a clear distinction made between the WTO of the Uruguay Round and the WTO of the 
Doha Round.  The former was often viewed as flawed, although perhaps necessary.  The latter 
was viewed as a useful and promising process, which may or may not lead to gains for India.  
There was a sense that multilateral negotiations were a good in of themselves.  Perhaps the 
Indian state gained diplomatically from its high profile in the negotiations whether or not they 
led to substantive new agreement or not. 
 Chapter 8 also showed that there was a great deal of disagreement among experts as to 
if the WTO had had an impact on Indian agriculture.  Some saw little or no effect, while others 
saw limited specific effects like the decline of non-cotton oilseed production.   Those who saw 
severe negative impacts on Indian agriculture were likely conflating WTO-specific impacts with 
liberalization in general.  This conflation may have some merit, however, as the expectations 
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that were raised by WTO membership may have helped to facilitate these reforms.  WTO 
membership also locked in prior unilateral liberal reforms, making them difficult to reverse and 
reducing the government’s policy space. 
 
Hegemonic Politics and Neoliberalism in India 
 The material in chapter 8 suggested the following hegemonic schematic within the 
agricultural political economy of India.  Small farmers had few and limited channels of influence 
in national politics, but they had some leverage in numbers.  A Ministry of Agriculture informant 
told me that the Indian government’s conservatism in agricultural liberalization was because it 
“can’t risk the pauperization of the agricultural population.”  Large farmers were more 
organized and had more voice in national politics, and exercised a degree of influence over small 
farmers, acting as the political spokespeople for farmers in general.  This was not necessarily 
disadvantageous to small farmers where their interests corresponded to those of large farmers.  
One potential conflict between small and large farmers over the price of food was smoothed 
over by the mechanisms of Marginal Support Prices and the Targeted Public Distribution System.  
The large farmers whom were net producers of food benefitted from higher MSPs, while the 
smaller farmers whom were net consumers benefitted from subsidized food prices.  Likewise, 
the large umbrella groups like the CII and FICCI helped to smooth over the differing interests of 
industry and farmers, by incorporating farmer groups into their organizations.  Overall, it 
appears that Industrial capitalists are the dominant partners in a hegemonic structure that 
incorporates large farmers and through them small farmers as well.  This hegemonic sketch, it 
must be reiterated, is a product of the policy discourse of experts and officials.  It would be an 
interesting subject of future research to investigate how closely it captured actual conditions on 
the ground. 
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 Chapter 8 suggested that the ascendance of pro-liberalization sentiment among Indian 
intellectuals was related to the rise of privately-funded think tanks in India.  This may suggest a 
hypothesis that the rise of neoliberalism in India has been similar to the rise of neoliberalism in 
the United States in the role played by business-funded think tanks (Harvey 2005; Peet 2003; 
Stone 2004).  The great size of the Indian economy, which gives it more bargaining power in the 
WTO, than a typical developing country, also makes it more resistant to the top-down 
mechanisms of neoliberalization imposed on smaller developing countries by global governance 
bodies like the IMF and World Bank through structural adjustment programs (not completely 
resistant as shown by the IMF’s role in stimulating the start of India’s liberal reforms in 1991).  
For neoliberalism to take root here, it must work through indigenous intellectuals. 
 
Hegemonic Politics and Neoliberalism in the WTO 
 Analysis of the three TPRs examined in chapters 5- 7 revealed more than just a critique 
of Indian trade policy.  For one thing, the volume of statements attributed to advanced economy 
members substantially outweighed that of (non-Indian) developing country members.  If 
meeting wordcounts are any indication, then developed members, especially the European 
Union and the United States, are accorded a position of intellectual authority and deference 
when it comes to economic critique.  It is also notable that all four discussants (recall that the 
1998 TPR featured two discussants) were from developed countries, and two of them were from 
EU countries.  On the other hand, although advanced economy wordcounts were always greater 
than non-India developing country wordcounts, this ratio decreased in the Doha Round.  These 
numbers support the hypothesis that developing countries have increased their bargaining 
power in the WTO during the Doha Round, but that this only goes so far.  The wordcount 
percentage for developing countries peaks in 2002 at 22% coming close to matching the 
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advanced economy percentage (25.5%); I hypothesize that this can be attributed to building 
frustration and assertiveness among developing country delegations which would subsequently 
come to a head at the Cancun Ministerial the following year. 
 The Secretariat Report in many ways occupies a dominant position in the TPR process.  
Not only is it the longest of the documents produced, it also has the privilege of going first.  
Consequently, they set the tone for the rest of the review process.  The Government Reports are 
forced into a position of having to respond to the Secretariat’s arguments, while speakers in the 
meetings make frequent reference to the Secretariat Report to bolster their arguments.  Like 
the member representatives, the authors of the Secretariat Report are de-individualized, but 
unlike the former they are not taken to represent a member country with specific material 
interests.  Rather they personify an institution which is supposed to represent all WTO 
members.  This aura of neutrality lends credibility to the arguments expressed in Secretariat 
Reports.  These arguments are presented therefore as neutral, technocratic advice with no 
agenda outside that of the collective interests of all WTO members.  Like the Secretariat, the 
discussants also played a role of expressing policy critique unattached to the official positions of 
any member governments.  And like the Secretariat, this independence bolstered their claim to 
neutrality  
 Analysis of the content of the three Secretariat Reports, however, casts doubt on the 
picture of unbiased technocratic neutrality.  Chapter 6 shows that the Secretariat Reports 
present arguments based solidly on neoliberal principles, what I have called the strong 
liberalization argument.  The sequence of logical dependencies at the heart of the strong 
liberalization argument is that liberalization leads to economic growth and that economic 
growth in turn reduces poverty.  On the other hand, India and many of the representatives in 
the meetings express less extreme versions of liberalization arguments, which I have called the 
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weak liberalization argument.  If the Secretariat equally represented the views of all member 
states, it stands to reason that its arguments would not be so skewed to the neoliberal end of 
the spectrum of economic theory.  The work here thus supports the view that the Secretariat in 
biased in favor of neoliberal logic, which does not necessarily represent the views of many WTO 
members (Peet 2003; Jawara and Kwa 2004).  Therefore, when the Secretariat sets the tone for 
the TPR, it presents neoliberal doctrine as the default starting position for discussion. 
 The strong liberalization arguments which start out the TPRs, do not, however, remain 
uncontested.  The Government Reports argue for a less extreme version of liberalization, both 
slower in pace and open to more exceptions to neoliberal logic.  These views also find some 
support in the meetings.  Furthermore, the liberal reforms that India is described as pursuing or 
as having already adopted are often unorthodox applications of neoliberal policy.  Strong 
exceptions to free market principles were carved out for agricultural support and food subsidies.  
Principles like food and livelihood security trumped free market principles.  Further, some liberal 
reforms were implemented selectively in such a way as to promote industrial growth (i.e. lower 
tariffs on industrial inputs than consumer goods and the creation of special economic zones).  If 
the WTO is a mechanism for diffusing neoliberal economic policy, then India is an example of 
how this diffusion leads to innovative hybridization and adaptation rather than to a straight-
forward homogenization of global economic policy. 
 As to why developing countries remain in the WTO, this research can only suggest a few 
tentative hypotheses for one developing country.  We explored a possible reason for India’s 
initial acceptance of the Uruguay Round agreements – a mistaken expectation of new 
agricultural markets in developed economies.  The convergence of the WTO’s agendas with 
India’s autonomous liberalization certainly made membership easier.  The material in chapter 8 
suggested that perhaps there was a preference for multilateral negotiations in Indian political 
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culture.  Perhaps a reason for India remaining in the WTO and pursuing a resolution to the Doha 
agenda is an underlying conviction that the multilateral process will eventually pay off for India.  
We suggested above that even if there is no pay off, India’s international profile might be raised 
by the negotiations.  It may be that India’s adherence the WTO encourages other developing 
countries, which Indian representatives sometimes implicitly claimed to speak for in the TPRs, to 
themselves remain in the WTO. 
 
Questions of Neoliberal Hegemony 
 India has undergone far-reaching liberal reform since 1991, but can these reforms be 
characterized as neoliberal or part of global neoliberalism?  We can see more use of market 
competition as a disciplinary and regulatory mechanism, trade used as a growth engine, and an 
overall reduction of formal government intervention, but such policies are present in many 
variations of capitalism, not merely a neoliberal variety.  The Indian economy does not by any 
stretch of the imagination approach the extreme market utopian vision of neoliberal philosophy.   
At the same time, the tendency, moving away from state planning and protected markets, gives 
the impression of a ‘pull’ in the direction of a globally hegemonic neoliberalism.  Harvey (2005) 
has made this type of argument concerning the earlier liberalization program undertaken in 
China.  There may be some truth to this idea, but it must also be emphasized that the ‘pull’ may 
also work in the other direction.  India’s liberalization program may have helped to prop up 
global neoliberal discourse by providing something that looked like a success story for 
liberalization. 
 The idea of India as a ‘success story’ for neoliberalism is indicative of a form of 
neoliberal argumentation common in the TPR documents.  If some amount of liberalization has 
been successful, it then follows that further liberalization would lead to even more success.  The 
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converse of this is that when liberalization has failed or has not lived up to liberalization, this is 
because liberalization did not go far enough or was ‘incomplete.’  Both of those arguments were 
used extensively in the TPRs, especially in the Secretariat Reports, as demonstrated in chapter 6.  
As long as neoliberalism is never implemented in its most extreme forms, its proponents can 
always argue that successes of partial liberalization are attributable to neoliberal practices while 
failures of such reforms result from lingering non-neoliberal policy practices.13 
 Peck, Brenner, and Theodore (2010a) argue that neoliberalism is often called upon to 
solve crises which it has caused.  If this is the case, then the denial mechanism described above 
– any neoliberal policy failures are the result of not being neoliberal enough – may be an 
important component of this cycle.  The very tendency of neoliberal policy to be subject to local 
adaptation and mutation then bolsters the failure-proof argumentation tactic.  If the policy is 
successful, it is proof of neoliberalism’s efficacy; if it fails, then it is the unorthodox aspects of 
the policy which is to blame.  This poor sort of logic may be behind what Peck, et al (2009) refer 
to as ‘zombie neoliberalism.’ 
  
Collapsing Hegemony or Expanding Hegemony 
 According to Cox (1981), the United States lost its role as the sole hegemon of a world 
order as far back as the 1960s.  By Cox’s logic, then, we are solidly within a non-hegemonic 
world order at the present.  But, I find it rather limiting to think that hegemony can only exist on 
a global scale if one country is dominant.  Another model of global hegemony could be based on 
a small group of countries with similar interests co-exercising a hegemony over the rest  – a US-
EU axis, the Quad countries, or even developed countries in general.  We need not even think of 
global hegemony in terms of states, if we ascribe to the idea of a rising transnational capitalist 
13 To be fair, this form of argumentation could be used to justify almost any economic doctrine 
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class (TCC), as suggested in Sklair 2000.  Following Harvey (although he is ambivalent about the 
term TCC), neoliberalism can then be seen as a project of this class to everywhere turn 
economic policy to their advantage. 
 If the Quad (the US, the EU, Japan, and Canada) did exercise hegemony over the rest of 
the WTO members at the start, then this seems to have been challenged in the Doha Round by 
increasingly assertive developing country members, especially India and other emerging 
economies.  But is this challenge counter-hegemonic or is simply a case of the hegemony 
expanding to co-opt a new group of subsidiary members?  It has been pointed out that India and 
the G20 use neoliberal logic to attack farm subsidies and other perceived trade barriers in the 
United States and the European Union.  If anything, this reinforces the position of neoliberalism 
as a dominant discourse.  On the other hand, India also argues in the WTO from policy positions 
like special and differential treatment and food security, with decidedly un-neoliberal tones.   
 India’s positions as a member of the WTO’s new inner circle (that is, it’s inclusion in a 
series of exclusive high-level negotiations among the most powerful WTO members) and as a 
representative of developing country interest in general may serve to help stabilize a neoliberal 
hegemony over the developing world.  But if so, it may be doing so in such a way as to secure 
certain exceptions from liberalization for food security and special and differential treatment as 
the price of compliance.  It remains to be seen whether or not such a grand bargain will ever be 
struck to secure an end to the Doha Round. 
 
Closing Thoughts 
 The example of India shows that policy transfer via the WTO has not lead to a 
homogenous world policy regime.  India’s liberalization program is often held up as a success 
story for neoliberalism, but it is hardly a case of neoliberal orthodoxy.  The Indian government 
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has adopted liberal reforms selectively and has carved out exceptions for food security and 
other aspects of economic policy.  On the other hand, Indian liberalization does have a 
directionality moving towards more liberalization and there is still international pressure, 
especially through contemporary Doha Round negotiations to continue in this direction.  
However, in the wake of the Great Recession, global neoliberalism may not be able to exert the 
same pull it once did. 
 A key purpose of this research was to describe in tentative fashion what sort of power 
balances are at work in the overlapping sovereignty realms of the WTO and the Indian state.  It 
seems to me that developed countries and especially the old US-EU axis remains in a dominant 
position in the WTO, but that this dominance is not as strong as it once was.  The primary reason 
for this is the rising bargaining power of the G20, including India.  The Indian state has two great 
advantages in its struggle to secure a favorable outcome to the Doha Round.  First, it has 
widespread (though not total) legitimacy as a representative of developing countries, which 
constitute most of the WTO membership.  Second, it is on the side of neoliberal orthodoxy in its 
argument against developed country farm subsidies. 
 On the other hand, the Indian government is constrained in what concessions it can 
make in these negotiations both by the need to for support from other developing country 
governments and by a domestic constituency which is highly reliant on agricultural protection.  
If the Doha Round ends without a substantial new agreement, it would in a way be a negative 
victory for developing countries, since they would at least have avoided accepting another bad 
deal.  It would also, however, discontinue a forum in which India was in a very visible fashion 
able to exert its claim as a developing country leader and negotiating equal of developed 
countries.  If the Doha Round does end in a substantial agreement, India may be seen as a 
champion of the developing world or a sell-out depending on the substance of the agreement.   
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Appendix: Sample Interview Instrument 
 
The following list of interview questions was used during an interview with a policy expert from 
a think tank called Focus on the Global South.  Similar instruments were used during the other 
interviews, with of course “FGS” replaced by the name of their organization.  As these 
interviews were semi-structured, questions may have been asked that were not on the formal 
list, that occurred to me in the course of the interview. 
 
Interview Context 
1) Please describe your role at FGS. 
2) What areas of your field do you specialize in? 
3) Do you identify with any school of thought, intellectual tradition, or theoretical framework 
within your field?  
4) Schools? 
5) Jobs? (private sector, government?) 
6) What media do you consult to keep up events and developments pertaining to your work? 
(This can include databases, journals, newspapers, websites, etc.) 
 
FGS 
1) Please describe the role of FGS in society. 
2) How important are WTO and agricultural trade policy within the entire range of FGS 
research? 
3) What are its main activities? (such as: research, advocacy, government consultation, private 
consultation, etc) 
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4) What other groups or institutions does FGS partner with?  
 -  government? 
-   business? 
-  academia? 
-  civil society organizations? 
-  international bodies? 
- others? 
5) How is FGS funded? (is it mostly international?) 
6) How does FGS disseminate its findings?  
7) How does FGS compare to other institutions in India doing similar work? 
8) Can you provide some examples of FGS influencing government policy?  
9) How does FGS get information from/ about stakeholders in its policy areas? (i.e., meetings, 
surveys, statistics, etc) 
10) How does FGS India relate to FGS in the US and other countries? 
 
FGS Personnel 
1) What fields are most represented among FGS researchers? (economics, law, political science, 
etc)  
2) To what extent have FGS workers also- 
 - worked in the private sector? 
 - worked in academia? 
 - worked in government? 
 - worked in International bodies or NGOs? 
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Agriculture 
1) If you were to divide up stakeholders in India’s agricultural economy into groups based on 
differing interests, what dimensions would be the most important? (i.e. small-vs-large farms, 
producers-vs-consumers, regional interests, crop specific interests, primary producers/ 
processors/ traders) [adapt #4 to this answer] 
2) in general, what has been the impact of liberalization in general and WTO agreements in 
particular on the agricultural economy of India? 
3) To date, has trade policy had much impact of issues of hunger and poverty among farmers in 
India? 
4) (If so… ) How has it affected specific groups within India’s agricultural economy? 
 - large farms? 
 - small farms? 
 - different regions? 
 - different crops? 
 - auxiliary industries? (i.e., cargo, intermediate traders, input providers, food processing) 
5) What should India do in the next several years with regard to agriculture and what is it likely 
to do? 
 
Impact of WTO Agreements 
1) In your opinion, has the net impact of the WTO to date been a net benefit or a net cost to – 
 - India?  
 - the developing world in general?  
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- the developed world in general?  
2) Can you describe specific effects WTO regulations have had on Indian agriculture, including 
issues of food security and livelihood security?  
3) What specific events or statistical indicators are most revealing of these impacts?  
4) Did India’s WTO commitments cause it to do anything it would not have done anyway under 
its own liberalization programs?  
5) How important are the outcomes of current and future WTO negotiations to India?  
 
India ‘s WTO Strategies 
1) What do you see as the Indian government’s current negotiating strategy in the WTO?   
2) Do you have any criticism of this strategy?  
3) What are the roles of alliances like the G20, G33, etc, in India’s WTO strategies?  
4) In principle, would India sacrifice some of its own interests in WTO negotiations if it 
contributed to the welfare of other developing countries?  
5) How have India’s WTO strategies changed since 1995?  
 
Stakeholder Groups 
1) What groups in Indian society (including, but limited to farmers), if any, have been most 
impacted by the WTO to date?  
2) What stakeholders in India society have the most interest in the outcome of future WTO 
negotiations? (and to what extent are they aware of it?)  
3) Which stakeholders tend to have the most influence over India’s WTO policies and which 
have the least?  
4) How well informed is the Indian public about WTO policy issues?  
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5) Do many citizens take WTO issues into consideration when voting or undertaking other 
political activity?  
6) How would you describe the channels through which the desires of individual Indian citizens 
are transmitted to the decision-making bodies of the WTO?  
 
Power in WTO 
1) What are the advantages and disadvantages of developing countries in WTO negotiations?  
2) of India in particular?  
3) What are the advantages and disadvantages of developed countries in WTO negotiations?  
4) Has the balance of bargaining power between developed and developing countries in the 
WTO changed since 1995?  
5) Do you believe WTO institutions have any existence apart from the governments that make it 
up? (i.e. does it have any autonomous sovereignty apart from the collective sovereignty of its 
member states) 
  
  
229 
 
References 
Acharya, K.C.S. 1983. Food Security System of India. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. 
 
Agnew, John. 1994. “The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international relations 
theory.” Review of International Political Economy, 1:53- 80. 
 
Agnew, John. 2005. “Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary 
World Politics.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95(2): 437- 461. 
 
Agnew, John. 2005. Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press. 
 
Ahmad, Waquar. 2009. From Mixed Econlomy to Neo-liberalism: Class and Caste in India’s 
Economic Transition. Human Geography 2 (30): 37- 51. 
 
Ananth, V. Krishna. 2010. India Since Independence: Making Sense of Indian Politics. New Delhi: 
Dorling Kindersley Pvt. Ltd. 
 
Bello, Walden. 2005. Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire. New 
York: Metropolitan Books 
 
Bello, Walden and Kwa, Aileen. 2004. “G 20 Leaders Succumb to Divide-and-Rule Tactics: The 
Story behind Washington’s Triumph in Geneva” Focus on the Global South 
[http://www.focusweb.org/main/html/].  http://www.focusweb.org/main/html/Article408.html 
 
Bennett, Colin J. 1991. What is policy convergence and what causes it? British Journal of Political 
Science 21: 215- 233. 
 
Benson, David and Jordan, Andrew. 2011. What Have We Learned from Policy Transfer 
Research? Dolowitz and Marsh Revisited. Political Studies Review 10 (3): 333-338. 
 
Benson, David and Jordan, Andrew. 2012. Policy Transfer Research: Still Evolving, Not Yet 
through? Political Studies Review 10 (3): 333-338. 
 
Bieler, Andreas and Morton, Adam David. 2004. A critical theory route to hegemony, world 
order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations. Capital & 
Class 28 (1): 85- 113. 
 
Brenner, Neil; Peck, Jamie; and Theodore, Nik. 2009. Postneoliberalism and its Malcontents. 
Antipode 41 (6): 1236- 1258. 
 
Brenner, Neil; Peck, Jamie; and Theodore, Nik. 2010a. Variegated neoliberalization: geographies, 
modalities, pathways. Global Networks 10 (2): 182- 222. 
 
Brenner, Neil; Peck, Jamie; and Theodore, Nik. 2010b. After Neoliberalization? Globalizations 7 
(3): 327- 345.   
 
230 
 
Brenner, Neil; Jessop, Bob; Jones, Martin; and MacLeod, Gordon. 2003. “Introduction: State 
Space in Question” pp. 1-26 in Brenner, Neil; Jessop, Bob; Jones, Martin; and MacLeod, Gordon 
(eds). State/Space: a Reader. Malden, Ma.: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Cairns group. 2013. “Cairns Group Statement.” 
http://cairnsgroup.org/Pages/vision_statement.aspx 
 
Chandrasekhar, C.P. & Pal, Parthapratim. 2004.  “WTO: No Cause for Celebration.” The 
Economic Research Foundation, New Delhi. 
http://www.atisweb.org/sections/wto_G20/analysis/2004/august/anl17_WTO.htm 
 
Chang, Ha-Joon. 2003. “Kicking Away the Ladder: The ‘Real’ History of Free Trade.” Foreign 
Policy in Focus (Silver City, NM: Interhemispheric Resource Center, December 2003). 
Web location: http://www.fpif.org/pdf/papers/SRtrade2003.pdf 
 
Chimni, B.S. 2006. The World Trade Organization, Democracy and Development: A View From 
the South. Journal of World Trade 40 (1): 5- 36. 
 
Choven, Nitsan. 2005. The institutional project of neo-liberal globalism: The case of the WTO. 
Theory and Society 34 (3): 317- 355. 
 
Choven, Nitsan and Babb, Sarah. 2009. The crisis of neoliberalism and the future of international 
institutions: A comparison of the IMF and the WTO. Theory and Society 38 (5): 459- 484. 
 
Cox, Robert. 1981. Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory.  Millennium – Journal of International Studies 10: 126. 
 
Cox, Robert. 1983. Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method. 
Millennium – Journal of International Studies 12: 162. 
 
Cox, Robert. 1992. Multilateralism and world order. Review of International Studies 18 (2): 161- 
180. 
 
Das, Dilip K. 2006. The Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Trade in Agriculture. 
Journal of World Trade 40 (2): 259- 290. 
 
Dezalay, Yves and Garth, Bryant G. 2002. The Internationalization of Palace Wars. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Dixon, Deborah P. and Hapke, Holly. 2003. “Cultivating Discourse: The Social Construction of 
Agricultural Legislation.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 93 (1): 142-164. 
 
Dolowitz, David and Marsh, David. 1996. Who Learns from Whom: A Review of the Policy 
Transfer Literature. Political Studies 44: 343-357. 
 
Dolowitz, David and Marsh, David. 2012. The Future of Policy Transfer Research. Political Studies 
Review 10 (3): 339-345. 
 
231 
 
Dolowitz, David and Marsh, David. 2000. Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in 
Contemporary Policy-Making. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 
13 (1): 5-24. 
 
Dussauge-Laguna, Mauricio. 2012. On the Past and Future of Policy Transfer Research: Benson 
and Jordan Revisited. Political Studies Review 10 (3): 313-324. 
 
Efstathopoulos, Charalampos. 2012. Leadership in the WTO: Brazil, India, and the Doha 
development agenda. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25 (2): 269- 293 
 
England, Kim V. L. 2002. “Interviewing Elites: Cautionary Tales about Researching Women 
Managers in Canada’s Banking Industry.” pp. 200- 213 in Moss, Pamela (ed) Feminist Geography 
in Practice: Research and Methods.  Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
 
Evans, Mark. 2009. Policy transfer in critical perspective. Policy Studies 30 (3): 243- 268. 
 
Ferguson, James. 1994[1990]. The Anti-Politics Machine. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
 
Ferguson, James. 2006. Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
 
Ferguson, J. and Gupta, A. 2002. Spatializing states: Toward an ethnography of neoliberal 
governmentality. American Ethnologist 29:981-1002. 
 
Fischer, Frank. 2000. Citizens, Experts, and the Environment. Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1972. The Archaeology of Knowledge. NY: Pantheon Books. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1980. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. 
Ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1982. “Why Study Power? The Question of the Subject.” Critical Inquiry 8(4): 
777- 795. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1994. “The Subject in Power” pp. 326- 348 in Faubion, J.D. (Ed) Power. 
New York: New Press. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 1991. “Politics and the Study of Discourse” pp. 53- 72 in Burchell, Graham; 
Gordon, Colin; and Miller, Peter (eds.) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Foucault, Michel. 2003. “Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the College de France, 1975- 
1976. NY: Picador. 
 
Gale, Fred. 1998. Cave ‘Cave! Hic dragones’: a neo-Gramscian deconstruction and reconstruction 
of international regime theory. Review of International Political Economy 5 (2): 252- 283. 
232 
 
 
Government of India. 2013. Agricultural Statistics at a Glance. 
http://eands.dacnet.nic.in/latest_2013.htm [last accessed 3/22/14] 
  
Government of India. 2014a. Census of India 2011. http://www.censusindia.gov.in/default.aspx 
[last accessed 3/22/14] 
 
Government of Inida. 2014b. Agricultural Census 2010-11: All India Report on Operational 
Holdings. http://agcensus.nic.in/document/agcensus2010/completereport.pdf [last accessed 
3/22/14] 
 
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. New York: 
International Publishers. 
 
Grossman, Margaret Rosso. 2003. “The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and Domestic 
Support” pp. 49- 68 in Cardwell, Michael N,; Grossman, Margaret Rosso; and Rodgers, 
Christopher P. (Eds.). Agriculture and International Trade: Law, Policy, and the WTO. Cambridge, 
MA: CABI Publishing. 
 
G20. 2005. “Two Years of Activities of the G20: Moving Forward the Doha Round.” 
http://www.g-20.mre.gov.br/conteudo/19082005_Breviario.pdf 
 
Gupta, Akhil. 1998. Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of modern India. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
 
Hajer, Maarten A. 1995. The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and 
the Policy Process. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Harvey, David. 2005:  Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press: 
 
Harvey, David. 2007. Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction. The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 610: 22- 44. 
 
Hoda, Anwarul and Gulati, Ashok. 2007. WTO Negotiations on Agriculture and Developing 
Countries. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
 
International Trade Center. 2013. “Country – India.” http://www.intracen.org/country/india/ 
[accessed 11/14/13] 
 
International Monetary Fund. 1998. “World Economic Outlook: Financial Crises: Causes and 
Indicators.”  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/weo0598/ [accessed 3/37/14] 
 
International Monetary Fund. 2002. “World Economic Outlook: Recessions and Recoveries.”  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2002/01/ [accessed 3/37/14] 
 
International Monetary Fund. 2007. “World Economic Outlook: Spillovers and Cycles in the 
Global Economy.”  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/ [accessed 3/37/14] 
233 
 
 
James, Oliver and Lodge, Martin. 2003. The Limitations of ‘Policy Transfer’ and ‘Lesson Drawing’ 
for Public Policy Research. Political Studies Review 1: 179- 193. 
 
Jessop, Bob. 2002. “Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A State-Theoretical 
Perspective.” Antipode 34(3): 452-457. 
 
Josling, Timothy. 2000. “Agriculture and the Next WTO Round.” pp. 91- 117 in Schott, Jeffrey J. 
(Ed). 2000. The WTO After Seattle. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics. 
 
Krugman, Paul. 2009. “How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?” The New York Times Magazine 
(Sep 2). http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html?pagewanted=all  
[accessed 3/28/14] 
 
Kux, Dennis. 1992. India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941- 1991. 
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. 
 
Kwa, Aileen & Jawara, Fatoumata. 2004. Behind the scenes at the WTO: the real world of 
international trade negotiations/ the Lessons of Cancun - Updated Edition. London: Zed Books. 
 
Laclau, E; and Mouffe, C. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso. 
 
Laidi, Zaki. 2008. How Trade Became Geopolitics. World Policy Journal (Summer). 
 
Larner, Wendy and Laurie, Nina. 2010. Travelling technocrats, embodied knowledges: 
Globalising privatization in telecoms and water. Geoforum 41: 218- 226. 
 
Lee, Donna and Smith, Nicola J. 2008. The Political Economy of Small African States in the WTO. 
The Round Table 97 (395): 259- 271. 
 
McCann, Eugene and Ward, Kevin. 2010. Relationality/territoriality: Toward a conceptualization 
of cities in the world. Geoforum 41: 175-184. 
 
McCann, Eugene and Ward, Kevin. 2012. Policy Assemblages, Mobilities and Mutations: Toward 
a Multidisciplinary Conversation. Political Studies Review 10 (3): 325-332. 
 
McCann, Eugene. 2011. Urban Policy Mobilities and Global Circuits of Knowledge: Toward a 
Research Agenda. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 101 (1): 107- 130. 
 
McKay, Deidre. 2002. “Negotiating Positions: Exchanging Life Stories in Research Interviews.” 
pp. 186- 199 in Moss, Pamela (ed) Feminist Geography in Practice: Research and Methods.  
Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
 
Malhotra, Inder. 2010. “Swallowing the Humiliation”. Indian Express (July 12). 
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/swallowing-the-humiliation/645168/2 [accessed 
3/24/14] 
 
234 
 
Marsh, David and Sharman, J.C. 2009. Policy Diffusion and Policy Transfer. Policy Studies. 30 (3): 
269-288. 
 
Merill, Dennis. 1990. Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India’s Economic Development, 
1947- 1963. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Mitchell, Timothy. 1988. Colonizing Egypt. Berkley: University of California Press. 
 
Mitchell, Timothy. 1991. “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics.” 
American Political Science Review, 85(1): 77- 96. 
 
Mohammad, Robina. 2001. “‘Insiders’ and/or ‘outsiders’: positionality, theory, and practice” pp. 
101- 117 in Limb, Melanie and Dwyer, Claire (eds) Qualitative Methodologies for Geographers: 
Issues and Debates.  NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Mukherjee, Rohan and Malone, David M. 2011. From High Ground to High Table: The Evolution 
of Indian Multilateralism. Global Governance 17: 311- 329. 
 
Painter, J. 1995. Politics, Geography, and Political Geography: A Critical Perspective. London: 
Arnold. 
 
Peck, Jamie. 2004. “Geography and public policy: constructions of neoliberalism.” Progress in 
Human Geography 28 (3): 392-405. 
 
Peck, Jamie. 2010. Construction of Neoliberal Reason.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Peck, Jamie and Theodore, Nik. 2001. Exporting workfare/importing welfare-to-work: Exploring 
the politics Third Way policy transfer. Political Geography 20: 427- 460. 
 
Peck, Jamie and Theodore, Nik. 2010. Mobilizing policy: Models, methods, and mutations. 
Geoforum 41: 169- 174. 
 
Peck, Jamie; and Theodore, Nik; Brenner, Neil. 2012. Neoliberalism Resurgent? Market Rule 
after the Great Recession. The South Atlantic Quarterly 111 (2): 265- 288. 
 
Peet, Richard. 2007. Geography of Power: The Making of Global Economic Policy. London: Zed 
Books. 
 
Prince, Russell. 2012a. Policy transfer, consultants, and the geographies of governance. Progress 
in Human Geography 36(2): 188-203. 
 
Prince, Russell. 2012b. Metaphors of Policy Mobility: Fluid Spaces of “Creativity” Policy. 
Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography 94 (4): 317- 331. 
 
Ranjan, Prabhash. 2005. “How Long can the G-20 Hold Itself Together?” CENTAD, Center for 
Trade and Development (an Oxfam initiative). 
http://www.atisweb.org/sections/wto_G20/analysis/2005/february/pdf/G20_Hold_Itself.pdf 
 
235 
 
Rose, Gillian. 1997. “Situating Knowledge: positionality, reflexivities, and other tactics.” 
 Progress in Human Geography, 21 (3): 305-320. 
 
Rose, Richard. 1991. What is lesson drawing? Journal of Public Policy 11: 3- 30. 
 
Rose, Richard. 1993. Lesson-drawing in Public Policy: a Guide to Learning across Time and Space. 
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. 
 
Sharma, Ashok B. 2005. “G-20 Meet Creates Grand Alliance of the Third World Countries.” The 
Financial Express (Mar 21). 
http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=85772 
 
Sharma, Shefali. 2009. Delhi Mini-Ministerial on Doha: High Stakes to Break an ‘Impasse’? 
Economic & Political Weekly 44 (34): 12- 14. 
 
Skelton, Tracey. 2001. “Cross-cultural research: issues, positionality, and race” pp. 87- 100 in 
Limb, Melanie and Dwyer, Claire (eds) Qualitative Methodologies for Geographers: Issues and 
Debates.  NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sklair, Leslie. 2001. The Transnational Capitalist Class. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.  
 
Sparke, Matthew. 2003. “American Empire and Globalisation: Postcolonial Speculations on 
Neocolonial Enframing.” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 24(3): 373- 389. 
 
Sparke, Matthew. 2004, “Political Geographies of Globalization: (1) Dominance,” Progress in 
Human Geography. 28(6) 777–794 
 
Sparke, Matthew. 2005. In the Space of Theory: Postfoundational Geographies of the Nation-
State. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based bargaining and 
Outcomes in the WTO/GATT. International Organization 56 (2): 339- 374. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2002. Globalization and its Discontents. NY: W. W. Norton & Co. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2008. “The End of Neo-liberalism.” Project Syndicate: The World’s Opinion 
Page (July 1). http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-end-of-neo-liberalism- 
[accessed 3/28/14] 
 
Stone, Diane. 2000. Non-Governmental Policy Transfer: The Strategies of Independent Policy 
Institutes. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13 (1): 45- 62. 
 
Stone, Diane. 2004. Transfer agents and global networks in the ‘transnationalization’ of policy. 
Journal of European Public Policy 11 (3): 545- 566. 
 
Swyngedouw, Erik. 1997. “Neither Global nor Local - ‘Glocalization’ and the Politics of Scale” pp. 
137-166 in Cox, Kevin R. (Ed). 1997. Spaces of Globalization. Reasserting the Power of the Local. 
New York: The Guilford Press. 
236 
 
 
Taylor, P. 1994. “The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World System.” Progress in 
Human Geography, 18(3): 151- 162. 
 
United Nations. Member States of the United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/members/ 
[accessed 3/27/14] 
 
US Government. 2014. Countries Ranked by Size 2011, 2025, and 2050. 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/pdf/cb11-116idb_table1.pdf [accessed 3/24/14] 
 
Wade, Robert Hunter. 2003. “What strategies are viable for developing countries today? The 
World Trade Organization and the shrinking of ‘development space.’” Review of International 
Political Economy, 10(14): 621-644. 
 
World Bank. 2014. Data, by country, India. http://data.worldbank.org/country/india [accessed 
3/24/14] 
 
WTO. 1998a. “Trade Policy Reviews: First Press Release, Secretariat and Government 
Summaries; India, April 1998.” PRESS/TPRB/71. 
 
WTO. 1998b. “Trade Policy Reviews: Second Press Release and Chairperson’s Conclusions; India, 
April 1998.” PRESS/TPRB/73. 
 
WTO. 1998c. “Trade Policy Review: India: Minutes of Meeting.” WT/TPR/M/33. 
 
WTO. 2002a. “Trade Policy Reviews: First Press Release, Secretariat and Government Summaries 
India, June 2002.” PRESS/TPRB/195. 
 
WTO. 2002b. “Trade Policy Reviews: Second Press Release and Chairperson’s Conclusions; India, 
June 2002.” PRESS/TPRB/196. 
 
WTO. 2002c. “Trade Policy Review: India: Minutes of Meeting.” WT/TPR/M/100. 
 
WTO. 2007a. “Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat: India.” WT/TPR/S/182 18 April 
2007. 
 
WTO. 2007b. “Trade Policy Review, Report by India.” WT/TPR/G/182 18 April 2007. 
 
WTO. 2007c. “Trade Policy Review, India: Minutes of Meeting.” WT/TPR/M/182 April 2007. 
 
WTO. 2013a. “Trade Policy Reviews.” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm 
 
WTO. 2013b. “Uruguay Round: Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.”  
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm 
 
WTO. 2013c. “Text of the ‘July package’ — the General Council’s post-Cancun decision” 
  
237 
 
Vita 
Christopher L.  Blackden 
 
Education 
Current Doctoral Candidate, Geography 
University of Kentucky 
Dissertation: “Transnational Policy Articulations: India, Agriculture, and the 
WTO” 
  PhD expected 2013 
 
2005  MA, Geography 
University of Kentucky 
Thesis: “Cotton Nation: Scale, Sovereignty, and the WTO” 
 
2003  Double BA, Geography/ Anthropology and Economics 
  Minor in Biological Science 
  University of Southern Maine 
 
Awards 
2008  “Doctoral Dissertation Research: Transnational Policy Articulations: India, 
Agriculture, and the WTO.” National Science Foundation Award #0802518.   
 
2005-2006 G. Etzel Pearcy Fellowship in Geopolitics, Geography Department, University of 
Kentucky 
 
2004 Daniel R. Reedy Quality Achievement Award, the Graduate School, University of 
Kentucky 
 
2003-2004 Academic Fellowship, the Graduate School, University of Kentucky   
 
2003  Daniel R. Reedy Quality Achievement Award, the Graduate School, University of 
Kentucky 
 
2001 Frank Hodges Geography Excellence Award, Department of Geography/ 
Anthropology, University of Southern Maine 
 
Professional Experience 
2012  Research Associate 
  Kentucky Transportation Center 
  University of Kentucky 
 
2012  Teaching Assistant (discussion section leader) 
  University of Kentucky 
  Geo 163: Global Conflicts 
 
2011  Teaching Assistant (discussion section leader) 
  University of Kentucky 
238 
 
  Geo 160: Lands and Peoples of the Non-Western World 
 
2009- 2011 Part-time Instructor (2 Winter Intersessions) 
  University of Kentucky 
  Geo 160: Lands and Peoples of the Non-Western World 
 
2010  GIS Specialist 
  Appalachian Center 
  University of Kentucky  
 
2009  Research Assistant/ GIS Consultant, 
Lexington Community Food Assessment 
University of Kentucky 
   
2009  Teaching Assistant (full class responsibility) 
  Geo 160: Lands and Peoples of the Non-Western World 
University of Kentucky 
   
2008  GIS Specialist 
Kentucky Parks Department 
 
2008  Teaching Assistant (full class responsibility) 
  Geo 365: GIS Fundamentals 
  University of Kentucky 
   
2006  RA/ GIS Lab Manager 
  University of Kentucky 
   
2004- 2007 Teaching Assistant (TA helper) 
Geo 130: Intro Physical Geog, Geo 160: Lands and Peoples of the Non-Western 
World, Geo 300: Research Meth, Geo 309: Intro GIS, Geo 409: GIS Fundamentals 
University of Kentucky 
 
2003  Teaching Assistant, Political Economy (Eco 303) 
  University of Southern Maine 
 
2002  Teaching Assistant, Intro to GIS (Geo 199) 
  University of Southern Maine 
 
2000 – 2003  GIS lab proctor/ tutor 
  University of Southern Maine 
 
2002  GIS Consultant 
  Greater Portland Council of Governments 
   
2001  Intern (GIS, web programming) 
  Greater Portland Council of Governments 
 
239 
 
Publications 
Blackden, Chris. 2009. “Prelude to Cancun: India's trade policy reviews under the World Trade 
Organization” in Anshu (ed.), Food Security in India: Challenges of 21st Century. Patna,  India: 
Kalakriti Offset. 
 
Blackden, Chris. 2010. “World Trade Organization (WTO).” Entry in Warf, Barney (lead ed.) 
Encyclopedia of Geography. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc. 
 
Conference Presentations 
“Think Tanks: Postcolonial Delhi, Neoliberalism, and the Role of Intellectuals” [Co-authored with 
Priyanka Jain]. American Associations of Geographers (AAG), Las Vegas, Nevada.  Mar, 2009 
 
“Prelude To Cancun: India’s 2002 Trade Policy Review before the World Trade Organization.”  
National Workshop on Food Security In India – Problems And Prospects, Delhi, India.  Nov, 2008. 
 
“Sovereignty without Borders, Violence without Arms: India, Agriculture, and the WTO.”  
American Associations of Geographers (AAG), Boston, Massachusetts.  Apr, 2008. 
 
“ ‘The Decider’ or Sovereignty without Borders.” Critical Geography Conference, Lexington, KY. 
Oct, 2007. 
 
“Metasovereign.” American Associations of Geographers (AAG), San Francisco, Ca.  Apr, 2007 
 
“Modes of Power in the WTO.” Critical Geography Conference, Columbus, Ohio.  Oct, 2006 
 
“Embodying Abstraction: the Sovereign in All of Us.” Seventh Annual International Social Theory 
Consortium Conference, Roanoke, Virginia. May 2006 
 
“The WTO as a ‘Quasi-State’.” American Associations of Geographers (AAG), Chicago, Il.  Mar, 
2006 
 
 
 
 
 
240 
 
